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1. Introduction
One of the most important objectives of tort law is to provide potential injurers
and victims appropriate precautionary incentives to avoid an accident when undertak-
ing risky activities.1 Since the pioneering work of Trimarchi (1959a,b, 1961, 1967),
Calabresi (1961), Posner (1972), Brown (1973) and Shavell (1980), tort law scholars
have stressed the social goal to minimize accident costs and the deterrent function of
liability rules, namely the threats of being held liable and uncompensated injury in-
duce parties in an accident setting to take optimal care. The application of economic
concepts to tort has undergone a rapid development in the US and has also clearly ex-
panded to other continents. In the last 40 years, the literature has developed so quickly
that an encyclopedia completely devoted to tort has become necessary (Faure, 2009a).2
Notwithstanding the exhaustive number of contributions on tort law and economics,
1Tort law is frequently said to serve two purposes: the compensation of victims and the deterrence
of accident (e.g., Shapiro, 1991). The dominant perspective of the economic analysis of tort law is to
evaluate the efﬁciency of liability rules in terms of the precautions and activity-level incentives that they
create. This economic interpretation of tort law is not the only one, although it has undoubtedly become
the dominant perspective. See Parisi (2001) for a historical perspective on the development of tort law.
See also Posner (1972), Dewees et al. (1996), Kaplow and Shavell (2002, p.151) showing that tort law
is a slow and expensive way of providing compensation.
2The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics was published in 2000 by De Geest and Bouckaert, and
builds on the Bibliography of Law and Economics (De Geest and Bouckaert, 1992). Both these volumes
merely contained literature references to the various domains of law and economics. Faure (2009a)
collected topics exclusively related to the economics of tort.
there remain several open questions and different issues that warrant further investiga-
tion. The general aim of my research project is to reﬁne the traditional model of tort law
in the attempt to make it more realistic, updated with the recent technological progress
and in line with the experimental results concerning other-regarding preferences.
This thesis is divided into six chapters: Chapters 1 (this chapter) and 6 provide an
introduction and conclusions, respectively, while the remaining chapters are written in
the form of separate yet related articles. Different methodologies are used to investi-
gate four main issues that have been understudied in the extant literature: the efﬁcient
allocation of residual liability (Chapter 2); the characterization of efﬁcient liability sys-
tems in accidents involving automated technologies (Chapter 3); the optimal deﬁnition
of legal presumptions in a tort setting (Chapter 4); and the actual precautionary behav-
ior of potential injurers and victims (Chapter 5). In the following, I will highlight the
research questions and discuss their social and academic relevance, as well as explain
the methodology adopted to address each research question.
The ﬁrst research topic deals with the efﬁciency of liability rules in terms of activity-
level incentives (Chapter 2). The distinction between care level and activity level af-
fects the entire economic analysis of law (see, among others, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi,
2006 and Parisi, 2013). Polinsky (1980) and Shavell (1980) independently highlighted
the relevance of this distinction when the criterion of negligence is used to establish
liability, as well as its irrelevance in the regimes of strict liability and no liability.
The care level refers to the observable precautions used by courts to ascertain negli-
gence, and indicates the quality of parties’ precautionary efforts in carrying out their
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activities (e.g., vehicle speed, observing road signals). The activity level refers to the
other factors that are not taken into account by courts to ascertain negligence and it
indicates the quantity (i.e., intensity and duration) of the parties’ activities (e.g., how
many miles the tortfeasor drove, how often the victim crossed the intersection). The
efﬁciency-equivalence theorem and the activity-level theorem are the two fundamental
results in the economic analysis of law based upon the distinction between care and
activity levels. The efﬁciency-equivalence theorem states that under any fault-based
liability system, both parties have optimal incentives to comply with the due-care stan-
dards, regardless of the loss-sharing rule among negligent parties (Landes and Posner,
1980). Shavell’s (1980) activity-level theorem states that none of the standard liability
rules can provide both parties efﬁcient incentives with respect to activity levels.
The traditional analysis of accident law primarily focuses on care incentives and
on the optimal deﬁnition of standards of negligence. Plausibly, the relative lack of
scholarly interest in “non-negligent” accidents may be attributable to a sense of resig-
nation that optimal activity levels are unachievable under traditional tort rules, along
with concerns about the accessibility of activity-level information. However, under any
fault-based liability system, prospective injurers and potential victims have incentives
to comply with due-care standards (Landes and Posner, 1980), and some of the acci-
dents that occur in reality arise despite the due diligence of the individuals involved.
For this reason, the allocation of the residual liability plays a crucial role in minimizing
expected accident losses and it warrants more attention.
It is commonly ascertained that only the residual bearer (i.e., the party that bears
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accident costs in equilibrium) has incentives to reduce his or her activity level (Shavell,
1980). Residual liability is traditionally allocated either entirely on the tortfeasor
(strict-liability-based rules) or entirely on the victim (negligence-based rules). Dari-
Mattiacci and Parisi (2013) and Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014) provide an exhaustive
overview of the allocation of the residual liability under the traditional liability sys-
tems. The effect of this all-or-nothing allocation is that one party (the bearer of residual
liability) is fully incentivized to undertake an optimal level of activity, while the other
(the non-bearer of residual liability) has no legal incentives to mitigate his or her ac-
tivity level. Recent contributions have discussed the possibility of sharing the residual
loss, showing that loss-sharing rules do not undermine parties’ compliance with due-
care standards. More speciﬁcally, Parisi and Fon (2004) studied the efﬁciency of com-
parative causation, under which the residual loss is shared among parties based upon
their causal contribution to the accident. Parisi and Fon showed that parties’ incentives
to undertake due-care levels are preserved even when the residual loss is shared, while
the incentives to exert excessive activity levels are mitigated for both parties. Parisi
and Singh (2010) revisited this issue, highlighting the virtues and desirable properties
of the rule of comparative causation, providing further proof that loss-sharing rules are
efﬁcient in creating optimal care incentives. In their ﬁnal remarks, Parisi and Singh
(2010) raised the question about the conditions under which the rule of comparative
causation should be preferred to alternative liability rules in real-life contexts. This can
be seen as a speciﬁc version of the research question posed in Chapter 2 of this work.
In fact, having acknowledged that loss-sharing rules might be a valuable alternative to
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traditional all-or-nothing based rules since parties’ compliance with due-care levels is
not undermined, the question that emerges is when loss-sharing should be employed
in place of all-or-nothing rules and vice-versa. Particularly relevant to Chapter 2 is the
most recent contribution on this topic by Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014), who studied a
generic fault-based liability rule in which the accident loss is shared among negligent
parties and non-negligent parties. They generalized the compatibility of loss-sharing
rules with optimal care incentives and provided examples on the optimal loss-sharing
rule among non-negligent parties when parties’ activities are independent of each other
in the production of the expected accident loss.
The choice between all-or-nothing based rules and loss-sharing rules as alternative
allocation of the residual liability has always been taken as given and has only recently
been slightly challenged (Parisi and Fon, 2004; Singh, 2006; Parisi and Singh, 2010;
Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2014). For this reason, the question about which party should
bear the accident costs if care incentives work (i.e., both parties adopt the due level of
care) happens to be a crucial question. Therefore, this study ﬁrst aims to answer the
following research question:
1. Under what conditions are traditional all-or-nothing based rules more desirable
than loss-sharing rules in terms of activity-level incentives?
In order to inﬂuence activity-level incentives, it becomes fundamental to ﬁrst an-
alyze the characteristics of parties’ activities (e.g., riskiness, value) and subsequently
study the optimal allocation of the residual loss. The key insight of Chapter 2 is that the
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allocation of the residual liability should not be treated as given. Traditional economic
models of accident law allocate the residual loss on either one party or the other, with-
out accounting for the relevant characteristics of parties’ activities. In other words, tort
scholars have conventionally treated the residual liability as an exogenous variable in
their models. The analysis in Chapter 2 adds to the literature by considering the allo-
cation of residual liability as an endogenous variable, which should optimally depend
on the relevant characteristics of parties’ activities.
Chapter 2 considers six factors embedded in the cheapest-cost-avoider principle
(Calabresi, 1970). Speciﬁcally, through a more generalized accident model, Chapter
2 explores all possible relationships between the riskiness and the value of activities,
the interaction of the parties’ activities in the production of risk, returns to scale from
the activities, and parties’ relative risk preferences. These factors – which have been
almost entirely overlooked in the current literature, with the exception of Nell and
Richter (1996) on parties’ risk preferences and Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014) on the
riskiness of parties’ activities – should optimally guide the allocation of liability costs
among faultless parties. The analysis of these factors allows identifying the optimal
allocation of residual liability.
Regarding the methodology, this chapter extends the theoretical frameworks used
by Singh (2006), Parisi and Singh (2010) and Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014) following
two steps. First, it is proven that under a general fault-based liability system, parties
have incentives to comply with the (second-best) due-care standards. Second, the so-
cially optimal allocation of the residual loss is analyzed as depending upon the relevant
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characteristics of parties’ activities. The optimization problem is formulated as a two-
stage model where parties’ activity and care choices in the second stage are affected
by the initial-stage deﬁnitions of the due-care levels and the sharing rule between non-
negligent parties by the social planner. This essentially means that the social planner
designs the optimal liability scheme by anticipating the parties’ reactions to marginal
increases in liability share.
The results show that loss-sharing rules are more desirable than conventional all-
or-nothing based rules in a large range of conditions, such as in the presence of homo-
geneous risk avoiders (e.g., parties whose activities have the same degree of riskiness,
parties with similar attitudes towards risk) and countervailing policy objectives (e.g., a
party’s activity is riskier yet more valuable than that of the other party).
Residual liability is not only relevant with respect to activity-level incentives, but
also for investments in new precaution technologies. My second research question
focuses on a speciﬁc type of safety technology, i.e., automated technology, such as
driverless cars and automated drones. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of such automated
technologies on the law of torts.
Modern automated technologies replace human actions and autonomously perform
activities in a broad range of potentially harmful situations, such as driving vehicles,
delivering packs, performing surgery operations, unloading trucks and stock merchan-
dise. In doing so, automated technologies remove risk and errors from individuals
and place them on autonomous machines. This reduces the probability of negligent
harm (e.g., excessive speed, inattention or intoxication causing a road crash), as well
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as the probability of “unavoidable accidents” (Grady, 2009), i.e., expected harm that
the actor could not have foreseen or prevented by exercising reasonable precautions
(e.g., a driver losing the control of the car due to health problems, obstacles running
out in front of a car and the driver having insufﬁcient time to avoid it).3 At the same
time, this welfare-enhancing shift of tasks from product-users to automated devices
raises the question of how to apportion liability among manufacturers, product users
and third parties: should negligence law change to encourage the development and
adoption of safer automated technologies?
Consider as an example the case for driverless cars. Google and major car manu-
facturers have developed vehicle prototypes capable of driving, parking and navigat-
ing without direct human input (Greene, 2011). This evolution of the automotive
know-how offers the potential to change the concept and the network of transporta-
tion, promising invaluable social beneﬁts such as saving lives by reducing the number
of road crashes,4 reducing liability claims and insurance costs, lowering fuel consump-
tions and pollution,5 assisting people who cannot safely drive, and, ultimately increas-
ing productivity in daily commuting. This technology is almost ready but despite its
beneﬁcial impact, only a few U.S. states have authorized the operation of these vehi-
3See the deﬁnition of “unavoidable accident” in Restatement (Second) Torts (St. Paul, Minn.: Amer-
ican Law Institute, 1965), §8, 8 A, 435 (1965): “The words ‘unavoidable accident’ are used throughout
the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that the harm which is so described is not caused by
any tortious act of the one whose conduct is in question.”. See also Grady (2009): “In negligence law,
‘unavoidable accident’ is the risk that remains when an actor has used due care. The counterpart of
unavoidable accident is ‘negligent harm’.”.
4By replacing human actions with autonomous technologies, it is estimated that nearly 1,9 million
of accidents could be prevented, and 9,600 lives could be saved each year if 50 percent of vehicles in
the U.S. were self-driving (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2013).
5Considering again the estimates by the Eno Center for Transportation, economic annual savings
could reach $102 billion ($211 billion, comprehensive) with a 50 percent autonomous vehicles market
penetration rate.
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cles for testing purposes to date. Beyond technological concerns, the real challenge of
self-driving cars lies in unanswered liability questions (Marchant and Lindor, 2012).
One of the most debated is: who is liable for accident involving driverless cars? If be-
ing distracted, sleepy or intoxicated does not constitute negligent behavior, should the
driver still be directly liable for accidents happening without his direct contribution?
The answer to these questions depends upon two objectives of the tort system,
namely incentivizing both the production and adoption of new safety technologies.
The economic literature on liability law regarding innovative automated technologies
remains at an embryonic stage. The conventional economic conception of tort law has
indeed assumed the existence of two human actors — a tortfeasor and a victim — al-
though this assumption becomes tenuous with the advancement of automated technolo-
gies. My second contribution stands as the ﬁrst attempt to introduce automation in the
traditional model of accident law to evaluate whether and how the current negligence-
based liability system should evolve to encourage the creation of a market for new
automated technologies. Accordingly, my second research question is the following:
2. Is the current fault-based liability system still adaptable to robotic torts?
Even if errors may occur at substantially lower rates with robots as compared with
humans, accidents will nevertheless occur. Legal systems thus have to deﬁne the extent
to which individuals should be held liable for what an artiﬁcial system “decides” to do.
This is one of the most innovative aspects in the ﬁeld of the laws of tort. Chapter 3
addresses this issue and uses a unilateral-care model with automated activity to deter-
mine whether and how negligence law should “evolve” to deal with injuries caused by
9
automated technology.
Although the economic literature addresses the elements of automated technology
torts, such as durable precautions and compliance-saving technology (e.g., Grady,
2009), and the legal literature addresses certain specialized questions about the tort
implications of automated technologies (e.g., Garza, 2011), no one has yet introduced
a general theoretical approach to robot torts. Chapter 3 employs a unilateral-care tort
model (i.e., the accident rates only depend upon the behavior of the tortfeasor) to ana-
lyze the social cost of accidents in cases where the actor is not a human being, but rather
an automated technology. This chapter builds upon Shavell’s (1980; 1987) unilateral
accident model to incorporate the level of activity automation adopted by potential in-
jurers. Automated technologies are modeled by using two assumptions: ﬁrst, advances
in automation reduce the effectiveness of the end-user’s precautions; and second, hu-
man precautionary care and automated technology safety are substitutes. Accordingly,
the probability of an accident occurring decreases as the level of activity automation
or the level of care increase. It follows that an increase in automation leads the prob-
ability of an accident to decrease. In the limiting case when no investment is made in
automation, our model simply reduces to the standard model.
The main result of Chapter 3 shows the desirability of a negligence standard tai-
lored to activity automation. More speciﬁcally, the standard of due-care should be
optimally tailored to activity automation and should decrease as investments in au-
tomation increase. This would create more incentives to adopt safer automated tech-
nologies rather than averaged care standards. The decision to also tailor negligence
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standards to automated-activity levels should depend upon the trade-off between two
policy objectives, namely incentivizing the adoption of automated technologies versus
controlling excessive automated-activity levels, whereby a negligence standard tailored
to the automated-activity level creates optimal incentives for automated-activity levels
but dilutes the incentives to adopt and use automated devices.
It is worth noting that tort law usually work in tandem with regulation. Indeed,
tort law and regulation are two alternative and, in practice, complementary approaches
of achieving safety (Calabresi, 1970). Regulation contributes to safety through an ex
ante mechanism, whereas the tort system through an ex post mechanism. Under the
liability system of corrective justice, wrongdoers are required to compensate victims
for injuries caused by a wrong, with the main goal of generating precautionary incen-
tive streams and inducing parties to internalize the costs of wrongdoing; whereas the
regulatory system imposes sanctions for violations. The relationship between tort law
and regulation is highly debated (see, among others, Shavell, 1984). Product liabil-
ity and medical malpractice are considered as the most difﬁcult areas of tort law (see,
among other, Faure, 2000, discussing whether product liability and product safety in
Europe should be regulated in a decentralised or centralised manner). In these cases
parties are not strangers between each others as in classic tort situations, but they are
in a preaccident relationship as sellers and buyers or doctor and patient. Some critics
pointed out the advantages of ex ante regulations in these areas where technical infor-
mation about health and products are relevant to harm and courts lack of expertise and
technical staff to deal with such issues (Viscusi, 1984). In these cases, the tort system
11
can become extremely expensive because of high transactions and administrative costs
including legal fees. These costs can be much greater than either private insurance
or regulatory cost, and could make the tort system not an efﬁcient system for com-
pensation of victims. In practice, however, torts and regulations are complementary
and their joint use is generally socially desirable (Shavell, 1984). For example, tort
law can work in tandem statutory regulation when regulatory standards are designed
to establish a baseline which a more precise tort doctrine can supplement or when tort
doctrines apply absent a more stringent regulatory statute. These arguments certainly
hold for automated technologies; for example, the user of a driverless car deciding to
manipulate the car speed limit must consider the possibility of liability in case of an
accident for wrongful manipulation of the automated technology as well as a speeding
ticket. The main focus of Chapter 3 is upon tort law and negligence-based liability sys-
tems. My framework can be further extended to consider the desirability of the joint
use between tort law and regulation in the presence of automated activities. Indeed,
the application of due-care standards tailored to activity automation might lead to high
administrative costs and might make regulation preferable to tort law.
Beyond liability and regulation systems, automated technologies could potentially
affect the law of evidence. Indeed, the more that these machines become interactive
and autonomous, the more that third parties will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to prove that the man-
ufacturer or the product-user did not conform to a certain standard of conduct. In these
cases, questioning the traditional allocation of the burden of proof upon the plaintiffs
appears to hold crucial importance. My third research question proceeds along this
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path by questioning the conventional deﬁnition of legal presumptions in a tort setting.
Chapter 4 explores the incentive effects of legal presumptions on a tort setting,
which is an important dimension that should inform the allocation of the burden of
producing evidence in a contested issue. The core questions of Chapter 4 are as fol-
lows: how should the burden of proof be allocated among parties to foster the adoption
of evidence technologies? How should the burden of proof be allocated in the pres-
ence of discovery errors to preserve parties’ care incentives? How should the burden
of proof be allocated to mitigate excessive activity levels?
Legal presumptions can be either “pro plaintiff ” in the sense that the defendant has
to prove his diligence (the burden of producing evidence is on the defendant, thereby
creating a presumption of negligence on the defendant) or “pro defendant,” in the sense
that the plaintiff has to prove the defendant’s negligence (the burden of producing ev-
idence is on the plaintiff, thereby creating a presumption of non-negligence on the
defendant). The law of evidence generally places the burden of producing evidence
on plaintiffs, de facto creating a presumption of non-negligence in favor of the defen-
dant (Talley, 2013). In the event of a negligent accident, this means that a victim is
generally faced with the burden of producing evidence about the negligent behavior
of his tortfeasor, as a condition for establishing liability and obtaining compensation
even if the content of the required evidence relates to the activity of the defendant
(Sanchirico, 2008). Previous contributions on the burden of proof (with the exception
of Sanchirico, 2008) explained the choice of presumptions based upon parties’ relative
cost of discovery (Hay, 1997; Hay and Spier, 1997; Shin, 1998), truth-ﬁnding by the
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court (Sanchirico, 2004), and litigation incentives (Sanchirico, 2008). The question
arising here is why evidence law generally shift the burden of proof onto the plaintiff
(presumption of non-negligence on the defendant) rather than the defendant (presump-
tion of negligence on the defendant), even when the required evidence relates to the
activity of the defendant.
The analysis in Chapter 4 adds to this literature by focusing on the effect of evi-
dence rules on tort incentives, which is an overlooked dimension that should inform
the choice of legal presumptions. The aim of Chapter 4 follows in a straightforward
manner, namely to investigate the optimal allocation of the burden of proof between
the plaintiff and the defendant based upon parties’ access to the relevant information
and the probability of discovery errors. The analytical move of this analysis lies in the
interrelated roles that legal presumptions play in a tort setting, whereby the allocation
of the burden of proof affects the adoption of evidence technologies, the parties’ in-
centives with respect to care levels, and the parties’ incentives with respect to activity
levels. The third question of my research project is thus threefold:
3. How does the availability of new evidentiary technology affect the optimal def-
inition of legal presumptions? How should legal presumptions be deﬁned to
preserve parties’ care incentives in the presence of evidentiary problems? How
should legal presumptions be deﬁned to create optimal incentives with respect to
activity levels?
Chapter 4 proceeds stepwise by analyzing these three factors. The analysis shows
that the conventional allocation of the burden of proof onto the plaintiff could be not
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efﬁcient in three situations: when the defendant can more effectively invest in evidence
technology; when the plaintiff has a high probability of making discovery errors; and
when the plaintiff is already burdened by the residual liability.
Regarding the ﬁrst situation, it is worth stressing that the incentives to adopt pri-
vate fact-keeping technologies, i.e., technologies privately adopted by individuals to
collect information about present events and preserve it for future investigations, are
endogenously determined by evidence law. Under existing presumption rules, this
could reduce or, in some cases, entirely undermine the parties’ incentives to adopt
such technology. Indeed, if the information gathered by private fact-keeping technolo-
gies (e.g., Snapshot technology) could be used in court against the driver in the event
of an accident, the likelihood that any driver might want to adopt such technology
would obviously diminish. In terms of the second situation, a shift of the burden of
proof between the defendant and the plaintiff affects the parties’ care-level incentives
when adjudication errors are present. This reﬁnes and extends the analysis by Hay
and Spier (1997), which argued that the choice between two alternative legal presump-
tions in a hypothetical world of error-free adjudication would leave care incentives
unchanged. To illustrate the point, consider the rule of simple negligence. Suppose
that the plaintiff is likely to fail to prove the tortfeasor’s negligence and consequently
the tortfeasor is likely to avoid liability notwithstanding his negligence. In this case,
evidence problems may dilute a tortfeasor’s care incentives. The defendant will only
undertake optimal care if the probability that the plaintiff will be able to prove the
defendant’s negligence is sufﬁciently high. However, as probatory difﬁculties for the
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plaintiff increase, a simple negligence rule gradually degenerates into a no liability
rule, thus undermining the prospective defendant’s care incentives. A change in the
legal presumption could mitigate this problem. If a presumption of negligence on the
tortfeasor applies, the tortfeasor may fail to produce evidence of his own diligence and
thus he may bear full liability notwithstanding his diligence. At the limit, when the
proof of non-negligence is excessively costly, the simple negligence rule would degen-
erate into the strict liability rule, preserving primary care level incentives. Chapter 4
shows that a similar analysis applies to other negligence-based liability regimes, such
as the regime of strict liability with contributory negligence. The third role of legal
presumptions in a tort setting is related to activity-level incentives, which are not only
inﬂuenced by the allocation of the residual liability but also by the allocation of the
burden of proof. Indeed, a shift of legal presumptions between parties can either de-
press the activity levels of the residual bearer below the social optimum, or mitigate
the excessive activity levels of the non-residual bearer. In a negligence regime, a pre-
sumption of negligence would thus be desirable, since it shifts the burden of proof onto
the party who is not already burdened by the residual liability, thereby inducing both
parties to mitigate excessive activity levels.
Evidence technologies and incentives on care and activity levels are factors that
have been overlooked in the traditional literature on evidence law, despite being crucial
for the optimal allocation of the burden of proof in a tort setting. The analysis in
Chapter 4 reﬂects the ﬁrst attempt to highlight these additional factors, and further
extensions are possible to better answer the question “which party should produce
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evidence on a contested issue?”. Chapters 4 and 6 discuss future investigations on this
topic (e.g., what is the optimal allocation of the burden of proof in a tort setting when
all the three factors identiﬁed in Chapter 4 point in different directions?).
A ﬁnal note on Chapter 4 concerns the methodology. The theoretical framework
used in Chapter 4 follows Shavell (1980) and Hay and Spier (1997) in studying the
optimal allocation of the burden of proof when discovery errors are considered. Chap-
ter 4 uses a simple unilateral-care framework to analyze whether a change in the legal
presumption could preserve parties’ care incentives in the presence of large discovery
errors. This theoretical setup is also used to study parties’ incentives to invest in pri-
vate fact-keeping technologies under alternative allocation of the burden of proof. The
analytical move here is to assume that the probability of discovery error is close to zero
when the party with the burden of providing evidence adopts evidentiary technologies.
The impact of alternative deﬁnitions of legal presumption on activity-level incentives
is discussed without deriving a formal proof. The logic underlying our discussion is
very simple and intuitive. The cost associated with the burden of proof is similar to a
tax imposed on the activity levels. The burden of proof can thus be used as an activity
level tax with a legal presumption in favor of the residual bearer of the loss.
All the preceding chapters have considered prospective tortfeasors and their vic-
tims as risk-neutral individuals, free from any type of prosocial behavioral bias and
moral sentiment. However, the literature on prosocial preferences and emphatic be-
havior shows that people care about others’ well-being and feel empathy for others’
pain (Cooper and Kagel, 2009; Crockett et al., 2014). The fourth discussion in my
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dissertation evaluates the role of other-regarding preferences in accident prevention.
Imagine that you may either cause material damage to another car, or suffer damage
to your car. How many precautions would you like to undertake to prevent damage to
another car? How many precautions would you like to undertake to prevent damage
to your own car? How would your precautionary decisions change in case of perfect
compensation of damages? Are you more averse to being victims of an accident or
tortfeasors?
My fourth research question follows in a straightforward manner:
4. Do individuals adopt a different precautionary behavior depending upon their
role in an accident?
The conventional analysis of accident law predicts that individuals attribute the
same weight to two different actions under mirrored liability rules (i.e., no liability and
strict liability), namely causing damage to a stranger and suffering damage. This im-
plies that individuals are expected to undertake the same precautionary choices regard-
less of their being victims or tortfeasors in an accident context. Under the traditional
theoretical framework, liability incentives are role-independent. Chapter 5 questions
this theoretical prediction: are liability incentives actually role-independent? Con-
versely, do people undertake different precautionary behaviors depending upon them
being victims or injurers? And, how does feeling responsible for someone else’s losses
affect precautionary behavior?
This question comes from the growing literature in psychology, neuroscience, be-
havioral and experimental economics that has investigated other-regarding preferences
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from different perspectives. Among others, Eckel and Grossman (1996), Fehr and Fis-
chbacher (2004), Fehr and Schmidt (2006), Henrich et al. (2010), Engel (2011) and
Rand et al. (2012) have showed that individuals care about the well-being of others
and that the evaluation of others’ well-being is highly context-dependent. Determining
the precise conditions of pro- or anti-social behavior remains under investigation and
has several implications for legal and political decision-making.
The main contribution of the research project presented in Chapter 5 is twofold.
First, it suggests a novel, non-neutral context (i.e., a car accident situation) to study
prosocial behavior, which is substantially different from the standard neutral-context
games, i.e., ultimatum and dictator games, used to test other-regarding preferences
and altruistic behavior in economic exchanges. The behavioral implications of this
research are crucial in understanding how people evaluate others’ well-being compared
to their own in a context that is closer to daily-life activities. Second, this research
adds behavioral insights to the economic analysis of tort law. The result shows that
in an accident situation most people sacriﬁce more money to reduce their probability
of being victims of an accident rather than injurers, even under the full compensation
of damages. Tort scholars should consider this behavioral bias when deﬁning liability
rules and speciﬁcally when establishing negligence standards.
As a ﬁnal note on the methodology, Chapter 5 relies upon Shavell’s unilateral-
accident model to set the hypotheses for the experiment. It focuses on no-fault liability
rules — no liability and strict liability — and the experiment uses a between-subject 2
x 2 design, whereby the treatments differ in the type of liability rule (strict liability or
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no liability) and the role played in an accident (victim or injurer).
Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion on the results achieved in the separate chap-
ters and a short comment on the possible interaction between tort law and insurance
in the context of liability for automated technologies. It shows and discusses how
the results derived from the separate chapters combine with each-others, and suggests
several insights for future research.
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2. Sharing Residual Liability:
“Cheapest-Cost-Avoider” Revisited6
“To err is human,” the great poet famously wrote.7 No doubt the tort lawyer would
happily agree. It seems indeed an inescapable characteristic of human activity that
accidents arise from time to time. Yet while accidents may be an inevitable part of
life, we can nevertheless take steps to ensure that they are a somewhat less frequent
part of it. For although accidents may not be entirely eliminable, exercising sensible
precautions may at least reduce their likelihood.
The most obvious function of tort law —at least from an economic perspective—
is to incentivize prospective injurers and potential victims to exercise optimal pre-
cautionary care when undertaking risky activities, balancing the cost of precautions
6 This chapter is largely based on my paper “Sharing Residual Liability: “Cheapest-Cost-Avoider”
Revisited,” Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-47, coauthored with Emanuela Carbonara
(University of Bologna, Department of Economics) and Francesco Parisi (University of Minnesota, Law
School; University of Bologna, Department of Economics). The working paper has been revised and
resubmitted to the Journal of Legal Studies. The authors would like to thank Ronen Avraham, Omri
Ben-Shahar, Ennio Bilancini, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Samuel Ferey, Barbara Luppi, Ariel Porat, and
Louis T. Visscher for helpful comments and suggestions, as well as seminar audiences at the 2014
Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association at University of Chicago, the 2013
Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics at the University of Warsaw,
the 2013 Annual Meeting of the German Law and Economics Association at the Free University of
Bozen, the 2013 EDLE conference at the University of Hamburg.
7Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (1711).
against the expected cost of accidents.8 Speciﬁcally, by assigning liability to “negli-
gent” parties, the law of negligence incentivizes potential injurers to exercise optimal
care under threat of liability; and recognizing that potential injurers will tend to be-
have non-negligently, potential victims are likewise incentivized to exercise optimal
care under threat of uncompensated injury.
Yet precautionary care is not the only relevant factor in minimizing the expected
cost of accidents. Reducing the magnitude or frequency of the risky activity itself
also decreases the probability of accidents. For example, an individual may lower the
probability of a potential car accident by taking care (e.g., driving slower and driving
sober), but also by simply driving less often.9 Similarly, the likelihood that a pedestrian
will be hit by a car is affected not just by drivers’ and pedestrians’ precautions, but
also by the number of miles driven and the number of road crossings during a day.
Law and economics scholars have called this factor “activity level,” distinguishing it
from ordinary care precautions for several reasons. The distinction between “care”
and “activity level” was originally articulated by Shavell (1980) and Polinsky (1980).
Their insights have found followers (Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987; Hylton,
1991; Miceli, 1997; Shavell, 2004; Cooter and Ulen, 2007), critics (Diamond, 1974;
Latin, 1986; Grady, 1988; Gilles, 1992), as well as empirical researchers (Edlin and
8We do not mean to imply that this function was consciously recognized at the inception of tort
law (see Parisi, 2001 for a historical perspective on the development of tort law). Nor do we mean to
suggest that the economic interpretation of tort law is the only one, though it has become the dominant
perspective (See Coleman, 1982, 1991, for alternative moral theories on tort law).
9The statistics tell us that the more miles you drive, the higher the chance that you will be involved
in an accident (see among others the reports provided by Fatality Analysis Reporting System, National
Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration.): by driving 10000 miles per year, the probability of being
involved in an accident is approximately 10 times higher than it would be if driving only 1000 miles per
year.
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Mandic, 2006). Parties’ care levels are generally veriﬁable by courts, whereas their
activity levels are often more difﬁcult to determine. Even when activity levels can be
ascertained by courts, determining their optimality may be very difﬁcult, inasmuch
as the value of the parties’ activities is difﬁcult to measure by a third-party decision-
maker. “Activity levels” have also been used as a catchall term for any precaution that
a court will not consider when evaluating negligence. In one sense therefore, activity
levels are by deﬁnition those evidentiary factors that are inaccessible or are otherwise
ignored by courts. For these reasons, courts directly control parties’ incentives to take
precautions (i.e., by setting the standard of due care), but only exert some inﬂuence on
activity levels indirectly.
Historically, liability rules were designed to incentivize potential tortfeasors and
potential victims to exercise appropriate levels of care when undertaking risky activ-
ities. Under such regimes, a “negligent” party, failing to exercise due care, bears the
cost of the resultant accident. Tort scholars and legal systems have largely been con-
cerned with the scope and magnitude of liability in situations involving at least one
such negligent party. Though optimal precautionary investments reduce the probabil-
ity of an accident, accidents among faultless parties may still arise, and the cost of
such accidents must still be borne by someone. We refer to accident liability arising
when both injurer and victim acted non-negligently as “residual liability” or “residual
loss” interchangeably. The allocation of residual liability is the court’s lever for inﬂu-
encing activity-level incentives (Cooter and Ulen, 2007, p. 348; Dari-Mattiacci et al.,
2014). Notably, while liability rules may succeed at incentivizing optimal care, it has
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been demonstrated that none of the traditional liability categories succeeds at generat-
ing optimal activity level incentives. This result is sometimes referred to as “Shavell’s
activity level theorem.”
Until recently, tort scholars have been primarily concerned with care incentives,
investigating the scope and magnitude of liability when one or more of the parties be-
haved negligently. The relative lack of scholarly interest in “non-negligent” accidents
may be attributable to a sense of resignation that optimal activity levels are unachiev-
able under traditional tort rules, along with concerns about the accessibility of activity
level information. However, in equilibrium, prospective injurers and potential victims
will both behave non-negligently, and therefore a number of the accidents that occur in
reality will arise despite the due diligence of the individuals involved. We shall use the
terms “diligent” and “non-negligent” interchangeably. Thus, assuming a tort regime is
efﬁcient with respect to precautionary care, the question how we deal with such non-
negligent accidents takes on acute signiﬁcance, and unsurprisingly a growing body of
recent research has been directed toward this topic (Gilles, 1992; Calabresi, 1996; Cal-
abresi and Cooper, 1996; Parisi and Fon, 2004; Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, 2005;
Parisi and Singh, 2010; Garoupa and Ulen, 2013; Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2014).
In dealing with non-negligent accidents, tort regimes have traditionally adopted
“all-or-nothing” approaches, whereby the accident losses are assigned either entirely
to the tortfeasor or entirely to the victim, with no possibility of division. Under
negligence-based rules—simple negligence, contributory and comparative negligence—
the victim must absorb the residual loss (i.e. the loss that occurs when both parties are
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non-negligent), while under strict-liability-based rules—strict liability, and strict liabil-
ity with a defense of dual contributory negligence, contributory negligence, and com-
parative negligence—the injurer bears the residual loss. Brieﬂy, negligence-based rules
burden the victim, while strict-liability-based rules burden the injurer with the cost of
faultless accidents (see Cooter and Ulen (2007) and Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2013)
for a comprehensive taxonomy of liability rules). This chapter analyzes the conditions
under which loss-sharing proves to be more effective than conventional all-or-nothing
liability regimes in minimizing accident losses. We will proceed by relaxing the stan-
dard assumptions used in earlier tort models. The critical analytical move will be to
unbundle Calabresi’s (1970) “cheapest-cost-avoider” principle to distinguish speciﬁc
situations where the sharing of the loss generates superior activity-level incentives. We
show that the allocation of residual loss has non-trivial consequences on a number of
additional variables. This suggests that, even in a world in which all relevant actors are
risk-neutral, the optimal allocation of residual liability should play an important role
in the normative choice of tort liability.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 provides a review of the existing
literature on loss-sharing between non-negligent parties. Section 2.2 sets up a simple
tort model to compare loss-sharing and all-or-nothing liability as alternative second-
best solutions in allocating an accident loss between a non-negligent tortfeasor and his
non-negligent victim. Section 2.3 discusses the conditions under which loss-sharing in
equilibrium may prove to be superior to conventional liability rules in affecting second-
best activity levels. This study proceeds analytically by unpacking the cheapest-cost-
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avoider principle into a number of sub-principles, namely the least-risk-producer, the
cheapest-activity-avoider, the cheapest-risk-avoider, the best mix of activities, the best
scale of activities and the best-risk-bearer.10 The results show that the choice between
liability rules depends on the interaction of these factors, and that loss-sharing rules
become more appealing in the presence of countervailing policy objectives and homo-
geneous conditions of risk. More speciﬁcally, loss-sharing is desirable not only when
parties are risk-averse but also when parties are risk-neutral. In case of risk-averse
parties, loss-sharing plays a mutual insurance role, placing a greater portion of the risk
on the best risk-bearer. Interestingly, as pointed out in the recent law and economics
literature, the sharing of non-negligent losses provides a form of risk-spreading that
avoids the dilution of incentives and the moral hazard problems caused by standard
liability insurance (Parisi and Fon, 2004; Parisi and Singh, 2010; Dari-Mattiacci et al.,
2014). Loss-sharing can also yield second-best activity-level incentives when parties
are risk-neutral, as it encourages higher activity levels by more productive and less
risky parties, which enhances social welfare. This chapter unveils several important
policy considerations in assigning the optimal allocation of residual risk. Section 2.4
concludes by offering a condensed summary of our results and a brief discussion of
their signiﬁcance.
10The current literature refers to several factors encompassed in the cheapest-cost-avoider princi-
ple, including cheapest risk-avoider, cheapest precaution-taker, best risk-bearer, and most effective
precaution-taker. For a complete list of these factors with brief analytical deﬁnitions, see Parisi (2013).
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2.1 Residual Loss-Sharing: Related Literature
The adoption of optimal precautions is not a panacea against accidents. When
both parties undertake due care, an accident may nevertheless occur, and someone ul-
timately needs to bear the accident loss. Since Shavell (1980), scholars generally refer
to such faultless accident loss as “residual loss” or “residual liability.” Traditionally,
legal rules assign the entire residual loss either on the victim (negligence rules) or on
the tortfeasor (strict-liability rules). Residual loss-sharing rules would instead allow a
sharing of the residual loss when neither party is at fault. In Table 2.1 we illustrate the
allocation of the accident loss under residual loss-sharing, comparing it to a traditional
rule of comparative negligence. In a comparative negligence regime, accident losses
are shared when both parties are negligent (Table 2.1, Panel (a)). In a comparative non-
negligence regime, accident losses are instead shared when neither party is negligent
(Table 2.1, Panel (b)). Hereinafter, we shall refer to this latter form of loss-sharing as
“Residual Loss-Sharing.”
(a) Loss-Sharing
Between Negligent Parties
Injurer
Negligent Diligent
Victim
Negligent Share Victim
Diligent Injurer Victim
(b) Residual Loss-Sharing
Between Non-Negligent Parties
Injurer
Negligent Diligent
Victim
Negligent Injurer Victim
Diligent Injurer Share
Table 2.1: Loss-Sharing vs. Residual Loss-Sharing
Unlike negligent-based accidents, for which losses are often split between negli-
gent parties — as under comparative negligence (Panel (a) in Table 2.1: “Loss-Sharing
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Between Negligent Parties”), it is rare cases that tort systems have used loss-sharing
rules between non-negligent parties, through comparative non-negligence rules (Panel
(b) in Table 2.1: “Residual Loss-Sharing Between Non-Negligent Parties”). In mod-
ern legal systems, loss-sharing rules are applied by courts when it is undesirable or
prohibitively expensive to compare fault. Similarly, in international law loss-sharing
and indemniﬁcation rules are adopted for catastrophic events among sovereign states.
So for example, loss-sharing rules have been adopted in U.S. jurisdictions to spread an
accident loss between an incapable child (who was deemed incapable of being at fault)
and the owner of a dog, who had taken reasonable precautions (Howard v. Allstate
Insurance Co);11 between a municipality and a truck driver for an accident occurred
due to poor road conditions (Gibson v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation and
Development);12 between an employee and the Commission of the European Com-
munities for his wrongful arrest (Stanley George Adams v. Commission).13 More
speciﬁcally, recent examples of loss-sharing solutions in U.S. case law include Howard
v. Allstate Insurance Co.,14 a well-known Louisiana case, in which the defendants were
found non-negligent but were nevertheless held “partially liable” when their dog bit a
child. The court implemented a loss-sharing solution introducing a sort of “compar-
ative non-negligence” rule, according to which the plaintiffs’ non-negligent conduct
is compared to the defendants’ non-negligent conduct (the victim was a mentally dis-
11520 So. 2d 715 (La. 1988).
12674 So. 2d 996 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
13Case 145/83, Stanley George Adams v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 3651, 45 C.M.L.R.506, 550
(1986).
14520 So. 2d 715, 719 (La. 1988).
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abled child, whose fault could not be easily assessed), in order to determine how to
split the loss between the parties. Similarly in products liability, courts have occasion-
ally adopted loss-sharing in the absence of comparative negligence criterion. Courts
use residual loss-sharing as a way to spread losses between producers and consumers.
See for example Murray v. Fairbanks Morse.15 In several other U.S. cases, courts ap-
portioned the loss among faultless parties on a causal basis as a loss-spreading solution
when no other criterion of liability allowed to split the loss between the parties. See
for example Gibson v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation and Development.16
Similar developments of the loss-sharing alternative can be found outside of the U.S.
For example, Japanese courts have adopted equitable loss-sharing solutions in both tort
and contract cases. Japanese courts exercise substantial discretion in considering the
individual circumstances of a particular case to determine the liability of the defen-
dant (Yu, 2000). As discussed in Yoshihsa (1999), this judicial discretion provided a
pragmatic adjudicatory solution in several mass toxic tort cases, in which there was an
unclear causal connection between the defendant’s poisoning and the resulting illness.
Legal developments in Europe have also focused on loss-sharing in the ﬁeld of envi-
ronmental law. The Hoge Raad, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands applied loss-
sharing solutions to a series of cases involving environmental liability in the 1980s.17
Both the law of the European Union and public international law follow a similar ap-
15610 F.2d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1979).
16674 So. 2d 996 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
17For further references on the Dutch trends, see Hondius (1999). Loss-sharing rules are also adopted
in divorce law for breach of marriage contracts, and in labor law for employment contract breach or
termination (Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, 2005).
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proach. For example, in Stanley George Adams v. Commission,18 the European Court
of Justice decided a case against the Commission of the European Communities for
wrongful arrest, afﬁrming that an equitable loss-sharing (with partial compensation to
the plaintiff) was appropriate under the circumstances. In international law, the liability
of sovereign nations for non-negligent tortious harm is governed by a loss-sharing rule
with an equitable apportionment of the loss between states (Brownlie, 1990, p.434).
Diplomatic expediency often reinforces the need to adopt loss-sharing in the absence
of fault, in order to maintain good foreign relations and uphold the principle of repara-
tion (Brownlie, 1990, p.439).
In legal theory, fourteenth-century commentators and ﬁfteenth-century legal hu-
manists considered explicitly the problem of apportioning losses among faultless par-
ties. Seventeenth-century natural law scholars such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) took a clear position in favor of residual loss-sharing,
criticizing the so-called fault principle and formulating an alternative paradigm of li-
ability, which they called the principle of compensation. Grotius (1625) proposed
moving away from the fault principle suggesting that, absent fault, there was no rea-
son to let losses fall on the innocent victims, just as there was no obvious reason to
shift the entire accident loss on the tortfeasor. The essence of their arguments was
that when neither party is negligent or when negligence cannot be assessed, equitable
principles may warrant a sharing of the residual loss between the parties. American
tort scholars have expressed support for the idea of residual loss-sharing, arguing that
18Case 145/83, 1985 E.C.R. 3651, 45 C.M.L.R. 506, 550 (1986).
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we must recognize the possibility that strict liability is a sliding scale and not an exact
point of reference (Palmer, 1988, p. 1306). Loss-sharing is therefore often regarded as
a logical alternative to the “unfair” all-or-nothing allocations of liability for faultless
accidents (Gershonowitz, 1986, p. 485). Also Grimley (2000, p. 534) and Strassfeld
(1992, p. 949) discussed several arguments in favor of loss-sharing among faultless
parties. Loss-sharing in tort has been advocated also in other formulations, for example
through comparative negligence in the presence of negligent parties (see Bar-Gill and
Ben-Shahar, 2003 for a recent critical review of related literature), of several potential
tortfeasors (Landes and Posner, 1980; Kornhauser and Revesz, 1989, 1990, 1994), of
asymmetric costs of precautions (Rubinfeld, 1987), or under conditions of evidentiary
uncertainty (Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, 2005), and through proportional liability in
the presence of causal uncertainty (Young et al., 2004).
Notwithstanding these historical antecedents, only a handful of law and economics
scholars have given attention to the possibility of residual loss-sharing. Calabresi
(1965, 1970) was the ﬁrst to consider the value of deterring accidents between fault-
less parties. Calabresi (1965) ﬁrst observed that systems that apportion liability based
on fault only deter those accidents that are caused through fault and ignore the value
of deterring accidents that are faultless. In his later book, Calabresi (1970) returned
to this issue, assessing the merits of loss-sharing between faultless parties. Calabresi
stated that “the justiﬁcation found most often among legal writers today for allocation
of accident losses on a nonfault basis, is that accident losses will be least burden-
some if they are spread broadly among people and over time” (Calabresi, 1970, p.
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39). A quarter of a century later, Calabresi (1996) and Calabresi and Cooper (1996)
lamented that not enough consideration had been given to the idea of distributing the
loss between non-negligent parties and explored the idea put forth in Calabresi’s ear-
lier writings in greater detail. Calabresi and Cooper (1996) stressed the desirability
of splitting losses among faultless parties instead of having a legal rule in place that
puts the entire burden on either the plaintiff or the defendant. Calabresi’s arguments
in favor of residual loss-sharing ran against the conventional wisdom in the law and
economics literature, according to which any form of loss-sharing would be undesir-
able because it would dilute care-level incentives (Brown, 1973). Recent contributions
reconciled the two opposing views, showing the limits of the conventional wisdom.
The concern that loss-sharing may dilute incentives is correct as a general matter, but
is not applicable when loss-sharing is carried out only with respect to non-negligent
parties (i.e., residual loss-sharing). Recent research in the law and economics literature
suggests that a spreading of the residual loss in equilibrium can be accomplished pre-
serving efﬁcient care incentives. The ﬁrst contribution that studied the incentive effect
of residual loss-sharing is Parisi and Fon (2004). The authors showed that residual
loss-sharing does not necessarily undermine care-level incentives while studying the
effects of a rule of comparative causation (a species of residual loss-sharing in which
liability is divided between faultless parties on the basis of their causal contribution to
the accident). Parisi and Fon (2004) never derived a general proof, and their model
showed that loss-sharing in the form of comparative causation under negligence was
in most cases compatible with full incentives for optimal care. Parisi and Singh (2010)
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later provided a more general proof of the compatibility of residual loss-sharing un-
der comparative causation with optimal care incentives.19 In the latest contribution to
the topic, Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014) showed that, under some sufﬁcient conditions,
parties’ compliance with the standard of due care can be achieved in equilibrium not
only for any residual loss-sharing rule implemented among negligent parties (Landes
and Posner’s 1980 result), but also for any loss-sharing rule implemented among non-
negligent parties. In Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014), the plausible conditions under which
compliance with the standard of due care is a Nash equilibrium are the following: the
standards of due care and the loss-sharing rule are set at the (second best) socially op-
timal levels; a party’s (optimally chosen) activity level decreases in his due-level of
care (i.e., an increase in a party due-care level reduces his chosen level of activity).
In their Section 3, Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014) analyzed the optimal setting of resid-
ual loss-sharing in a speciﬁcation of their initial general model, where parties’ activity
levels are independent of each other in the production of the expected accident loss.
They further restricted the analysis by using two functional forms of the loss func-
tion, i.e., a linear and a quadratic loss function. This chapter generalizes and extends
Dari-Mattiacci et al.’s (2014, Section 3) analysis in considering a more general model
without employing speciﬁc functional forms in order to investigate different interre-
lations of parties’ activities in the production of the expected accident loss (Section
2.3.4).
Building on a generalization of these results, this study tackles two novel, interre-
19For an analysis of the effects of liability rules on parties’ care incentives, see also Landes and Posner
(1983), Haddock and Curran (1985) and Singh (2006).
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lated questions. While Parisi and Fon (2004), Parisi and Singh (2010), Dari-Mattiacci
et al. (2014) established the independence of the residual liability problem, they never
investigated when and how loss-sharing rules ought to be employed. This chapter in-
vestigates what factors should guide the optimal allocation of residual liability and
under which conditions residual loss-sharing among faultless parties may be prefer-
able to conventional all-or-nothing rules. We identify several characteristics of parties’
activities and accident functions which should optimally guide the apportionment of
the residual loss. We relate these characteristics to Calabresi’s (1970) “cheapest cost-
avoider” principle, identifying six sub-principles that are embedded in the cheapest-
cost-avoider principle. Speciﬁcally, we offer a more generalized accident model to
consider all possible relationships between the riskiness and the value of activities,
the interaction of the parties’ activities in the production of risk, returns to scale from
the activities, and parties’ relative risk preferences. The analysis of these factors, con-
sidered in isolation and collectively, allows us to understand under which conditions
loss-sharing rules are preferable to conventional all-or-nothing rules. It is worth not-
ing that other authors analyzed the heterogeneities among parties and their activities
in independent, yet related studies. Emons (1990a) and Emons and Sobel (1991) ﬁrst
analyzed liability rules when risk-neutral parties have different marginal utilities from
their actions. They argued that sharing-liability rules implement a superior allocation
of the activity levels compared to negligence rules. Garoupa and Ulen (2013) ques-
tioned one of the implicit assumptions regarding the activity-level effect, namely the
positive monotonic relationship between the probability of accident and the risky ac-
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tivity. The authors pointed out deﬁnitional issues on activity level, and discussed the
complementary role of liability and regulation in incentivizing socially optimal pre-
cautions. These contributions can ﬁnd a formal extension and a deeper analysis on
other sources of heterogeneity among tortious activities, in our research.
2.2 The Model: Setting the Stage
Let us begin by deﬁning terms and articulating our assumptions. We consider a
bilateral non-durable care model in which two parties—the potential tortfeasor (T )
and the potential victim (V )—inﬂuence the unilateral risk of an accident (i.e., where
only the victim suffers the loss if an accident occurs) by taking two different types of
precautionary measures: care level and activity level.
Following the conventional notation, x and y denote the tortfeasor’s and victim’s
care levels respectively, and z and u denote the tortfeasor’s and victim’s activity levels
respectively. Let w = w(z,x) be the injurer’s level of wealth, and let b = b(u,y) be the
victim’s wealth. We begin adopting the standard assumptions of tort models (Landes
and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987; Miceli, 1997; Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2014): both
parties’ utilities decrease in care level at a constant or increasing rate, and increase
in activity level at a decreasing rate, i.e., wx < 0, wxx ≤ 0, wz > 0 and wzz < 0 for
the tortfeasor, whereas by < 0, byy ≤ 0, bu > 0 and buu < 0 for the victim. We shall
relax some of these assumptions in Section 4.5 to consider the effect of increasing
returns, i.e., wzz, buu > 0, on the optimal allocation of residual liability. We plausibly
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assume that an increase in a party due-care level reduces his optimally chosen level of
activity.20
We now turn to the cost of accidents. Following the conventional setup (Shavell,
1980, 1987), we assume that the probability of an accident q(z,u) increases at a con-
stant or increasing rate as parties increase their activity levels, i.e., qz, qu > 0, qzz,
quu ≥ 0, and that the loss suffered by the victim in the event of an accident L(x,y) de-
creases in care levels at a decreasing rate, i.e., Lx, Ly < 0, Lxx, Lyy > 0. The assumption
that the probability of the accident loss is not affected by care levels comes without
loss of generality: the same results are achieved by deﬁning the expected accident loss
as a function of all the four decision variables, i.e., D = D(x,y,z,u). Following Dari-
Mattiacci et al. (2014), we consider parties’ activities as independent in the production
of the accident loss, i.e., qzu = 0. We shall relax this assumption in Section 4.4 to con-
sider cases where parties’ activities are substitutes, qzu > 0, or complements, qzu < 0.
Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014, Section 3) assumed the loss function to have an additive
form, that is, the parties’ activity levels are independent of each other in the production
of the expected accident loss. Our general formulation allows to extend the framework
in Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014, Section 3) to consider different interaction of parties’
activity choices in the production of the expected accident loss (see Section 2.3.4).
The share of the residual loss borne by the injurer is denoted by σ , such that 0 ≤
20The deﬁnition of due-care standards inﬂuences parties’ activity choices and might change depend-
ing upon the interrelation between care and activity levels. The standard accident model assumes the
cost of care to be proportional to activity level (Shavell, 1987, 2004). Nussim and Tabbach (2009)
relaxed this assumption within a unilateral-accident model and analyzed the impact of different interac-
tions between the injurer’s care and activity levels on the deﬁnition of due-care standards.
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σ ≤ 1. In other words, σ represents the allocation rule for accident losses in the
absence of fault. In the limiting cases, σ = 0 is the allocation produced by a negligence
rule, σ = 1 is the allocation produced by a strict-liability rule, while 0 < σ < 1 is the
allocation produced by a residual loss-sharing rule.
The optimization problem is formulated as a two-stage problem where the choice
of activity levels in the second stage is affected by the initial-stage deﬁnition of the
liability rule σ by the social planner. The model is thus solved by backward induc-
tion. We consider the case of risk-neutral agents, and we discuss some special insights
related to the case of risk-averse agents in Section 2.3.6.
Under the assumptions speciﬁed in Section 2.2, it can be shown that parties have
incentives to comply with the due-care standards regardless of the sharing rule among
negligent parties.21 Thus the following lemma holds true throughout our analysis:
Lemma 2.2.1 (Loss-Sharing Neutrality). Under any fault-based liability rule, if due-
care standards and the loss-sharing rule among non-negligent parties are set at the
(second best) socially optimal level, parties have optimal incentives to comply with the
due-care standards x∗ = xd∗ and y∗ = yd∗ regardless of the loss-sharing rule imple-
mented among negligent parties.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
Given that under Lemma 2.2.1 compliance with due care standards is veriﬁed for
21It has already been established in the recent literature that under any fault-based liability rule, if
due-care standards and the loss-sharing rule among non-negligent parties are set at the (second best)
socially optimal level, parties have optimal incentives to comply with the due-care standards, regardless
of the loss-sharing rule implemented among negligent parties (Singh, 2006; Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2014).
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any chosen sharing rule, we can meaningfully restrict our analysis to the properties
of the equilibrium in the region of x∗ = xd∗ and y∗ = yd∗. This allows us to focus on
the characterization of the optimal sharing rule. The ﬁrst-stage (second best) social
maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
max
xd ,yd ,σ
S = w(z,x)+b(u,y)−q(z,u)L(x,y) (2.2.1)
subject to x∗ = xd∗ and y∗ = yd∗ (2.2.2)
z∗ = z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗) and u∗ = u(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗) (2.2.3)
The social planner maximizes the social welfare function (2.2.1) subject to two con-
straints. Constraint (2.2.2) indicates that parties have incentives to comply with the
due care standards, as shown in Lemma 2.2.1. Constraint (2.2.3) indicates that the
privately optimal activity choices depend upon all policy variables.
The non-negligent tortfeasor and his faultless victim will choose the activity levels
which maximize their utility functions, i.e.,
max
z
UT = w(z,xd∗)−σq(z,u)L(xd∗,yd∗) (2.2.4)
max
u
UV = b(u,yd∗)− (1−σ)q(z,u)L(xd∗,yd∗) (2.2.5)
The privately optimal activity levels z∗ and u∗ are respectively deﬁned as follows
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(omitting arguments):
wz−σ qz L = 0 (2.2.6)
bu− (1−σ)qu L = 0 (2.2.7)
The second-best socially optimal loss-sharing rule, σ∗∗, and the second-best so-
cially optimal due-care levels, xd∗ and yd∗, are respectively deﬁned as follows:
dz∗
dσ
(wz−qzL)+ du
∗
dσ
(bu−quL) = 0 (2.2.8)
dz∗
dxd
(wz−qzL)+ du
∗
dxd
(bu−quL)+wx−qLx = 0 (2.2.9)
du∗
dyd
(bu−quL)+ dz
∗
dyd
(wz−qzL)+by−qLy = 0 (2.2.10)
By considering (2.2.6) and (2.2.7), the second-order effects of marginal changes in
σ on the privately optimal activity levels are given by:
dz∗
dσ
=
qzL
wzz−σqzzL (2.2.11a)
du∗
dσ
=− quL
buu− (1−σ)quuL (2.2.11b)
Similarly, the second-order effects of marginal changes in the due-care levels on
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the privately optimal activity levels are given by:
dz∗
dxd
=
−wzx+σqz Lx
wzz−σqzzL (2.2.12a)
du∗
dxd
=
(1−σ)quLx
buu− (1−σ)quuL (2.2.12b)
dz∗
dyd
=
σqzLy
wzz−σqzzL (2.2.12c)
du∗
dyd
=
−buy+(1−σ)quLy
buu− (1−σ)quuL (2.2.12d)
The optimal levels of due-care standards (5.2.2) and (2.2.10), and the second-order
effects in (2.2.12) show that changes in σ ∈ [0,1] affect the deﬁnition of the due-
care standards, xd∗ and yd∗, but parties’ compliance with such due-care standards is
not undermined, as shown in Lemma 2.2.1. Our analysis considers how the injurer’s
share of the residual loss should optimally change within the non-negligence region
of x∗ = xd∗ and y∗ = yd∗. In other words, we focus on the optimal allocation of the
residual loss as deﬁned in (2.2.8). Our general framework allows to identify all the
possible interrelationships between the policy variables and activity levels. Future
research can build on this framework to study the conditions under which second-best
efﬁciency would require either varying the allocation of the residual loss, or changing
the due-care standards, or both.
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2.3 Optimal Loss-Sharing: Unbundling the “Cheapest-
Cost-Avoider”
This section analyzes the optimal value of σ , as given by (2.2.8), to identify the
conditions under which loss-sharing could be desirable and more efﬁcient than con-
ventional all-or-nothing liability rules. We will consider several factors in isolation,
exploring the optimal assignment of residual liability when a particular factor is deter-
minative. The interaction of factors and their signiﬁcance are then discussed in Section
2.4.
2.3.1 Riskiness of the Activity: “Least Risk-Producer”
The ﬁrst building block in our analysis sheds light on the riskiness of the activity,
deﬁned as the marginal increase in the probability of an accident when either the injurer
or the victim increase their activity level (i.e., qi, i= z, u). Bracketing off other factors,
the relative riskiness of the activity may also determine the optimal allocation of the
residual loss, as identiﬁed in Proposition 2.3.1.
Proposition 2.3.1. (Least Risk-Producer). Ceteris paribus, when the injurer’s activity
is substantially riskier than the victim’s, strict-liability rules are preferable. When the
victim’s activity is substantially riskier than the injurer’s, negligence rules are prefer-
able. When the parties’ activities present similar riskiness, loss-sharing rules are so-
cially desirable. Particularly, when activities are equally risky it is optimal that parties
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share the loss in equal measure.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
Intuitively, if the activity of the injurer is more likely to increase the probability of
an accident with respect to the activity of the victim, it is preferable to shift a larger
portion of the residual loss on the tortfeasor. When the injurer’s activity is substantially
riskier, the adoption of a strict-liability rule may be warranted. Clearly, for activities
of comparable value, the net value of a dangerous tortfeasor’s activity is smaller be-
cause it creates a greater expected accident loss. Consequently, from a social point of
view, reductions in such dangerous activities will be less costly than reductions in less
harmful activities. The converse holds true when the victim’s activity poses the greater
risk. And in both cases, all-or-nothing liability systems are preferable to a loss-sharing
rule. This may explain the adoption of strict liability in cases involving abnormally
dangerous (or “ultrahazardous”) activities —e.g., transportation of dynamite and other
explosives— and the use of no-liability regimes to mitigate victim’s extraordinary ex-
posures to risk —e.g., less-skilled skiers facing the hardest slopes; cyclists riding in
high-speed roads (see for example the Italian legal system in which under certain con-
ditions drivers are immune from liability for accidents involving pedestrians or cyclists
in highways)22.
As regards ultrahazardous activities, according to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, §520: “In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the follow-
ing factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm
22Cass. Pen. , Sez. IV, n. 33207 31 luglio 2013.
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to the person, land, or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from
it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness
of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to
the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.” Several categories of activ-
ities are commonly deﬁned as ultrahazardous, including transportation, storage, and
use of dynamite and other explosives, radioactive materials, and hazardous chemicals;
keeping of wild animals or domesticated animals that have a known propensity for dan-
gerous behavior (e.g., keeping a domesticated animal that has attacked people before).
Ultrahazardous activities are classiﬁed as a strict liability tort, i.e., the person perform-
ing the activity can be held liable, even if she took reasonable precautions to prevent
harm. Examples from case law of absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities are Ry-
lands v. Fletcher,23 Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co.,24 Langan v. Valicopters, Inc..25
For a general overview of these and other related cases, see James, 1949.
The result in Proposition 2.3.1 is consistent with Cooter and Ulen (2007, p. 349):
“Usually one party’s activity level affects accidents more than the other party’s activity
level. Efﬁciency requires choosing a liability rule so that the party whose activity level
most affects accidents bears the residual costs of accidental harm.” This section extends
Cooter and Ulen (2007)’s intuition by showing that sharing rules might be the preferred
option when one party’s activity is riskier but relative riskiness is not substantially
23(1866) UKHL 1, LR 3 HL 330, (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
24107 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash. 1952).
25567 P.2d 218, 88 Wash. 2d 855, 88 Wash. 855 (1977).
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different. In other words, all-or-nothing rules are optimal when one party’s activity is
far riskier than the other party’s activity.
Concerns of practical implementability may arise with respect to the application of
this proposition, except when courts and juries can discern the relative difference in
the riskiness of parties’ activities.
2.3.2 Value of the Activity: “Cheapest Activity-Avoider”
The next building block for the understanding of the optimal allocation of residual
liability comes from the value of the parties’ activities. Accidents are often the un-
avoidable byproduct of otherwise desirable human activities. However, not all activi-
ties are equally desirable. The optimal liability rule, ceteris paribus, should make the
party who can reduce the activity level at the lowest cost (“cheapest activity-avoider”)
the residual bearer of the accident loss. The cheapest activity-avoider entails consider-
ation of the relative value of the parties’ activities.
Clearly, the reduction of a more valuable activity will reduce social welfare more
than the reduction in a less valuable activity. Thus, all things being equal, residual
liability should fall on the party that can reduce its activity level at a lower social cost.
Proposition 2.3.2. (Cheapest Activity-Avoider). Residual liability should fall on the
party who can more cheaply reduce his or her activity level. Ceteris paribus, when the
injurer’s activity is substantially more valuable than the victim’s, negligence rules are
desirable. When the victim’s activity is substantially more valuable than the injurer’s,
strict-liability rules are desirable. When the parties’ activities have comparable val-
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ues, loss-sharing rules are preferable to all-or-nothing allocations. Particularly, when
activities are equally valuable, it is optimal for parties to share the loss in equal mea-
sure.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
A reduction in the level of activity results in a reduction in the probability of an
accident, but also a decrease in the total value of the activity. All things being equal,
the cost of non-negligent accidents should be borne by the individual who undertakes
the less valuable activity, because a reduction in activity level will be less costly from
a social point of view. A close variant of the idea that residual liability should be borne
by the party who more cheaply reduce his or her activity level can be found in Cooter
and Ulen (2007). As already mentioned, the idea that losses can be shared expands
the domain of possibilities, compared to the conventional all-or-nothing approach. For
example, efﬁciency should favor the activity of a doctor who needs to drive to visit his
patients over somebody who uses his car to distribute marketing ads. If liability rules
could be linked to some observable characteristics such as profession (or other proxy
for the value of the activity), then it might be possible to efﬁciently allocate the residual
loss based on the relative values of the parties’ activities. This result may also provide
a positive explanation for the heightened standard of liability (i.e., gross negligence
or intent is required for liability) when socially valuable activities such as ambulance
driving or ﬁreﬁghting are involved. For example, in Wilkins v.Williams,26 a motorist
was injured in a trafﬁc accident with an ambulance and was hospitalized. The motorist
26991 N.E.2d 308, 2013 I.L. 114310, 372 Ill. Dec. 1 (2013).
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ﬁled a negligence claim against the ambulance driver individually and as agent of the
ambulance service and the ambulance service. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
the Emergency Medical Services Act provides emergency medical service providers
immunity from civil liability based on the provision of emergency or non-emergency
medical services in the normal course of conducting their duties except in cases of
willful and wanton misconduct (see Medical Law Perspectives, February 2013 Report:
“Emergency Medical Services: Liability and Immunity for Medical Rescue”). As re-
gards immunity from liability for ﬁre police ofﬁcers, see for example § 9-1-27 Police
and ﬁreﬁghters, Immunity from liability (RI Gen L § 9-1-27 (2013)): “No member
of any police force or ﬁre department of the state or any city or town, [. . . ], or any
person acting in the capacity of a rescue attendant or member of a rescue squad, and
no ofﬁcer or member in active service in any incorporated protective department co-
operating with ﬁre departments, and no person performing the duties of a ﬁreﬁghter
in a town or city, and no member of any volunteer ﬁre company or volunteer rescue
squad or member of any voluntary ambulance association, whether the company or
squad is incorporated or not, who while on duty and in the performance of that duty
voluntarily and gratuitously renders emergency assistance to a person in need thereof,
and no person properly certiﬁed by the American heart association or the American
national red cross in basic or advanced life support as deﬁned in the standards of the
American heart association or the American national red cross who voluntarily and
gratuitously renders emergency assistance to a person in need thereof shall be liable
for civil damages for any personal injuries or property damage which result from acts
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or omissions by the persons rendering the emergency care, which may constitute ordi-
nary negligence. This immunity does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross,
willful, or wanton negligence.”
2.3.3 Trading Off Riskiness and Value of the Activity: “Cheapest
Risk-Avoider”
When applying the cheapest-cost-avoider criterion in the context of Calabresi’s
(1970) paradigm, it is especially important to consider the interaction between the
factors we analyzed above. If the activity of the injurer is socially more valuable but
at the same time riskier than the victim’s activity, then a trade-off arises: if an all-
or-nothing approach is used, one of the parties will either carry on a riskier or a less
valuable activity with greater-than-optimal intensity. Loss-sharing rules may offer a
more desirable alternative in such cases. To illustrate the point, consider a collision
(due to bad weather, hectic trafﬁc, congestion or poor visibility) between a car and a
truck. The collision occurs even though both drivers have taken the due precautions
(e.g., observing speed limits, stopping at the stop sign), and only the car is damaged.
Consider the case in which the truck driver’s activity is socially more valuable, but
at the same time creates a greater risk than the car. If a negligence rule applies (as
efﬁciency would require when looking at the value of the activity), the truck driver
will undertake higher activity levels, notwithstanding the fact that truck driving creates
a greater risk. If instead a strict-liability rule applies (as efﬁciency would require when
looking at the riskiness of the activity), then the car driver would carry out an excessive
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activity level, notwithstanding the lower social value of his activity. In this case, a
loss-sharing rule can usefully balance the two countervailing efﬁciency criteria — the
least-risk-producer and the cheapest-activity-avoider — in line with a more nuanced
efﬁciency criterion. We refer to this combined rationale as the “cheapest risk-avoider”.
The major theoretical conclusion that emerges from the trade-off between the risk-
iness and the value of activities can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3.3. (Cheapest Risk-Avoider). Ceteris paribus, when the injurer’s ac-
tivity is substantially less risky and at the same time more valuable than the victim’s,
then negligence rules are preferable. When the victim’s activity is substantially less
risky and at the same time more valuable than the injurer’s, then strict-liability rules
are preferable. When one party’s activity is more valuable but at the same time riskier
than the other, loss-sharing rules are preferable to both negligence and strict liability.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
2.3.4 Coordinating Risks: “Best Mix of Activities”
One often overlooked function of residual liability is that of promoting coordina-
tion among risky activities. The optimal allocation of activity-level incentives hinges
upon the relationship between the parties’ activities in the production of an accident
loss. Here we distinguish three possible cases: additive, subadditive, and superadditive
risks. Parties’ activities create an additive risk, qzu = 0, when each activity indepen-
dently affects the probability of an accident, with no additional interactive effect when
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both parties’ activities are carried out. The overall risk of an accident is determined by
the sum of the parties’ activities, regardless of which party carries out the larger share
of the activity. Similar to independent inputs in a production function, activities that
create additive risks contribute linearly to the overall risk of an accident. Given that the
parties’ activities independently affect the probability of an accident, any allocation of
the residual loss is compatible with the social optimum. When risks are additive, the
choice between negligence, strict liability, and loss-sharing solutions is driven by the
other efﬁciency considerations discussed in the previous sections.
In real life tort situations, however, risks are rarely independent and linearly addi-
tive. The allocation of residual loss acquires acute importance when risks are interde-
pendent, qzu = 0. A ﬁrst case of non linearity is the one in which parties’ activities
create a superadditive risk, qzu < 0: raising the level of activity of one party leads to
an increasing marginal augmentation of the risk. Consider, for example, the emission
of chemicals and noise in the environment. The presence of moderate quantities of the
two pollutants may be less harmful than the presence of high levels of only one pollu-
tant. The risk created by additional units of pollutants may have superadditive effects.
Legal systems might tackle these situations through regulation (e.g., by putting caps on
the maximum quantity of each risky input) or through tort law, by spreading activity-
level incentives between the parties. In this case, a loss-sharing rule might help reduce
the expected accident costs, by inducing both parties to mitigate their activity levels.
A second case of non linearity is the one in which parties’ activities create a sub-
additive risk, qzu > 0: both activities contribute to cause the accident, and total harm is
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greater when both parties carry out their activities conjunctly. Similar to complemen-
tary inputs in a production function, activities that create a subadditive risk contribute
non-linearly to the overall risk of an accident. The resulting risk is not determined by
the sum but by the relative mix of the parties’ activities. Mixing different activities
creates a greater risk than concentrating only one or the other activity. Consider, for
example, the presence of children and cyclists on a trail. The frequency of accidents
grows larger as the two activities mix together: having all children or all cyclists is
preferable than having the two activities mixed together. Legal systems might tackle
these situations either by separating complementary activities through regulation (e.g.,
planning pedestrian areas; denying access to pedestrians, bicycles and other slow vehi-
cles in the highways; locating smokestacks industries far from residences) or through
tort law, by allocating the residual liability entirely on one or the other one party. In
this case, all-or-nothing rules are preferable to loss-sharing rules since they produce a
result that mimics the one achieved by regulation, inducing one of the two individuals
to reduce his or her activity level to a minimum.
Proposition 2.3.4. (Best Mix of Activities). Ceteris paribus, loss-sharing rules are
more efﬁcient when parties’ activities create a superadditive risk. All-or-nothing allo-
cations of the residual loss might be preferable with subadditive risks.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
Proposition 2.3.4 may explain the dominance of all-or-nothing rules in situations
characterized by subadditive risk. For example, in a shooting range area, there should
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be no individual walking around the target area; and in an urban environment, there
should be no one shooting targets. In the case of subadditive risk, the optimal equilib-
rium is characterized by corner solutions: no walking in shooting rings, no shooting
in walking areas. On the contrary, when risks are superadditive, high concentrations
of risky activities may be problematic, and the optimal equilibrium is characterized by
an interior solution with a balanced mix of different activities. In these straightforward
cases, regulation of the activities can accomplish a complete separation or a mix of
activities (e.g., pedestrian areas, no bicycles on highways). However, in situations that
are not amenable to regulation, the tort system can pursue comparable results with the
allocation of the residual loss on one or the other party, or the sharing of the residual
loss among the parties.
2.3.5 Activity Levels and Return to Scale: “Best Scale of Activi-
ties”
An additional factor to consider when choosing the optimal allocation of non-
negligent accident losses is the marginal value of activities, wzz, buu. By relaxing the
assumption introduced in Section 2.2 of decreasing marginal value of the parties’ ac-
tivities, wzz, buu < 0, we may now consider cases characterized by increasing marginal
value of the activity. The allocation of the residual loss on one or the other party will
affect the parties’ activity levels and their ability to optimize the scale at which their
activity is carried out. All other things being equal, it will be optimal to allocate risk
and liability on the party that faces decreasing marginal returns from its activity. The
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activity exhibiting diminishing marginal returns can, in fact, be reduced at a lower cost,
given that the portion of the activity that is curtailed is characterized by lower returns.
Proposition 2.3.5. (Best Scale of Activities). Ceteris paribus, a loss-sharing rule
is desirable in equilibrium when the marginal returns from the parties’ activities are
decreasing. Conversely, increasing marginal returns from the activities requires an
all-or-nothing approach in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.
Proposition 2.3.5 implies that in the absence of other justifying factors, increasing
marginal returns from the activity represent a necessary condition for all-or-nothing
rules to be socially optimal. When the marginal returns are decreasing, the value func-
tion increases with respect to activity levels at a decreasing rate. The greater the activity
level, the lower the return from an additional increase in activity level. Beneﬁts grow at
a decreasing rate, while accident risks continue to grow steadily larger. In this case, a
loss-sharing rule will induce both parties to mitigate their activity levels, foregoing the
less valuable ﬁnal quantities of their activities. Conversely, with increasing marginal
returns, increments in activity levels lead to increasingly larger gains. Thus, it may
be desirable to allow at least one party (the one with the highest marginal increase) to
undertake a higher activity level, with the adoption of all-or-nothing liability regime.
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2.3.6 Loss-Sharing vs. Insurance: “Best Risk-Bearer”
With some exceptions (e.g., Greenwood and Ingene, 1978; Shavell, 1987; Gollier
et al., 1997; Privileggi et al., 2001; Nell and Richter, 1996, 2003), the literature on tort
law assumes risk-neutrality for both parties in order to isolate the effect of liability on
individual incentives. Although risk-neutrality may be a reasonable approximation of
preferences when corporate actors are involved or when insurance markets are readily
available, risk-aversion lurks behind all remaining tort situations. The assumption of
risk-neutrality in the standard tort model is justiﬁed by two compelling arguments in
the literature. The ﬁrst argument is that tort law should be designed to promote efﬁcient
incentives, and any attempt to use tort rules to provide an insurance function for the
parties would undermine the incentive function of tort liability. The second argument
is that parties involved in risky activities generally have access to well-functioning
insurance markets, which reduce the need for providing insurance through tort law.
Though useful for the study of care incentives, the assumption of risk-neutrality
obfuscates the analysis of other important policy dimensions that hinge upon the opti-
mal allocation of risk. Risk preferences play an important role in individuals’ choices
of activity levels for risky activities. Policymakers can inﬂuence risk-taking behavior
by appropriately allocating residual liability. Recent contributions to the tort literature
have unveiled the limits of the conventional approach, showing that under fairly general
conditions, loss-sharing and other forms of mutual insurance between faultless parties
can be implemented without undermining optimal care incentives (e.g., Shavell, 1982;
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Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, 2005). Further, not all risks are insurable, and resid-
ual loss-sharing can provide a form of risk-spreading when insurance is not available.
Most compellingly, unlike standard insurance, residual loss-sharing can spread the risk
without corroding care incentives and creating other moral hazard problems.
As pointed out by Nell and Richter (2003), bracketing off other factors, the law
should allocate risks and liability on the risk-neutral party or on the party who can
more easily hedge against the risk (“best risk-bearer”). To determine which party is
the best risk-bearer, the court should ascertain risk preferences and identify which party
is in a better position to hedge against the risk. The best-risk-bearer criterion may run
into epistemic problems as to the veriﬁability of risk preferences, as well as concerns
of political palatability, and tastes for fairness. This may render the best-risk-bearer
criterion unlikely to be used as an ad hoc basis of liability. Notwithstanding these lim-
itations, loss-sharing could emerge as desirable legal instruments when parties have
similar attitudes toward risk and invest in comparable activities (e.g., two average indi-
viduals involved in a driving accident). In this case, loss-sharing may provide a form of
mutual insurance that operates when a faultless accident occurs: the risk is spread, yet
preserving optimal care incentives for both parties. Further, these insights may explain
some characteristics of the tort system. For example, the fact that a risk-neutral party
should bear residual liability for non-negligent conduct seems a plausible explanation
for the widespread use of strict liability in product liability cases (see The Product Lia-
bility Directive 85/374/EEC creating a regime of strict liability for defective products),
or more generally, when victims are less likely to be able to hedge against the risk of
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an accident as compared to their injurers.
2.4 Analysis and Concluding Remarks
This study has pulled together several important threads of research from the law
and economics literature on torts.
It is a well-established result that activity-level incentives are a function of resid-
ual liability. Shavell’s (1980) activity-level theorem shows that conventional liability
rules based on negligence and strict liability are unable to create optimal activity-level
incentives for both parties. Negligence and strict-liability regimes apportion residual
liability entirely on one or the other party. The effect of this all-or-nothing allocation
is that one party (the bearer of residual liability) is fully incentivized to undertake an
optimal level of activity, while the other (the non-bearer of residual liability) has no
legal incentives to mitigate his or her activity level. Decoupling provides a solution by
making both parties full bearers of residual liability. The decoupled system requires a
faultless victim to remain uncompensated even if the tortfeasor paid for the full amount
of the harm (Polinsky and Che, 1991): this basically implies the limited political vi-
ability of the decoupling rule on the ground of fairness, and to a general offense to
the natural sense of justice. In the absence of victim compensation, it is unclear how
disputes would even enter into the legal system. Without the hope of obtaining com-
pensation for his injuries, the victim has no reason to bring suit against the tortfeasor
— thereby bypassing the “perfect” liability regime entirely. For these reasons, the ap-
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peal of the decoupling solution is conﬁned to the realm of economic theory, given its
practical untenability in modern tort systems.
At this junction, the identiﬁcation of a second-best apportionment of residual li-
ability becomes critical. In addressing this policy question, this chapter examines
loss-sharing rules as an alternative to conventional all-or-nothing rules, identifying the
factors that determine who should bear the cost of faultless accidents. We unveiled
several sub-principles embedded in Calabresi’s (1970) “cheapest-cost-avoider” princi-
ple, all of which bear on the optimal allocation of residual liability. We summarize the
analysis in Table 2.
The allocation of residual liability plays a fundamental role in the design of tort
liability. The efﬁciency criteria labeled (A) through (D) in Table 2 consider the role
of loss-sharing for risk-neutral parties. Our analysis shows that when parties are risk-
neutral, the optimal allocation of residual loss depends on a number of factors, which
include the riskiness and the value of their activities, their interaction in the production
of risk, and returns to scale from the activities. Our ﬁndings explain long-standing
principles of the tort system, in addition to providing ways of improving them. For
example, our results show that the party who carries out the riskier activity should bear
the residual liability for non-negligent conduct. This result can explain the widespread
adoption of strict-liability rules in case of ultrahazardous activities, and the use of no-
liability when the victim came to the nuisance or exposed herself to risk. Similarly,
our analysis explains the presence of immunities or heightened standards of liability
(gross negligence or intent required for liability) when socially valuable activities are
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Strict Liability Loss-Sharing Negligence
(A) Least Injurer’s Activity Parties’ Activities Victims’s Activity
Risk-Producer Riskier Equally Risky Riskier
(B) Cheapest Victim’s Activity Parties’ Activities Injurer’s Activity
Activity-Avoider More Valuable Equally Valuable More Valuable
(A)+(B) Cheapest Victim’s Activity One Party’ Activity Injurer’s Activity
Risk Avoider More Valuable More Valuable More Valuable
and Less Risky but Riskier and Less Risky
(C) Best Mix
Subadditive Risk Superadditive Risk Subadditive Riskof Activities
(D) Best Scale Victim’s Increasing Both Decreasing Injurer’s Increasing
of Activities Returns Returns Returns
(E) Best Victim Both Injurer
Risk-Bearer Risk-Averse Risk-Averse Risk-Averse
Table 2: Unbundling the “Cheapest-Cost-Avoider”: Optimal Allocation of Residual
Liability
involved. Yet the foregoing analysis begs the followup question: how should residual
liability be divided when the factors point in different directions? For example, if the
tortfeasor was the least risk-producer, but the victim was the cheapest activity-avoider,
who should bear the residual loss? Most real life situations are characterized by coun-
tervailing considerations pointing in different directions. In such situations tradeoffs
arise, and loss-sharing rules may ultimately emerge as a more desirable alternative than
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all-or-nothing approaches. Finally, while risk-neutrality may be a reasonable approx-
imation of preferences when corporate actors are involved or when insurance markets
are readily available, risk preferences remain a relevant factor in the allocation of the
residual liability. With the aim of exploring a broader range of normative goals, we
discussed the possible role of loss-sharing for the optimal allocation of risk between
risk-averse parties. In interpreting our results, we should keep in mind that residual
liability is relevant not only with respect to activity-level incentives but also for invest-
ments in non-observable precautions and research and adoption of new precautions
technologies.27 Future research could, among other things, consider how different
allocations of the residual loss among non-negligent parties could promote the adop-
tion of non-observable precautions and foster the development and use of new, safer
technologies. In this regard, the next chapter deals with speciﬁc types of precaution
technologies, i.e., automated technologies. Chapter 3 investigates the incentives on
care and activity levels when the activity is automated, and provides a fruitful theo-
retical framework to study how residual liability could promote the adoption of such
technologies.
It is worth stressing that the six sub-principles that we considered in this chapter are
not alternatives to Calabresi’s (1970) “cheapest-cost-avoider”, but rather components
of it. The cheapest-cost-avoider principle stands untouched as the unifying criterion
that should guide the optimal allocation of the residual loss: the combined effect of the
several factors involved will ultimately determine who should be the bearer of residual
27For a review of the literature on this point, see Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2006).
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liability. The existence of countervailing arguments arising from our analysis should
not therefore be understood as obscuring Calabresi’s (1970) criterion, but rather eluci-
dating it. Analyzing the cheapest-cost-avoider principle into sub-principles therefore
gives us a handle, with which to carry out the analysis, and the aggregate effect of those
factors will determine which party is the cheapest cost-avoider if one exists. A good
dose of skepticism is warranted about the ability of policymakers to apply each and ev-
ery sub-principle considered in this chapter, given the difﬁculty in measuring some of
the factors involved. But these measurement problems are indeed a point of strength of
loss-sharing solutions. For practical necessity, when useful information is not known
to the judicial system, loss-sharing rules provide a pragmatic and possibly superior
alternative to rules in which one party bears the entire accident costs. In other words,
in cases where the cheapest-cost-avoider principle fails to uniquely identify one of the
parties, loss-sharing may emerge as the most desirable and equitable solution. The
second-best liability regime, while suboptimal by deﬁnition, may be usefully reframed
as being the optimal (i.e., ﬁrst-best) distribution of residual liability with the constraint
that the total liability assigned cannot be greater than the accident loss, as when de-
coupling is carried out. And it is not difﬁcult to see that in many (perhaps most) cases,
such an optimum will fall somewhere between the limiting cases of negligence and
strict-liability regimes, contrary to current adjudicatory practices.
As a ﬁnal note, it is worth noting that this chapter has shown the conditions under
which loss-sharing rules are more desirable than traditional all-or-nothing rules by fo-
cusing on primary and secondary costs of accidents, that is, on deterrence and on the
59
optimal risk spreading and risk bearing. More speciﬁcally, Calabresi (1970) consid-
ered the total costs of accidents as divided into three categories: primary, secondary
and tertiary costs. Primary costs are the accident costs which can be reduced by the
prevention of accidents (deterrence). Secondary costs are the costs due to an inefﬁ-
cient distribution of the accident losses and can be reduced by optimally spreading
the risk and the cost of accidents over society in such a way that individuals who are
more able or more willing to bear the costs do bear them (optimal risk spreading and
risk bearing). Tort law aims at minimizing primary and secondary accident costs as
long as such minimization outweighs the increase in tertiary costs it causes (see also
Visscher, 2010 on the categories of accident costs). Tertiary costs are the administra-
tive costs of accident systems. The issue arising is that loss-sharing rules may lead
to higher tertiary costs compared to all-or-nothing based rules. Among others, Rubin-
feld (1987) and Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2005) argued that a negligence-based
system with loss-sharing rules among negligence parties (namely, the rule of com-
parative negligence) may result in higher administrative costs because there are more
cases to adjudicate and/or a higher cost per case. A similar reasoning may apply to
loss-sharing rules among non-negligent parties. The comparison between loss-sharing
rules and all-or-nothing rules in terms of tertiary costs warrants further investigations.
If loss-sharing rules and all-or-nothing rules are equivalent with respect to care and
activity levels incentives, then tertiary costs should guide the allocation of the residual
loss, and all-or-nothing based rule might appear more desirable.
To conclude, Chapter 2 gives several insights for further research on the allocation
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of the residual liability. For example, future studies can analyze how to allocate the
residual loss when one of the two parties can take precautions most cheaply (cheapest
precaution taker), or can take the most effective precautions (the most effective pre-
caution taker). Further investigations could study how to foster second-best activity
levels when parties can alternatively undertake durable and non-durable precautions.
Moreover, residual liability is relevant not only with respect to activity-level incentives,
but also for investments in new precautions technologies. Different allocations of the
residual loss among non-negligent parties could promote second-best non-observable
precautions and foster the development and adoption of new precautionary technolo-
gies. This opens the perspective for further research questions on the relationship
between tort law and new safer technologies. My second research question goes along
this path. Chapter 3 deals with new automated technologies (e.g., driverless cars, au-
tomated drones) and analyzes their impact on the law of torts.
2.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. Let us consider a general negligence-based liability rule, where
σ denotes the sharing rule between non-negligent parties, θ denotes the sharing rule
between negligent parties, xd∗ and yd∗ are given standards of care. Under the structural-
form model of our analysis, the private maximization problem of the injurer is deﬁned
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as follows:
max
x,z
UT =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
w(z,x)−σq(z,u)L(x,y) if x ≥ xd∗ and y ≥ yd∗
w(z,x)−θq(z,u)L(x,y) if x < xd∗ and y < yd∗
w(z,x)−q(z,u)L(x,y) if x < xd∗ and y ≥ yd∗
w(z,x) if x ≥ xd∗ and y < yd∗
(2.5.1)
Similarly, the private maximization problem for the victim is deﬁned as follows:
max
y,u
UV =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
b(u,y)− (1−σ)q(z,u)L(x,y) if x ≥ xd∗ and y ≥ yd∗
b(u,y)− (1−θ)q(z,u)L(x,y) if x < xd∗ and y < yd∗
b(u,y) if x < xd∗ and y ≥ yd∗
b(u,y)−q(z,u)L(x,y) if x ≥ xd∗ and y < yd∗
(2.5.2)
In order to prove that parties have incentives to comply with the due-care standard,
we will proceed stepwise by showing that neither party has incentives to deviate from
the due-care equilibrium by investing in suboptimal or excessive care.
Claim 1: No Under-Precautions. In equilibrium, the injurer is not able to increase
his payoff by undertaking less than due care, i.e.,
w(z∗,xd∗)−σ∗∗q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)> w(z,x)−q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗) (2.5.3)
for all ∀x < xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗).
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Proof of Claim 1. Given that xd∗, yd∗, u∗= u(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗), and z∗= z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗)
maximize the social welfare function (2.2.1), we have:
w(z∗,xd∗)+b(u∗,yd∗)−q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗) = (2.5.4)
= w(z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗),xd∗)+b(u∗,yd∗)−q(z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗),u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)
(2.5.5)
> w(z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗),x)+b(u∗,yd∗)−q(z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗),u∗)L(x,yd∗)
(2.5.6)
for all ∀x < xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗). Since σ∗∗ ∈ [0,1], we have that:
w(z∗,xd∗)−σ∗∗q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)> w(z∗,xd∗)−q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗) (2.5.7)
It follows that:
w(z∗,xd∗)−σ∗∗q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)> w(z,x)−q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗) (2.5.8)
for all ∀x < xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗), which proves Claim 1.
Claim 2: No Over-Precautions. In equilibrium, the injurer is not able to increase
his payoff by undertaking more than due care, i.e.,
w(z∗,xd∗)−σ∗∗q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)> w(z,x)−σ∗∗q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗) (2.5.9)
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∀x > xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗).
Proof of Claim 2. Since z∗ = z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗), u∗ = u(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗), xd∗ and yd∗
maximize the social welfare function (2.2.1), we have:
w(z∗,xd∗)−q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗) = w(z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗),xd∗)−q(z(xd∗,yd∗,σ∗∗),u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)
≥ w(z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗),x)−q(z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗),u∗)L(x,yd∗)
= w(z,x)−q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗)
∀x > xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗). Accordingly we have:
w(z∗,xd∗)−σ∗∗q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗) = w(z∗,xd∗)−q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)+(1−σ∗∗)q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)
≥ w(z,x)−q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗)+(1−σ∗∗)q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)
> w(z,x)−q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗)+(1−σ∗∗)q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗)
∀x > xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗). It follows that:
w(z∗,xd∗)−σ∗∗q(z∗,u∗)L(xd∗,yd∗)> w(z,x)−σ∗∗q(z,u∗)L(x,yd∗) (2.5.10)
∀x > xd∗ and z = z(x,yd∗,σ∗∗), which proves Claim 2.
We thus proved that parties’ compliance with the due-care standards is not under-
mined under a generic fault-based liability system with loss sharing among faultless
parties. It follows that activity-level incentives can be studied with a reduced-form
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model in which the social and private optimization problems are expressed as in (2.2.1),
(2.2.4) and (2.2.5).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. By considering (2.2.6) and (2.2.7), the second-order ef-
fects of marginal changes in σ on the privately optimal activity levels are given by:
dz∗
dσ
=
qzL
wzz−σqzzL (2.5.11a)
du∗
dσ
=− quL
buu− (1−σ)quuL (2.5.11b)
By considering (2.2.6) and (2.2.7), and substituting (2.5.11), (2.2.8) becomes:
(1−σ)q2z
wzz−σqzzL −
σq2u
buu− (1−σ)quuL = 0 (2.5.12)
In order to isolate the riskiness of activity from the other factors, we consider symmet-
rical parties except for qz and qu. When qz = qu, (2.5.12) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ = 1/2.
By applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain:
∂σ∗∗
∂qz
=
−2(1−σ)qz
(wzz−σqzzL)
(
q2u(−buu+quuL)
(buu−(1−σ)quuL)2 +
q2z (−wzz+qzzL)
(wzz−σqzzL)2
) (2.5.13)
which is positive by construction. Similarly,
∂σ∗∗
∂qu
=
2σqu
(buu− (1−σ)quuL)
(
q2u(−buu+quuL)
(buu−(1−σ)quuL)2 +
q2z (−wzz+qzzL)
(wzz−σqzzL)2
) (2.5.14)
65
which is negative by construction. Given that σ∗∗ = 1/2 when qz = qu, (2.5.13) and
(2.5.14) imply that when qz > qu, σ∗∗ > 1/2; whereas when qz < qu, σ∗∗ < 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. In order to isolate the value of activity from the other fac-
tors, we consider symmetrical parties except for wz and bu. By considering (2.2.6) and
(2.2.7), and substituting (2.5.11), (2.2.8) becomes:
(1−σ)wz
σ(wzz−σqzzL) −
σbu
(1−σ)(buu− (1−σ)quuL) = 0 (2.5.15)
When wz = bu, (2.5.15) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ = 1/2. By applying the implicit function
theorem, we obtain:
∂σ∗∗
∂wz
=
1−σ
σ(−wzz+σqzzL)
(
wz(−wzz+(2−σ)σqzzL)
σ2(wzz−σqzzL)2 +
bu(−buu+(1−σ2)quuL)
(1−σ)2(buu−(1−σ)quuL)2
) (2.5.16)
which is negative by construction. Similarly,
∂σ∗∗
∂bu
=
σ
(1−σ)(−buu+(1−σ)quuL)
(
wz(−wzz+(2−σ)σqzzL)
σ2(wzz−σqzzL)2 +
bu(−buu+(1−σ2)quuL)
(1−σ)2(buu−(1−σ)quuL)2
)
(2.5.17)
which is positive by construction. Given that σ∗∗ = 1/2 when wz = bu, (2.5.16) and
(2.5.17) imply that when wz > bu, σ∗∗ < 1/2; whereas when wz < bu, σ∗∗ > 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. This follows straightforwardly from the previous proofs.
In order to isolate the value and the riskiness of activity from the other factors,
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we consider symmetrical parties except for wz, bu, qz, qu. Let consider (2.5.12) and
(2.5.15). Ceteris paribus, when wz = bu and qz = qu, (2.5.12) and (2.5.15) are satisﬁed
for σ∗∗ = 1/2. From (2.5.13), (2.5.14), (2.5.16), and (2.5.17), we obtain that when
qz < qu and wz > bu, (2.5.12) and (2.5.15) are satisﬁed for σ∗∗ < 1/2; whereas when
qz > qu and wz < bu, (2.5.12) and (2.5.15) are satisﬁed for σ∗∗ > 1/2. When qz < qu,
(2.5.12) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ > 1/2; when wz < bu, (2.5.15) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ < 1/2.
When qz < qu and wz < bu, and ∂σ∗∗/∂qz ∼ ∂σ∗∗/∂wz, neither of the two effects
prevails, thus (2.2.8) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ = 1/2. Similarly, when qz > qu, (2.5.12) is
satisﬁed for σ∗∗ < 1/2; when wz > bu, (2.5.15) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ > 1/2. When
qz > qu and wz > bu, and ∂σ∗∗/∂qz ∼ ∂σ∗∗/∂wz, neither of the two effects prevails,
thus (2.2.8) is satisﬁed for σ∗∗ = 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4. When qzu = 0, the second-order sufﬁciency condition for
σ∗∗ to be an interior second-best solution requires:
(
∂u∗
∂σ
)2
(buu−quuL)+
(
∂ z∗
∂σ
)2
(wzz−qzzL)+
− ∂
2u∗
∂σ2
σquL− ∂
2z∗
∂σ2
(1−σ)qzL−2qzu∂u
∗
∂σ
∂ z∗
∂σ
< 0 (2.5.18)
Condition (2.5.18) is always satisﬁed when qzu < 0. Condition (2.5.18) is more likely
to be violated when qzu > 0 and large, which requires by contradiction σ∗∗ ∈ {0,1}.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.5. The second-order sufﬁciency condition for σ∗∗ to be an
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interior second-best solution requires:
(
∂u∗
∂σ
)2
(buu−quuL)+
(
∂ z∗
∂σ
)2
(wzz−qzzL)− ∂
2u∗
∂σ2
σquL− ∂
2z∗
∂σ2
(1−σ)qzL < 0
(2.5.19)
Condition (2.5.19) is always satisﬁed when wzz,buu < 0. Condition (2.5.19) is more
likely to be violated when wzz,buu > 0 and large, requiring by contradiction σ∗∗ ∈
{0,1}.
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3. Tort Law for Robots28
Since our ancient ancestors ﬁrst fashioned stone tools, mankind has progressively
altered his environment in greater degrees—tilling the soil, building cities, devising
machines—to ease the burdens of daily life. We see these changes reﬂected in the
history of our laws, metamorphosing to suit the social conditions they were meant to
govern. From transformations in our political arrangements to advances in science and
technology, nowhere is the relationship between social conditions and the law more
evident than in torts. As primitive societies learned to control and exploit natural re-
sources, they grew wealthy (Posner, 1980). And so the earliest penal codes gave way
(when efﬁcient) to a framework allowing the private payment of compensatory dam-
ages in place of punishment (Parisi, 2001). Later, as agrarian communities, consisting
of sparse populations of neighbors, transformed to densely populated cities, consisting
of multitudes of strangers densely packed together, the balance of harms moved from
28 This Chapter is largely based on my paper “Tort Law for Robots,” coauthored with Daniel Pi
(University of Bologna, Department of Economics; University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Eco-
nomics). The authors would like to thank Carole Billiet, Emanuela Carbonara, Andrew Daughety, Luigi
Alberto Franzoni, Fernando Gómez Pomar, Peter Krebs, Marco Bochatay Magnani, Alessio Maria Pac-
ces, Francesco Parisi, Jennifer F. Reinganum, Ann-Soﬁe Vandenberghe, Louis T. Visscher for helpful
comments and suggestions, as well as seminar audiences at the 2014 Annual Conference of the Euro-
pean Association of Law and Economics at the University of Aix-Marseille, the 2014 Annual Meeting
of the German Law and Economics Association at University of Ghent, the 2014 EDLE spring seminar
at the Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics.
intentional to accidental. And so the attention of tort lawyers, judges, and scholars
shifted toward the treatment of negligent harms. Later still, the development of in-
dustrialization and mass production introduced harms of a wholly different nature and
scale (Stearns, 2012, p. 122; Hall et al., 1996, p. 116; White, 2003, p. 70). And so the
law responded with procedural innovations allowing mass litigation and new rules for
products liability.
Underlying these tectonic shifts in the trajectory of tort law, we see the transforma-
tion from nomadic to agrarian society, urban migration, and the industrial revolution.
So much is but history, yet glancing forward to the future, we may already anticipate
a fast-approaching revolutionary change, which is likely to challenge our present legal
rules. Our conception of tort law has hitherto assumed the existence of two human
actors underlying a tort—a tortfeasor and a victim. Yet this assumption grows ever
more tenuous with the advancement of automated technologies. Industrialized nations
are already populated by more automated devices than people. The role of humans
in society today bears little resemblance to the role of humans a century ago. Today,
our copyists are luminescent boxes, our launderers are whirling metal cylinders, our
assembly line workers are mechanized arms, our accountants are silicon chips. Work
which had for centuries occupied legions of farmers, today requires but a handful of
machine operators. Yet until the last couple decades, the legal effect of all this automa-
tion has been marginal, because the decisions made by machines were, by and large,
trivial and routine. The machine has hitherto been little more than an extension of the
operator’s will, incapable of forming its own judgments or acting independently. This
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state of affairs is rapidly changing, and as computers develop both in power and so-
phistication, the line between actor and tool, decision-making and routine, grows ever
more difﬁcult to discern.
Machines are now capable of driving cars, operating trains, delivering packages to
homes, piloting aircraft, killing or destroying military targets, and performing surgical
procedures with little or no human input. And this is only the beginning. Amidst
these revolutionary changes, we are faced with the natural question—whither the law
of torts?29 For inasmuch as machines relieve us of the burden of making ever-more-
complex decisions, and though errors may occur at dramatically lower rates with robots
as compared to humans, accidents will nevertheless occur. And when a driverless car
careens into a pedestrian, or a robot surgeon botches a procedure, what should the legal
rule be? If liability is assigned, then upon whom should that liability fall: manufacturer
or operator? If some variation of the negligence rule, then what should the standard of
negligence be?
In this study, we offer a general theoretical approach to automated technology torts.
Our aim will be to determine what legal rule is efﬁcient in cases where injury is caused
by automated technology. Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd that the ordinary rules governing
negligent humans are inefﬁcient when the actor is a machine. Under more speciﬁc
conditions, we shall ﬁnd that the eccentricities of the particular circumstances largely
determine how we should respond, leading to several concrete albeit nuanced results.
29This question is not only pressing for lawyers and economists—popular media coverage of auto-
mated technology developments invariably poses the tort law question as one in urgent need of answer
(Strumpf, 2011; Vanderbilt, 2013).
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We divide the adoption of automated technologies into three stages. Let us call
the ﬁrst stage the “experimental phase.” The experimental phase occurs prior to avail-
ability of the product to consumers. Since the product will not be commonly available
during this time, the signiﬁcance of tort law for the technology will be marginal, and
we shall therefore offer no analysis of this period. Next, the “adoption stage,” during
which time the technology is either as safe or safer than human actors and consumers
are given a choice whether to purchase manual or automated technologies. Finally,
the “reﬁnement stage,” the point at which all or nearly all consumers have adopted the
automated technology.
From an economic perspective, the main objective of tort law is to reduce the so-
cial cost of accidents (or equivalently, to maximize the value of risky activities). In the
adoption stage, this problem reduces to two competing objectives. On the one hand,
given that automated technologies will tend to be safer than human operated analogues,
we will want to encourage consumers to adopt automated alternatives. At a ﬁrst glance,
lowering the expected cost of liability for automated technologies would seem to gen-
erate such incentives. On the other hand, we will want to encourage manufacturers
to invest in making the automated technology safer. Here, increasing the expected
cost of liability—forcing manufacturers to internalize the cost of accidents caused by
their technology—would seem to generate the right incentives. These objectives pull
us in different directions, and we shall want to ﬁnd a balance, encouraging further re-
search in automated technology safety, while also encouraging consumers to adopt the
technology. We shall ﬁnd that tailoring the standard of care under negligence for hu-
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man operators to the level of automation will in most cases create efﬁcient incentives.
Additionally, we shall rebut an argument frequently articulated in the literature: that
automated technologies open the door to creating efﬁcient activity levels incentives.
We argue that in the adoption stage at least, tort law cannot create efﬁcient activity
level incentives for all parties.
In the reﬁnement stage, we assume that adoption of the automated technology is
nearly total—in other words, most users have opted to switch from human-operated
technologies to automated technologies where the two are substitutes. Here, we shall
ﬁnd that the legal rule which was efﬁcient during the adoption phase, no longer creates
efﬁcient incentives. Thus, we argue that the legal rule should change when the adoption
rate of the automated technology is total or nearly total. Anticipating this rule change,
it is possible that manufacturers and consumers will attempt to game the system. We
argue that this effect will be largely mitigated by competition and information costs.
This chapter consists of ﬁve sections. Section 3.1 summarizes the related economic
and legal literature. Section 3.2 establishes an important lemma, upon which all of our
main results will rely. In Section 3.3 we construct a model of unilateral accidents to
account for automated products. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 examine the implications of the
model for care and activity levels, respectively. And ﬁnally, Section 3.6 concludes with
a summary of our results.
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3.1 Related Literature
We draw from two strands in the prior literature: research on individualized vs.
uniform standards of negligence, and research on liability for safety technologies. This
section brieﬂy reviews each of them.
3.1.1 Individualized vs. Uniform Standards of Negligence
Several contributions have already analyzed how care incentives change in the pres-
ence of (i) injurers for whom the cost of care and wealth differ (Rubinfeld, 1987; Arlen,
1992; Miceli and Segerson, 1995; Schmitz, 2000); (ii) victims for whom the magni-
tude of harm, ability, and the cost of care differ (Landes and Posner, 1987; Kaplow
and Shavell, 1996; Miceli, 1997; Ganuza and Gomez, 2005), and (iii) victims and
injurers that differ in their relative gain from their risky activities (Emons, 1990a,b;
Emons and Sobel, 1991). In the presence of heterogeneity, the question is whether
due care standards should be tailored on an individual basis or whether they should be
set to some sort of “average.” Several scholars have argued that the use of a reason-
able person standard for a heterogeneous population is inefﬁcient. In the presence of
differing marginal rates of beneﬁt, risk of harm, ability, and effectiveness of care, the
efﬁcient investment in precautions will differ from individual to individual, and thus a
blanket standard would necessarily be inefﬁcient (Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell,
1987; Schwartz, 1989; Parisi, 1992; Ganuza and Gomez, 2005; Miceli, 2006; Endres
and Friehe, 2011b). Yet it is contended that the application of a uniform standard is
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justiﬁed when it is costly to assess the individuals’ precautionary care costs (Diamond,
1974; Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987).
3.1.2 Safety Innovations, Automated Technologies and Liability
Issues
Although automated technologies have not previously been investigated using for-
mal law and economics models, categories of technology with many interesting simi-
larities to automated technologies have been studied in the literature. In our analysis,
we shall treat automated technologies as possessing two distinguishing characteristics.
First, automated technologies may be regarded as “durable precautions.” From the
consumer’s perspective, the reduction in the expected cost of accidents comes with the
one-time, up-front cost of purchasing the automated good. From the manufacturer’s
perspective, the reduction in the expected cost of accidents comes with the one-time,
up-front cost of researching (and outﬁtting factories to produce) the technology.
The second salient feature of automated technology safety is that it is a substitute
for human precaution. When a human actor is replaced by an automated technology,
not only does the automated technology reduce the expected cost of accidents, it also
reduces the effectiveness of the human actor’s efforts.
The durable precautions aspect of automated technologies has been extensively re-
searched in the prior literature. Grady (1988) ﬁrst deﬁned precautions as “durable” if
they are long-lasting and require a single isolated measure to be taken; and as “non-
durable” if they must be taken per unit of activity. This distinction has been then
75
applied in several models: Shavell (2008) argued the desirability of protecting durable
precautions from changes in legal rules; Nussim and Tabbach (2009) revised the tra-
ditional model of unilateral accidents by introducing durable and nondurable precau-
tions; De Mot and Depoorter (2011) focused on memory costs and showed that ac-
cidents involving nondurable technology occur more frequently than those involving
durable technology; Dari-Mattiacci and Franzoni (2014) demonstrated that due-care
standards should be conditioned on the impact of new technologies on expected harm.
Following the deﬁnitions introduced by Grady (1988, 2009), automated technologies
may be considered “compliance-saving” for their users and “compliance-using” for
manufacturers. Grady (2009, pp. 213-16) introduced the distinction between tech-
nologies which are substitutes for precautionary care levels, which save on compliance
effort (e.g., parking sensors, advanced navigation system), and technologies which are
complements to care levels, which require high rates of nondurable precaution and thus
increase compliance effort (e.g., new hemodialysis machine). By relying on a graph-
ical analysis, Grady (2009) argued that compliance-saving technologies make negli-
gent liability less likely and thus reduce the ﬂow of negligence accidents. The opposite
holds true with compliance-using technologies, inasmuch as they increase the oppor-
tunities for negligent behavior for the human operators. In this terminology, we may
describe automation as being durable, compliance-saving technology since the range
of human intervention (thus, of human error) is narrowed (Grady, 1987, 2009; De Mot
and Depoorter, 2011). Moreover, if considered in a dynamic perspective, compliance-
using technologies tend to evolve over time in compliance-saving technologies (Grady,
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2009). Following the example by Grady (2009), at the beginning of its production, air-
liner technology required a constant monitoring activity in order to be effective. With
the development of automated devices, airliner technology started to monitor itself and
to autonomously activate the alert system in case of danger.
Beyond the analytical distinction between different types of technology, other con-
tributions have compared the incentive effects of alternative liability systems to induce
the adoption of safer technologies (Dari-Mattiacci and Franzoni, 2014). Similarly,
in the environmental ﬁeld there are several contributions exploring how to foster the
development of new technologies to control pollution (Faure, 2009b, Section 10.4; En-
dres et al., 2008; Endres and Friehe, 2011a, 2012, 2013). Among others, Endres and
Bertram (2006) compared the dynamic effects of strict liability and negligence rules
on parties’ choices to introduce efﬁcient progress in technologies that reduce precau-
tionary care costs; Endres and Friehe (2013) inquired what due care standards would
induce technological advances in environmental contexts; Dari-Mattiacci and Franzoni
(2014) proposed setting negligence standards tailored to safety technologies available
to the parties. More generally, Parchomovsky and Stein (2008) discussed the adverse
effect of tort law on innovation. Other scholars have considered the effect of imperfect
information about a product’s future risks (e.g., Wade, 1983 and Ben-Shahar, 1998
analyzed innovation incentives when useful information about the future risks of a
product is not available at the time of production), and the intertwined relationship
between innovation, competition and punitive damages (Baumann and Heine, 2013).
Legal scholars have also investigated the effects of liability on incentives for harms
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caused by automated product malfunctions in speciﬁc product areas. The general anal-
ysis of liability for software defects has received much attention in the legal literature
(Levy and Bell, 1989). Some of the most widely studied software-related accidents are
linked to the medical industry (Lawrence, 1987). Among others, Leveson and Turner
(1993) presented a detailed accident investigation on the radiation overdoses caused
by a computerized therapy machine. Medical liability for software and automated
equipment defects has been among the most hotly debated issues in courts and recent
tort scholarship. De Ville (1998) provided a comprehensive historical framework of
the late 20th century medical malpractice litigation in the United States, highlighting
the pivotal role of the development and proliferation of new medical technologies in
litigation.
More recently, several contributions have questioned whether the current tort rules
represent a barrier for the development and widespread diffusion of self-driving cars.
Three approaches to the emergence of self-driving automobiles have been proposed:
(1) that the current product liability law is still effective and adaptable to self-driven
vehicles; (2) that a systematic review of the traditional tort system is needed to allow
the development and production of safety technologies in a timely fashion; (3) that
no prediction is possible until the new technologies will be placed on the market. As
regards the ﬁrst argument, Garza (2011) argued that product liability law in its present
state may not need to be amended for autonomous vehicles. He claimed that, despite
criticism, the expected increase in manufacturer liability will not be a “dire concern”
since self-driven cars will make automobile travel safer, leading to a net decrease in
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the costs of liability, insurance and litigation. Similarly, Mele (2013) argued that the
traditional negligence rules, together with regulatory changes, could overcome the cur-
rent legal barriers. On the opposite, Calo (2010) analyzed the commercial prospects of
robotics in United States, suggesting tort immunity for manufacturers in order to en-
courage aggressive development of this technology. He further proposes supplement-
ing manufacturer immunity with markets for user insurance. Marchant and Lindor
(2012) analyzed some legal tools that may protect manufacturers from the expected
increase in liability, and discussed the possibility that manufacturers’ immunity may
reduce the incentives to make incremental improvements in the safety of autonomous
systems. Among other, Graham (2012) supported the third argument, emphasizing the
uncertainty surrounding the application of tort law to emerging technologies. He ar-
gued that the precise content of the legal rules for autonomous cars will remain unclear
until these vehicles will appear on public highways.
Though relevant to our present inquiry, these considerations have focused princi-
pally on product malfunctions, where the victim is the product user. Though still at
an early stage, the literature here is developing quite rapidly, and we shall have little
to say about these particular issues. Rather, we will focus on cases where victims are
third parties, and where the accident is not necessarily due to a design ﬂaw or product
defect. In setting our analysis we start from the premise that an accident arising from
the actions of a robot actor is not, ipso facto, be the result of a design ﬂaw or man-
ufacturing defect. To see why this is not the case, consider chess-playing computer
programs. Chess is a useful exemplar, insofar as it is an area where computers are
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tasked with decision-making problems, formerly the domain of human experts. The
technology is now at a point where a typical home computer far outclasses the best
human players, and yet there remain certain kinds of rare positions, which humans are
still better at evaluating. We would not regard such “blind spots” as being design ﬂaws
or errors—and over the course of a game the slight inaccuracies that may arise from
such specialized situations are unlikely to offset the overall superior play of computers.
To bring the analogy closer to our discussion, in the case of self-driving automo-
biles, there may arise very specialized circumstances when a human driver would avoid
an accident better than a robot. Because an automated technology operates by apply-
ing general rules, there may always be special cases, which fall outside the scope of
the algorithm, where a human decision-maker might perform better. For example, a
human driver may know from experience that a particular stretch of road is unusually
slippery, or that he should avoid a certain street that local teens use for drag racing on
weekends. Yet failing to account for every special circumstance, of which there are
innumerably many, should not be regarded as a design ﬂaw or error—particularly if
robots outperform humans in the vast majority of “normal” situations.
Though the economic literature addresses the elements of automated technology
torts, such as durable precautions and compliance-saving technology, and though the
legal literature addresses certain specialized questions about the tort implications of
automated technologies, no one has yet introduced a general theoretical approach to
robot torts. Our contribution may be seen as synthesizing the prior literature, along
with several fresh insights, to construct a uniﬁed theoretical approach to torts where
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automated technologies cause injury.
3.2 Allocating Liability between Consumers andManu-
facturers
It is frequently asked in the popular media, in case of injury caused by a robot,
who should bear the cost of the accident—the consumer or the manufacturer?30 In this
section, we shall argue that this question is (mostly) irrelevant.
In ordinary (human) torts, we impose liability to force prospective tortfeasors to in-
ternalize the expected cost of injury. This incentivizes prospective injurers to exercise
the optimal level of precautionary care when undertaking risky activities. The cal-
culus changes completely with automated technologies—automated technologies are
insensitive to “incentives,” and simply execute ﬁxed (though possibly very complex)
routines. Assuming that we are past the “experimental” stage, and that robots are at
least as safe or safer than human operators, we are faced with two objectives. First, to
reduce the social cost of accidents, we will want manufacturers to invest in research to
make automated technologies ever safer. Second, we will to want consumers to adopt
the safer automated technologies.
These objectives push us in opposing directions. In order to incentivize manu-
facturers to invest in improving safety, it is natural to suppose that we should impose
30See, e.g., U.S. News and World Report, Tesla’s Next Hurdle: Who’s to Blame if a Self-Driving
Car Crashes?, available at: http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/03/teslas-next-hurdle-whos-
to-blame-if-a-self-driving-car-crashes (last access on August 1, 2015).
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liability on them, forcing them to internalize the cost of accidents. Yet this will increase
the price of the product, reducing the rate of adoption. Likewise in the reverse direc-
tion, reducing liability will decrease prices and increase the rate of adoption, but it will
also reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to invest in researching further in safety. In the
next sections, we will discuss how to balance these objectives, treating manufacturers
and consumers of automated technologies as if they were a single entity—collectively,
the “tortfeasor.” Treating manufacturers and consumers/users as one party greatly sim-
pliﬁes our analysis. However, we must ﬁrst establish that this is a valid move.
Let us begin by considering what it would look like if there were a problem lumping
manufacturers and consumers together. Why would this be? The concern is that the
efﬁcient liability rule for automated activities, in case of an accident loss L, may be
some assignment αγL, (1−α)γL, and (1− γ)L for the manufacturer, consumer, and
victim respectively, where γ ∈ (0,1) is the share of liability borne by the injurers, and
α ∈ (0,1) is the share of injurer liability borne by the manufacturer.
Thus, in order to prove that manufacturers and consumers may be lumped together,
given a liability burden γL, we need to show that for any assignment of liability be-
tween manufacturer and consumer α , the manufacturer’s and consumer’s incentives
remain unaffected. To see why this is the case, think of γL as an excise tax on the
use of automated products. If the tax is imposed on the consumer, then that decreases
the marginal beneﬁt he derives from use of that good, and he will consume less of it.
Therefore, demand for the good decreases, which in turn reduces the manufacturer’s
incentive to produce the good. If, on the other hand, the tax is imposed on the manu-
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facturer, then assuming it is a competitive market, the manufacturer will increase the
price of the good, effectively “passing on” the cost of the tax to the consumer, who will
then consume less of the good, reducing the payoff for the manufacturer.
In either case, the effect will be identical. For any value of α ∈ (0,1), manu-
facturers and consumers/users will share the cost of the tax γL. Manufacturers will
“pay” in the form of reduced demand, and consumers/users will “pay” either directly
through liability (if liability is assigned to consumers/users) or indirectly through the
increase in prices (if liability is assigned to the manufacturer).
Formally, let a≥ 0 denote the manufacturer’s investment in automation which gen-
erally improve performance and safety of a product. The price that the manufacturer
charges to the consumer for the product is denoted with π(a), which increases as the
level of product automation a increases at a decreasing rate, i.e., π ′ > 0, π ′′ < 0. Let
x and w denote respectively the care level and the activity level chosen by consumers.
The demand function of consumers for automated products D(a,π) is increasing in the
automation level and decreasing in the price, i.e., Da > 0, Daa ≤ 0, Dπ < 0, Dππ ≥ 0.
Let V (a,w) be the beneﬁt that consumers derive as a function of automation and activ-
ity levels, with Va,Vw > 0,Vaa,Vww ≤ 0.
Let p(x,a) denote the probability of an accident, which is decreasing in both the
care level x and the automation level a, i.e., px, pa < 0, pxx, paa ≥ 0. Let the symbol λ
be the expected cost of accidents borne by the consumer and the manufacturer in case
of an accident involving a third party, with λ (x,a) = γw p(x,a)L. The remaining part
of the expected accident loss, i.e., λ¯ (x,a) = (1−γ)w p(x,a)L, might fall upon the third
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party, which we assume cannot take any action to prevent the accident (e.g., a ﬂying
drone falling upon a pedestrian; a driverless car hitting a vehicle properly parked).
We express the liability rule’s incentive effects by assigning the cost of accidents to
λM = α γw p(x,a)L or λC = (1−α)γw p(x,a)L. For example, if the manufacturer is
strictly liable, then λM = λ (x,a) and λC = 0; if the consumer is strictly liable, then
λC = λ (x,a) and λM = 0. Now the private welfare functions of the manufacturer and
consumer will be:
M(a,w,x) = D(a,π(a))[π(a)−λM(x,a)]−a (3.2.1)
C(a,w,x) =V (w,a)−π(a)−λC(x,a)−wx (3.2.2)
And the social welfare function will be M+C:
S = D(a,π(a))[V (w,a)−λ(x,a)−wx]−a (3.2.3)
Lemma 3.2.1 (Irrelevance of Liability Assignment Between Manufacturer and Con-
sumer). Under symmetric information, given some division of the accident loss L be-
tween the victim (1− γ)wpL and tortfeasors γwpL, the further division of liabilities
between manufacturer λM, and the consumer/user λC will not affect incentives to in-
vest in precautionary care or research and development of automated technologies,
assuming there exists a competitive market.
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Proof. See Appenix 3.7.
Thus, for any assignment of liability on the tortfeasor, it is irrelevant with respect
to innovation incentives and the adoption rate of automated technologies whether the
“tortfeasor” is the manufacturer or the consumer (or some admixture of the two). In ei-
ther case, the incentive effects on manufacturers and consumers will be shared through
pricing and demand.
Of course, in the foregoing analysis we have assumed that manufacturers and con-
sumers are rational and that there is symmetric information.31 We shall not attempt
a rigorous treatment here, however it is worth remarking that the possible effects of
cognitive biases are unclear. For example, on the one hand, if we assume that con-
sumers are risk averse, then this suggests that liability should be assigned on manu-
facturers rather than consumers (distributing accident costs through pricing). If, on the
other hand, we assume that consumers are optimistic, then they may think they will be
“luckier” than other consumers, in which case they would rather not have the cost of
accidents priced into the good, suggesting liability should be imposed on consumers.
When both biases are present, it is unclear which prevails, or indeed whether they
cancel each other out.
31Under asymmetric information, producers may know the risks of their products whereas consumers
do not. In these cases, the allocation of liability between manufacturers and consumers become relevant
and contingent upon the stage of technological development.
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3.3 The Model: Setting the Stage
We will construct a simple unilateral care model in which the potential tortfeasor
(T) inﬂuences the risk of an accident by choosing automated technology, precautionary
care, and activity levels. We assume that in case of an accident, only the victim suffers
a loss (L > 0). The injurer beneﬁts from engaging in activity, w and may choose to
expend resources on precautionary care, x or on technological automation, a.
We model automated technologies using two assumptions. First, we assume that
advances in automation reduce the effectiveness of the end-user’s precautions. This
assumption is intuitive; for example, a self-driving car not only relieves human drivers
of their responsibility to exercise care, it also renders such care efforts otiose. Let β (a)
denote the effectiveness of the injurer’s precautions as a function of automated safety
investments, which is decreasing in a at a constant or increasing rate (βa < 0 , βaa ≤ 0).
Second, we assume that human precautionary care and automated technology safety
are substitutes. That is, the probability p of an accident occurring decreases as a in-
creases or x increases. Let us deﬁne the “effective care level,” denoted by f (a,x), as an
admixture of a prospective tortfeasor’s precautionary care investment and investment
in automation, i.e.,
f (a,x) = β (a)x+ γa (3.3.1)
where γ > 1 is a multiplier expressing the effectiveness of one unit of automation
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investment relative to one unit of precautionary care on the part of the individual.
The multiplier γ can be interpreted as the “quality of automation,” or better as the
quality of a marginal unit of automation, i.e., the level of care of the manufacturer
in designing and implementing additional levels of automation. In our model, γ is
assumed to be exogenous since the product-user cannot inﬂuence the manufacturing
quality of automation. It follows from these assumptions that advances in automation
increase the effective care level, i.e., fa = γ + βax > 0, and that in the limiting case
when no investment is made in automation, our model simply reduces to the standard
model, i.e., β (0) = 1 and f (0,x) = x.
Let p( f ) denote the probability of an accident, with p f < 0, p f f ≥ 0. By con-
struction, an additional marginal investment in automated safety measures reduces the
probability of an accident at a decreasing rate, i.e., pa < 0, paa > 0.
Let us now consider the rule of negligence, under which the injurer is liable if and
only if he exercised less than due care (we assume that negligence standards are set at
the efﬁcient level).
3.4 Care Levels and Automation
We proceed stepwise by ﬁrst analyzing the model without activity levels.32 The so-
cial planner’s objective is to deﬁne the socially optimal care level in order to minimize
32By maintaining Shavell’s (1980; 1987) traditional assumptions under which the cost of care and
expected harm are proportional to activity level, the results of this section do not change when activity
levels are included in the model (see Section 3.5).
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the total social costs:
min
x
S = x+a+ p( f )L (3.4.1)
The following ﬁrst-order condition deﬁnes the socially optimal care standard x¯ (omit-
ting arguments):
1+β p f L = 0 (3.4.2)
Likewise, the adoption of automated safety technology is socially desirable up to the
point at which the marginal cost of automation equals the total marginal beneﬁt a¯:
1+ p f (βa x+ γ) = 0 (3.4.3)
By considering the relationship between the socially optimal level of care and the
level of activity automation, we obtain the following results:
Proposition 3.4.1. As automation levels increase, the efﬁcient due care standard de-
creases.
Corollary 3.4.2. In the limiting case of fully-automated activities, the standard of due-
care is zero, a Negligence regime effectively becomes a de facto No Liability regime.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.
According to Proposition 3.4.1, the efﬁcient negligence standard should be tailored
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to automation levels. The practical implementability of this proposition requires courts
to set due-care standards contingent upon the level of automation, and to establish the
causal relationship between autonomous devices and accidents. This result is intuitive.
For example, consider a self-parking car hitting a pedestrian. Intuitively, if the ac-
cident happened while parking, courts should apply a lower due-care standard to the
car operator since the system was expected to safely operate the vehicle without hu-
man input. In this case, the concept of reasonable person used to evaluate a negligent
behavior should consider, among others, the speciﬁc circumstances of the case, the
adopted automation level. Yet if instead the accident occurred while the human oper-
ator was driving, the fact that the vehicle is provided with automated-parking devices
should not affect the deﬁnition of the due-care standard.
A higher γ means a higher effectiveness of automation devices in reducing expected
accident costs, thus requiring a lower standard of care for a given automation level. The
effectiveness factor γ can be also interpreted as the development status of an automated
technology. Under this interpretation, for a given automation level, the standard of
negligence should optimally evolve over time to keep pace with the development status
of a given automated technology.
Let us now consider the private incentives to invest in care and automation under
the rule of negligence. The private cost function of the injurer is given as:
min
x
T =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x+a+ p( f )L if x < x¯
x+a if x ≥ x¯
(3.4.4)
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The following ﬁrst-order condition deﬁnes the privately optimal care level x∗ (omitting
arguments):
1+β p f L = 0 (3.4.5)
Proposition 3.4.3. Under tailored negligence standards, injurers will always have in-
centives to comply with the care standard. Under non-tailored negligence standards,
the privately optimal care level falls below the due-care standard as investments in
automation increase. This might induce potential injurers either to exercise excessive
and inefﬁcient care, or to not adhere to the non-tailored standard, preferring to exer-
cise privately optimal care and be considered negligent in case of an accident.
Corollary 3.4.4. Injurers have more incentives to invest in automation under tailored
negligence standards rather than under non-tailored negligence standards.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.
We should remark here on an interesting legal implication. A phenomenon which
has developed gradually over the past several decades is the migration of activities
from the domain of common law torts to regulatory law. Whereas automobile acci-
dents are frequently given as exemplars of tort law, the reality is that most automobile
torts are entirely determined by statutory obligations. Assuming that automated tech-
nologies will tend, at least during the developmental stage of a product, to exhibit a
large degree of heterogeneity, and further assuming that it would be impractical for
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legislatures to enact statutory standards to cover every possible permutation of tech-
nological improvement as they are released to the public, the effect of a “tailored”
negligence standard is to return tort law to its origins. Rather than assessing whether
a defendant’s conduct satisﬁed some statutorily determined standard, the tailored ap-
proach requires judges and juries to decide cases on γ < pL or “reasonable person”
bases.
Standards of negligence tailored to the level of automation underlying the injurer’s
activity allow us to fully exploit the potential beneﬁts of automated technologies. Con-
sider self-driving cars. If the standard of negligence remains unchanged with respect
to automation level, the operator of a self-driving car could be held liable for an acci-
dent if he was not monitoring the road ahead while autonomous devices were driving
the vehicle. In this case, the operator of a driverless car could have incentives either
to always monitor the actions of automated devices, thus nullifying their function, or
to not adopt safer automated devices in order to maintain a direct control on the ve-
hicle. On the contrary, tailored standards are aligned with the purposes of automated
technologies, allowing a driver to be distracted while automated devices are operating
the vehicle, without be threaten by liability issues. As a consequence, under tailored
due-care standards potential injurers have incentives to adopt safer, automated tech-
nologies especially for risky actions, and to prove their actual usage in courts to avoid
full liability costs.
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3.5 Activity Levels and Automation
In this section we introduce activity levels in the model. Let 0≤ k(a)≤ 1 denote the
percentage of activity automation, with ka > 0, kaa ≤ 0, k(0) = 0 (non-automated activ-
ity) and k(a) = 1 when a→+∞ (fully-automated activity). We deﬁne the activity level
q as determined by two components: the automated component, J = k(a) j(a) (here-
after, automated-activity level) and the non-automated component, Z = (1− k(a))z
(hereafter, manual-activity level). For example, a vehicle can be provided with au-
tomatic parking devices and/or with autonomous cruise control, remaining otherwise
non-automated. The activity level is thus given by q = k j+(1− k)z. We posit that
the automated-activity level increases with technological automation at an increasing
or constant level, j(0) = 0, ja > 0, jaa ≥ 0. This assumption follows by considering
the beneﬁts of adopting automated technologies on individual utilities, e.g., increased
productivity, performing tasks that are beyond human capabilities, reduced operation
time, improved quality and consistency of an output. For example, driverless vehicles
are expected to drive more and more safely than trained professional drivers; auto-
mated drones can more safely deliver more packages than traditional courier services.
Let w(Z) denote the utility derived from the manual activity, and b(J) the utility de-
rived from the automated activity, which are both increasing in the activity level at a
constant or decreasing rate, i.e., wZ > 0, wZZ ≤ 0, and bJ > 0, bJJ ≤ 0.
We otherwise follow the standard assumptions in Shavell (1987): expected accident
cost are linear with respect to the activity, i.e., L(x,a,q,γ) = q p( f )L; and care costs
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are a multiple of the manual activity level and a constant per-unit-of-manual-activity
care effort, i.e., c(z,x) = (1− k)zx.
The social problem with care and activity levels can be described as follows:
max
x,z, j
S = w(Z)+b(J)− (1− k)zx−a−qp( f )L (3.5.1)
Note that when a = 0, the socially optimal problem in (3.5.1) turns into its standard
unilateral-case formulation. The socially optimal care level remains deﬁned as in
(3.4.2). The socially optimal activity levels z¯ and j¯ are respectively deﬁned as so-
lutions of the following ﬁst-order conditions:
wZ = x+ pL (3.5.2)
bJ = pL (3.5.3)
which have the standard interpretation: the socially optimal activity level is set at the
point at which the beneﬁt of a marginal increase in activity level (LHS in (3.5.2) and
(3.5.3)) equals the corresponding marginal costs (RHS in (3.5.2) and (3.5.3)). For
similar marginal values of activities, the automated-activity level is optimally greater
than the manual-activity level since the latter implies care costs per unit-of-activity.
Negligence standards are conventionally deﬁned solely in terms of care because
of information costs: the amount and/or the frequency of an activity is usually not
easily observable by courts. This claim should be revised when considering automa-
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tion technologies. By automatically tracing the user’s activity, these technologies can
convey information to courts and juries about the user’s activity level. The automated
part of the activity becomes observable, thus raising the question whether it should be
included in the standard of negligence. The answer lies on the trade-off between cre-
ating incentives for socially optimal automated-activity levels and creating incentives
to adopt automated technologies. In order to show this trade-off, we have to introduce
the private optimization problem.
If the standard of negligence is deﬁned as in (3.4.2) only in terms of care, the
privately optimal problem becomes:
min
x,z, j
T =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
w(Z)+b(J)− (1− k)zx−a−qp( f )L if x < x¯
w(Z)+b(J)− (1− k)zx−a if x ≥ x¯
(3.5.4)
In this case, the injurer will invest in the due-care level x∗1 = x¯, but will exercise ex-
cessive activity q∗1 > q¯, as the standard model predicts. The privately optimal manual-
activity level z∗1 and automated-activity level j
∗
1 are respectively given by:
wZ = x (3.5.5)
bJ = 0 (3.5.6)
which are greater than the socially optimal levels (3.5.2) and (3.5.3), i.e., z∗1 > z¯, j
∗
1 > j¯.
If it is possible and desirable to deﬁne the standard of negligence in terms of both
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care level and automated-activity levels,33 the privately optimal problem becomes:
min
x,z, j
T =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
w(Z)+b(J)− (1− k)zx−a−qp( f )L if x < x¯ or j > j¯
w(Z)+b(J)− (1− k)zx−a if x ≥ x¯ or j ≤ j¯
(3.5.7)
In this case, potential injurers have incentives to invest in the due-care level x∗2 = x¯,
and in a level of activity q∗2 which remains excessive with respect to the socially optimal
level q¯, but mitigated with respect to q∗1, given the extended deﬁnition of the negligence
standard.
Proposition 3.5.1. A negligence standard tailored to the automated-activity level cre-
ates optimal incentives for automated-activity levels but dilutes the incentives to adopt
and use automated devices.
Corollary 3.5.2. If the percentage of automated devices ought to be employed in the
relevant activity is exogenously imposed, the negligence standard could be efﬁciently
set in terms of both care and automated-activity levels. In particular, the due level
of automated activity should increase with the automation level. If the percentage of
automated devices ought to be employed is individually chosen by potential injurers,
a negligence standard tailored to the automated-activity level potentially destroys the
incentives to adopt automated technologies.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.
33We assume that due levels of care and automated activities are set at the socially optimal levels
(3.4.2) and (3.5.3)
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Let us suppose that the percentage of automated devices ought to be employed
in the relevant activity is ﬁxed (e.g., through mandatory equipment regulation) or the
automated technology is commonly and widespread adopted (e.g., aircraft autopilot).
Following our analysis, the users of these technologies might be held liable if their
automated-activity level exceed the socially optimal standard.
In the limiting case of fully automated activities, the privately optimal activity level
q∗2 approaches to the socially optimal level q¯, thus narrowing the possibility of exces-
sive activity levels. In this situation, the non-residual bearer of expected accident costs
has optimal incentives not only for care but also for activity levels. This creates an
exception for Shavell’s (1987) activity-level theorem, which states that no negligence-
based regime can incentivize optimal activity levels for the non-bearer of residual lia-
bility, i.e., the party that does not bear the expected accident costs in the non-negligence
equilibrium. This is because the non-bearer of residual liability (e.g., the injurer in a
negligence-based liability regime) wants only to avoid liability by demonstrating due
care, whereas the bearer of residual liability (e.g., the victim in a negligence-based li-
ability regime) wants to minimize expected harm. Therefore, only the bearer of resid-
ual liability will have incentives to exercise the optimal activity level. This theorem
should be revisited in the presence of partially ot totally automated activities. In this
case, when it is possible and desirable to deﬁne the standard of negligence also in
terms of automated-activity levels, also the non-residual bearer of the loss (e.g., the
injurer under the rule of negligence) have incentives to mitigate excessive activity lev-
els. The problem of the information costs related to activity levels might be therefore
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partially solved by mandating automated equipments for the expected riskiest parts of
an activity, leaving unobservable human actions for the less risky parts.
Deﬁning the standard of negligence also in terms of automated-activity levels might
be not desirable when the automated technology is not widely adopted or mandated by
regulation, that is when individuals decide autonomously whether to adopt a new au-
tomated technology. In this case, introducing an upper bound on the frequency of au-
tomated activity under penalty of liability serves as a tax on automated-activity levels.
As such, this might induce individuals to prefer conducing non-automated activities,
which remain unbounded from the negligence standard.
Therefore, the traceability of automated-activity levels should not implicitly lead
courts to establish a negligent behavior also in terms of the observable activity level.
The decision to tailor negligence standards on the basis of automated-activity levels
should result from the trade-off between two policy objectives: fostering the adoption
of automated technologies versus creating incentives to mitigate excessive automated-
activity levels. Especially relevant for new automated technologies, the ﬁrst objective
should lead courts to deﬁne a standard of negligence only in terms of care levels, even
if a percentage of the activity is ex-post observable. As automated devices become
widely adopted or mandated by regulation, the standard of negligence could be opti-
mally deﬁned in terms of automated-activity levels in order to mitigate excessive levels
of automated activities.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study amends the standard unilateral tort model by incorporating the automa-
tion level of the relevant activity. The three key insights of our analysis are: consumer
demand and manufacturer’s incentives to invest in automation are insensitive to the
assignment of liability (between manufacturer and consumer); as investments in au-
tomation increase, individuals’ care measures lose their effectiveness in preventing an
accident; and the automated part of the activity becomes traceable, thus observable
ex-post. These observations allow the traditional analysis of liability law to keep pace
with modern, automated technologies as, for example, in the case of automated drones
and self-driving cars.
Our results show that the deﬁnition of the negligence standard is determinant for
the injurers’ choices to adopt safer automated technologies and to mitigate excessive
automated-activity levels. Figure 3.1 summarizes the results of our analysis by show-
ing how the standard of negligence should evolve with the automation level of the
activity on the basis of the policy objective.
In our ﬁrst result, we argue that the standard of care should be tailored to the au-
tomation level of the activity (left-panel in Figure 3.1). More speciﬁcally, the efﬁcient
standard of care should decrease with increasing automation. Therefore, when con-
sidering only care levels, a negligence regime gradually transforms into a no-liability
rule as the activity tends toward full automation. Tailoring care standards to activity
automation serves as a policy instrument to induce individuals to adopt new automated
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Figure 3.1: Tailoring Standards to Automated Activities
technologies, given that the cost of adopting new technologies generates higher private
payoffs than exercise per-unit-of-activity care. A uniform care standard (as conven-
tionally deﬁned) would destroy adoption incentives.
The second result of our analysis focuses on activity levels. By automatically trac-
ing users’ activities, automated technologies can convey information to courts about
users’ activity levels. However, the traceability of automated-activity levels should not
implicitly lead courts to set a corresponding negligence standard. The decision to tailor
negligence standards to both care and activity levels should result from the trade-off
between two policy objectives: to incentivize the adoption of automated technologies,
and to control excessive automated-activity levels (right-panel in Figure 3.1). These
objectives lead to opposite conclusions. Considering activity levels in the negligence
standard could create optimal incentives, but would potentially destroy the incentives
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to adopt automated technologies in the ﬁrst place. For this reason, in order to encour-
age the adoption of new automated devices, it would be optimal to tailor negligence
standards only to care levels, even if automated-activity levels become ex-post ob-
servable by courts. For widely used automated technologies or mandated automated
equipments, it is socially optimal to include automated-activity levels into a tailored
negligence standards, which increases with activity automation.
Scientiﬁc and technological advances in the automation sector open new horizons
in the domain of liability law, and have the potential to change our legal deﬁnition
of negligence. This study is a ﬁrst attempt to update traditional accident models by
considering the automation level of activities. The main message of our analysis is
that a revised deﬁnition of the standard of negligence makes the traditional fault-based
liability regimes effective and adaptable to new automated technologies. Tailored-to-
automation standards of negligence create optimal incentives to invest in safer devices
and represent an optimal solution for liability law to keep pace with recent innovations
in technological automation. As with other policy instruments, such as mandatory
equipment or insurance discounts, tailored-to-automation negligence standards could
create optimal incentives for the timely production and widespread adoption of new
safer technologies, leading to an efﬁcient reduction in the social cost of accidents.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.2.1. In order to prove Lemma 3.2.1, we have to show that, assum-
ing competitive pricing, (i) consumer demand is insensitive to the assignment of liabil-
ity rule between manufacturer and consumer; and (ii) the manufacturer’s incentives to
invest in automated safety are insensitive to the assignment of liability between man-
ufacturer and consumer. The mechanism at work here is intuitive: the assignment of
liability may be regarded as a tax, which is shared between the manufacturer and the
consumer. Let us ﬁrst consider consumers’ demand function, and assume that con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their purchasing decision.
Let Γ= {c0,c1, . . . ,cn} be the set of potential consumers. We ﬁrst deﬁne two sub-
sets of Γ: the set of consumers who will purchase the good in case liability is assigned
to the consumer ΓCL ⊆ Γ, and the set of consumers who will purchase the good in
case liability is assigned to the manufacturer ΓML ⊆ Γ. Let WCL(cx) =CCLx denote the
welfare function CCLx of consumer cx when liability is assigned to the consumer, and
let WML(cx) =CMLx denote the welfare function C
ML
x of consumer cx when liability is
assigned to the manufacturer.
Let b be the cardinality of the set of consumers who will purchase the good, and
let Π be the proﬁt margin of the manufacturer (it is plausible that competition effects
will drive prices near or equal to the cost of production, though this proof does not rely
on this assumption). Thus, we assume that π(a)CL(a) = ab +Π both when there is no
liability, and when liability is assigned to the consumer. Correspondingly, we assume
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π(a)ML = ab +Π+wpL when liability is assigned to the manufacturer.
It follows that D(a,πCL) = |ΓCL| and D(a,πML) = |ΓML|. Thus, if ΓCL = ΓML,
then it can be shown that demand is unaffected by the assignment of liability between
the manufacturer and consumer.
Rational consumers will only buy the good if the net beneﬁt they receive from the
good is greater than their opportunity cost O. Thus, for any individual x, if W φ (cx) >
Ox then the potential consumer purchases the good. We may therefore deﬁne ΓCL =
{cx|WCL(cx)> Ox} and ΓML = {cx|WML(cx)> Ox}.
Suppose for reductio that (∃cx)(cx ∈ ΓCL)∧¬(cx ∈ ΓML). Then it must be the case
that:
CCLx =Vx(wx,a)−
(a
b
+Π
)
−wxpL−wxxx > Ox (3.7.1)
CMLx =Vx(wx,a)−
(a
b
+Π+wxpL
)
−wxxx < Ox (3.7.2)
But we can see thatCCLx =C
ML
x , so it cannot be the case thatC
CL
x >Ox whileC
ML
x <Ox,
lest we get the inconsistency CCLx > C
CL
x . The same reasoning applies in the mirror
case where (∃cx)¬(cx ∈ΓCL)∧(cx ∈ΓML)with inequality signs reversed. Therefore, it
follows that (∀cx)(cx ∈ ΓCL)⇔ (cx ∈ ΓML). Thus, the demand function D is unaffected
by the assignment of liability between manufacturer and consumer.
Let us show now that the manufacturers’ incentives to invest in automated safety
are insensitive to the assignment of liability (between manufacturer and consumer).
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Under consumer liability, the manufacturer welfare function is given by:
MCL = D(a,π(a))πCL(a)−a =
= D(a,π)
(a
b
+Π
)
−a (3.7.3)
Under manufacturer liability, the manufacturer welfare function is given by:
MML = D(a,π)
(
πML(a)−λ)−a =
= D(a,π(a))
((a
b
+Π+λ
)
−λ
)
−a (3.7.4)
Since in equilibrium D(e, pCL) =D(e, pML), and because Equation (3.7.3) is equal
to Equation (3.7.4), it follows that the manufacturer’s welfare function is insensitive to
changes in liability allocation (between consumer and manufacturer). Consequently,
the optimal automated investments a∗ will not change depending on the assignment of
λ .
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 and of Corollary 3.4.2. Given the ﬁrst-order condition (3.4.2),
by applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain:
x¯a =−βa p f L+β p f f fa Lβ 2 p f f L (3.7.5)
which is negative by construction. By considering (3.4.2), as a → ∞, the marginal
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beneﬁts of undertaking care, i.e., β p f L, go to zero given βa, pa < 0, thus implying
x¯a→∞ = 0.
For illustrative purpose, let us suppose x, a ∈ [0,4], γ ∈ (1,4], β =
√
(1− a2/16),
and p( f ) = 1−√ f/4. In this case, the due-care standard can be deﬁned explicitly as:
x¯† =
(
16−a2)L2−1024aγ
256
√
(16−a2) (3.7.6)
In the limiting cases, when a = 0 (non-automated activity), x¯0† = L
2
/64; when a = 4
(fully-automated activity), given a ∈ [0,4], x¯1† goes to zero. The derivative of x¯† with
respect to a is:
x¯†a =−
16384γ+a
(
16−a2)L2
256(16−a2)3/2
(3.7.7)
which is negative given a ∈ [0,4].
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 and of Corollary 3.4.4. The proof of the compliance with
due-care standards follows directly from the comparison between (3.4.2) and (3.4.5).
When the standard of negligence does not incorporate the automation level, the social
minimization problem is traditionally modeled as:
min
x
S˜ = x+ p(x)L (3.7.8)
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which leads to the socially optimal care level x˜ deﬁned as:
1+ px L = 0 (3.7.9)
It follows that x˜ = x¯ when a = 0 in (3.4.1), and that x¯ becomes lower than x˜ as a
increases given that x¯ decreases in a. The private optimization problem is deﬁned as in
(3.4.4). Given that the privately optimal care level (3.4.5) is decreasing in a, it follows
that x∗ = x˜ only when a = 0, and x∗ < x˜ as a increases. If injurers exercise at least
due care, they will maximize x+ a s.t. x ≥ x˜. If injurers decide to not adhere to the
standard and to exercise privately optimal care, they will maximize x+a+ p( f )L s.t.
x < x˜. Exercising privately optimal care is preferred over exercising due care iff
x˜− x∗ > p( f ∗)L (3.7.10)
where f ∗ = β (a)x∗+ γa.
A non-negligent injurer has more incentives to invest in technological automation
under tailored standards rather than under non-tailored standards when x¯+ a < x˜+ a,
which is always veriﬁed for a > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1 and of Corollary 3.5.2. Let us suppose that the percentage
of automated devices ought to be employed is exogenously ﬁxed. In this case, the stan-
dard of negligence could be optimally set also in terms of automated-activity levels.
In particular, the socially optimal level of automated activity j∗ should increase with
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the automation level. Given the ﬁrs-order condition (3.5.3), by applying the implicit
function theorem we obtain:
Ja =
paL
bJJ
(3.7.11)
which is positive since pa < 0 and bJJ ≤ 0. Let us now suppose that the percent-
age of automated devices ought to be employed is individually chosen by potential
tortfeasors. If the negligence standard is not tailored to automated-activity levels, the
privately optimal automated-activity level j∗ is given by (3.5.6). If the negligence
standard is tailored to automated-activity levels, potential injurers should undertake
a level of automated activity lower or equal to j¯ deﬁned by (3.5.3) in order to avoid
expected liability costs. Given that j¯ > j∗, potential injurers have more incentives to
adopt and use automated technologies when the negligence standard is not tailored to
automated-activity levels.
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4. Presumption of Negligence34
The incentives to adopt new technologies and to invest in precautionary measures
are affected not only by the allocation of primary and residual liability, as shown in
Chapters 2 and 3, but also by the allocation of the burden of proof. This chapter is
about the incentive effects of legal presumptions in tort setting. We analyze three
interrelated effects of legal presumptions in a tort setting: (1) incentives to invest in ev-
idence technology; (2) incentives to invest in care-type precautions; and (3) incentives
to mitigate excessive activity levels.
Evidence technology affects both the viability and the effectiveness of evidence
rules. This chapter considers the impact that new evidence technology could have on
the range of available choices of legal presumptions. The law of evidence generally
places the burden of producing evidence on plaintiffs, de facto creating a rebuttable
presumption of non-negligence in favor of the defendant (Talley, 2013). In the event
34This chapter is largely based on my paper “Presumption of Negligence,” Minnesota Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 14-23, coauthored with Barbara Luppi (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia,
Department of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law) and Francesco
Parisi (University of Minnesota, Law School; University of Bologna, Department of Economics). The
paper has been submitted for publication. The authors would like to thank Omri Ben-Shahar, Emanuela
Carbonara, Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Jonathan Klick, Marie Obidzinski, Louis T. Visscher for helpful
comments and suggestions, as well as seminar audiences at the 2015 Joint Seminar ‘The Future of Law
and Economics’ at Université Paris (X) Ouest Nanterre La Défense and the 2015 Annual Meeting of the
American Law and Economics Association at Columbia Law School.
of a negligent accident, this means that a victim is generally faced with the burden of
producing evidence about the negligent behavior of his tortfeasor, as a condition for
establishing liability and obtaining compensation.
As recently pointed out by Sanchirico (2008), the victim bears the burden of proof,
even though the content of the required evidence relates to the activity of the defendant.
The tortfeasor may have better information about his own conduct than the victim does,
but it is nevertheless up to the victim to prove the facts supporting his claim. This basic
characteristic of the law of evidence rests on a variety of rationales, often embedded
in notions of procedural economy (Hay, 1997; Hay and Spier, 1997; Shin, 1998), re-
liability of evidence in the face of risk of contamination (Sanchirico, 2004), and more
general concerns of procedural justice.35 In terms of procedural economy, putting
the burden on the plaintiff allows unsupported legal claims to be weeded out and dis-
missed by summary judgment, hence reducing the defendant’s costly involvement in
full-ﬂedged litigation. From a pragmatic point of view, the burden of proof initially
falls on the plaintiff because the salient facts that are needed to establish liability are
facts that the defendant would have no incentive to disclose to the court, and that de-
fendants might actually have an opportunity to fabricate or tamper with (Sanchirico,
2004). Defendants are better informed, but this does not mean that they are in a better
position to reveal accurate and reliable information to the court, given that their private
information could be prejudicially used by their plaintiffs (Sanchirico, 2008).
35Recent theoretical law and economics literature has investigated the theoretical quagmire of the
burden of proof (Hay and Spier, 1997; Daugherty and Reinganum, 2000; Sanchirico, 2008; Bernardo
et al., 2000; Talley, 2013). Hay and Spier (1997) derive the optimal choice of burden of proof on the
basis of parties’ relative cost of discovery.
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Evidence law could trigger the revelation of private information by the defendant,
creating legal presumptions that shift the burden of proof to the defendant. However,
these presumptions are only exceptionally used. For example, a presumption of neg-
ligence on the defendant can arise from the circumstances of an accident, when the
accident could not have normally happened without somebody’s negligence. See for
example Byrne v. Boadle.36 This presumption of negligence, known as the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine (“the thing speaks for itself”) constitutes an exception to the general
presumption of non-negligence. Similarly, prima facie cases and afﬁrmative defenses
shift the burden to the other party, based on considerations of procedural economy and
on the greater probability that a certain event is true under the circumstances (Hay and
Spier, 1997).
Recent scientiﬁc and technological innovations have substantially changed the land-
scape of evidence practice. Think, as examples, of the new frontiers of evidence
made possible by genetic testing, computer recording of data, digital timestamping,
third-party electronic archival systems, black-box technology, body cameras and traf-
ﬁc surveillance cameras, satellite imaging, Snapshot® technology, and GPS tracking
devices. However good or bad these devices may be in terms of usefulness and in-
vasiveness of our private lives, these new technologies are transforming the routine
information protocols of our times. Scientiﬁc and technological advances will con-
tinue to provide new opportunities and to open new horizons in the domain of legal
discovery.
362 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863).
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This chapter explores the extent to which a broader range of legal presumptions
could be used thanks to the availability of new evidentiary technology. The adop-
tion of different legal presumptions could shift the burden of producing evidence to
the more informed party and, in turn, afford new degrees of freedom in the choice of
substantive rules.37 Legal presumptions play three interrelated roles in tort law. First,
presumptions allocate the burden of proof between the parties. The new frontiers of ev-
identiary technology would allow policymakers to exploit the comparative advantage
of the parties in accessing and revealing relevant information, therefore limiting the
invasion of privacy by adversarial discovery. Second, legal presumptions could affect
the parties’ incentives with respect to both care and activity levels. Third, legal pre-
sumptions could become instruments for increasing the robustness of legal incentives
in the face of evidentiary problems.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 reviews the existing literature on
burden of proof and identiﬁes omitted issues. We identify and build upon two sepa-
rate bodies of literature, looking at the interaction between evidentiary and substantive
rules in tort law. In Section 4.2, we introduce the concept of “best discovery-bearer”
and contrast it to the “cheapest evidence-producer” criterion elaborated in the current
literature. We consider the role of these criteria as guiding principles for the alloca-
tion of burdens of proof and choice of legal presumptions. We show that a properly
37The presumption of non-negligence (and the resulting allocation of the burden of proof on the
plaintiff) has historically affected the choice of substantive tort rules. Tort law could have developed
very differently. Prominent legal theorists, ranging from seventeenth century Hugo Grotius to modern-
time Guido Calabresi, have hypothesized radically different tort rules, but their ideas could ﬁnd no
incarnation in real-life legal systems, because of the obstacles posed by the law evidence, among other
reasons. For a historical survey, see Parisi and Fon (2005).
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deﬁned legal presumption would reallocate and possibly minimize the effects of evi-
dentiary uncertainty on the parties’ incentives in tort law. Section 4.3 discusses how
legal presumptions can be selectively used to shift the burden of proof to the party who
has readier access to the relevant information and whose care level and activity level
incentives are more critical for accident costs. Section 4.4 concludes with some policy
considerations.
4.1 Legal Presumptions and Evidence Technology
Legal presumptions play three interrelated roles in tort law, affecting the viability
and effectiveness of substantive rules, the parties’ incentives with respect to their activ-
ities, and the options available to lawmakers in regulating accident law. Our analysis
departs from much of the previous literature on burden of proof, that (with the excep-
tion of Sanchirico, 2008) explained the choice of presumptions on the bases of parties’
relative cost of discovery, truth-ﬁnding by the court, and litigation incentives.
4.1.1 The “Cheapest Evidence-Producer” Criterion in the Existing
Literature
The law and practice of evidence places an important weight on the role of legal
presumptions. In an attempt to systematize the various contributions on burden of
proof in tort law, Talley (2013) distinguishes several interrelated concepts related to
the notion of burden of proof. These concepts are operationally interdependent, but
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theoretically distinct: “burden of persuasion,” “burden of production,” and “presump-
tions.” Speciﬁcally, the concept of burden of persuasion deﬁnes how evidence should
be weighted and how much probative evidence should be offered to convince the fact
ﬁnders. Standards of proofs are those that specify the criteria for applying the burden
of persuasion. Talley (2013) differentiates the burden of production from the burden
of persuasion. This concept refers to the rules that identify which party is required to
“produce” the evidence (or, as Adler and Michael, 1931, p. 63 called it, the “burden of
coming forward with the evidence”). Legal presumptions are instead rules that operate
as a default, allocating the initial burden of production. An unfavorable presumption
shifts the burden of producing contrary evidence on the other party.
There are relatively few authoritative attempts in the literature of law and eco-
nomics that address the selection of legal presumptions. Several contributions tackle
the question from the point of view of procedural economy, starting from the premise
that the burden of proof should be placed onto the party who can provide reliable ev-
idence at the lowest cost. An important formulation of this principle, which we shall
refer to as the “cheapest evidence-producer” principle, can be found in Hay (1997)
and Hay and Spier (1997), who include the goal of accuracy in fact-ﬁnding, and reach
the conclusion that the burden of proof should best be placed onto the party with ac-
cess to relevant information as a way to minimize the cost of obtaining accurate re-
sults. A subsequent incarnation of the “cheapest evidence-producer” principle can be
found in Shin (1998) who formulated the argument that the burden of proof should be
placed onto the party with better knowledge regarding the relevant facts. The cheapest
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evidence-producer criterion that emerges from this literature fundamentally captures
various considerations of procedural economy.
The idea that the burden of proof should be allocated to the party with better ac-
cess to relevant facts and information was later criticized by Sanchirico (2004) and
Sanchirico (2008). Sanchirico questions why the many arguments of procedural econ-
omy put forth in the current literature are not reﬂected in current evidence law. He
identiﬁes a possible ﬂaw in the premise that the party with better access to relevant in-
formation is also the party who can most reliably and cheaply provide the information
to the court. Sanchirico suggests that this premise is the Achilles’ heel of the existing
literature, pointing to the many problems related to reliable disclosure and evidence
tampering that arise when evidence is offered by those who have direct access to it.
He provides an alternative explanation for existing evidence law, suggesting that the
burden of proof is generally allocated to inﬂuence the primary-activity behavior of the
parties, rather than as a way to minimize the cost of truth-ﬁnding and adjudication.
In the following, we wish to push this analysis further by looking at the dynamic
effects of shifting the burden of proof to defendants. We contrast the results of our
analysis to those put forth in the existing literature, recasting the cheapest-evidence
criterion in light of the parties’ incentives to invest in evidence technologies.
4.1.2 The Negative-Proof Fallacy
A primary argument used to explain the reason for placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff is the fact that a burden placed onto the defendant would often entail a
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negative proof. From a logical point of view, this objection is quite important and, if
accepted, would de facto undermine the signiﬁcance of any further analysis. Therefore,
we shall tackle this preemptive objection at the outset of our analysis.
According to the logical foundations of the law of proof, the burden of proof should
be placed onto the person making an assertion or claim. The procedural laws of ev-
idence are viewed as embracing this basic principle, when they allocate the burden
of proof to plaintiffs. According to the conventional argument, shifting the burden of
proof to the person denying an assertion or a claim would constitute a logical fallacy,
as it would presume the claim is true unless otherwise disproven. In the ﬁeld of negli-
gence law, the victim bears the burden of proof of the elements necessary to establish
the tortfeasor’s liability. Shifting the burden of proving the non-existence of those el-
ements to the alleged tortfeasor (e.g., by creating a presumption of negligence) would
reproduce the same logical fallacy, since the person resisting a tort claim would face
the formidable burden of providing a negative proof to show a lack of negligence on
his part.
The logical premise of this argument is that negations often involve universal neg-
atives, while afﬁrmations do not. The formidable proof of a universal negative is what
ancient Romans called probatio diabolica (literally, “devil’s proof”), to signify its
heinous difﬁculty. Consider as an example the allegation of a fact: “Defendant signed
a contract promising X.” A signed document and a few additional pieces of corrobo-
rating evidence would sufﬁce to establish the probability of such an assertion. On the
contrary, the negative claim by defendant “I have never signed a contract promising X”
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would entail the proof of a universal negative, ultimately requiring the examination of
a potentially inﬁnite amount of evidence by the fact-ﬁnder.
Despite the logical soundness of this argument, we suggest that the negative-proof
fallacy is too often invoked in the law of evidence, when the factual premises of the ar-
gument do not hold. Consider the case of a negligence tort. Proving the non-negligence
of the tortfeasor at the time of the accident (or, for this matter, proving that any other
element of the tort is not present) does not entail the proof of a universal negative.
Proving non-negligence amounts to proving due diligence. While at times it may be
easier for a plaintiff to prove the negligence of his defendant, at other times it may
be easier for a defendant to prove his or her own diligence. Neither type of proof re-
quires supernatural abilities, and nothing dictates that, in this case, the burden of proof
should necessarily be placed onto the plaintiff making an assertion or claim (Adler
and Michael, 1931).38 The choice of optimal allocation of the burden of proof in these
cases should hinge upon a test of comparative advantage in the access to relevant infor-
mation. The party who has such comparative advantage is referred to as the “cheapest
evidence-producer.” This test of comparative advantage may be informed by some gen-
eral assumptions and guiding rules of thumb. For example, when the standard of due
care entails the undertaking of a large number of actions, proof of diligence can be
more burdensome than proof of negligence. Proof of negligence could be satisfacto-
38In the early 1930s, Columbia law professor Jerome Michael and Chicago philosopher and law
professor Mortimer Adler pointed out the inapplicability of these philosophical constructs to the legal
notions of burden of proof and choice of legal presumptions when they observed that: “The principles of
logic do not place upon either party any burden of proving the propositions which they have respectively
alleged. The principles of logic are concerned only with the validity and the structure of the processes
by which proof and disproof are accomplished.” (Adler and Michael, 1931, p. 60).
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rily obtained by showing that any one of the required actions had not been undertaken.
Proof of diligence would instead require evidence that each of the due precautionary
actions was undertaken. In the limiting case in which an inﬁnite number of actions
need to be undertaken to satisfy due care, a negative proof of non-negligence would
become impossible.
In real life, activities that provide grounds for liability vary in complexity and ac-
cess to factual information. Consider the other limiting case, in which the tortfeasor’s
negligence allegedly took the form of a given action or omission, say speeding above
the posted limit. The proof by the plaintiff that speeding occurred is the equivalent of
the proof by the defendant that speeding did not occur. Logic can say nothing about
which of the two parties should bear the burden of proof in this case. If one party
has better access to that factual information and can reliably supply new evidence to
the fact-ﬁnder (i.e., if the conditions identiﬁed by Sanchirico, 2004 hold), the optimal
allocation of the burden of proof should then be on that party. For example, if the de-
fendant can more easily prove the speed at which he was driving, thanks to the adoption
of GPS tracking or blackbox technology, the burden should optimally be imposed on
him.
4.1.3 Legal Presumptions and the Adoption of Evidence Techno-
logy
If, as it seems, there is nothing fundamentally necessary about placing the burden
of proof on plaintiffs, the next logical question becomes that of identifying the factors
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that should drive the optimal allocation of the burden of proof.
New technology is substantially increasing the amount of information that can be
acquired and preserved, with far-reaching applications in the ﬁelds of legal evidence
and discovery. Scientiﬁc and technological innovations play a dual role in evidence
and discovery. Some technologies can give the fact-ﬁnder insights, allowing her to
look back and gather information about past events, while others record and preserve
present information for future uses. We shall refer to the ﬁrst group as “investigative
technologies” and to the second group as “fact-keeping technologies.”
1. Investigative Technologies: The characteristic feature of investigative technolo-
gies is that they can be employed ex post, even though no such technology was avail-
able at the time of the event. Consider, for example, evidence obtained through genetic
testing. Similar to a lie detector, genetic testing can shed light on past events. This
technology need not be adopted by the parties at the time of the original event, but can
be deployed when a need for discovery arises at a later time.
2. Fact-Keeping Technologies: Other technologies collect information about present
events and preserve it for future investigations. This category encompasses two sub-
groups. The ﬁrst is technology that can be adopted by third parties, including local
governmental authorities, such as trafﬁc surveillance cameras and satellite imaging,
capable of documenting facts and events that occurred within their range. We shall
refer to them as “public fact-keeping technologies.” The second involves technolo-
gies that individuals and ﬁrms can privately adopt. These are instruments that are
tailored to a speciﬁc set of applications, determined by their user. Examples that fall
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within this category include adoption of body cameras by police ofﬁcers, installation of
black-box technology on vessels, installation of Snapshot® technologies on cars, use
of digital timestamp certiﬁcation methods, use of electronic archival systems managed
and certiﬁed by third-parties in digital communities, and various applications of GPS
technology. We shall refer to them as “private fact-keeping technologies.”
Both investigative and fact-keeping technologies have changed the relative cost of
providing evidence. As will be discussed in Section 4.2, the change in the cost of
accessing information and delivering it to the fact-ﬁnder may affect the institutional
choice of the optimal burden of proof in evidence law under the “cheapest evidence-
producer” criterion.
It is important to point out that the incentives to adopt private fact-keeping tech-
nologies are endogenously determined by evidence law. For example, evidence law
could make private fact-keeping technologies discoverable (i.e., usable in court against
the party that adopted the technology). Under existing presumption rules, this could
reduce or, in some cases, entirely undermine the incentives of the parties to adopt such
technology. Think of a Snapshot® device that could be installed on a car. If the infor-
mation gathered by this device could be used in court against the driver in the event
of an accident (or a trafﬁc violation, for this matter), the likelihood that anyone might
want to adopt such technology would diminish, notwithstanding the possible incen-
tives offered by insurance companies. Insurance companies themselves would be less
prone to promote the adoption of this technology, knowing that it might increase the
expected liability of its insureds, thereby creating an increased exposure for the in-
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surance company itself. These problems may be theoretically corrected by adopting
regulations that mandate the adoption of evidentiary technology (e.g., use of black-
box technology on aircrafts, or body cameras on police ofﬁcers). However, it would
be hard to make a case that the entire spectrum of evidence technology could be effec-
tively promoted through legal mandates and regulation. Further, the use of evidentiary
technology would only represent one necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for the
effectiveness of these technologies in the ﬁeld of evidence. Information collected by
private fact-keeping technologies needs to be made discoverable in litigation for it to
be a useful source of evidence and this may hit against individual liberties, constraints
of privacy and procedural economy.
Therefore we suggest that legal presumptions may play a more effective and less
intrusive role in creating incentives for the voluntary adoption of private fact-keeping
technologies, while giving a greater protection of freedom of choice and privacy pro-
tection for the parties. Evidence technology could only beneﬁt and never hurt the party
who is faced with the burden of proof and persuasion. For example, a party who knows
that he may be faced with the burden of proving his diligent behavior would develop
an interest in adopting such technology. Legal presumptions should therefore be tai-
lored to incentivize the efﬁcient adoption of evidence technology. In the following, we
consider the effects of legal presumptions on other incentives in tort law.
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4.2 Legal Presumptions and the Robustness of Incen-
tives: The “Best Discovery-Bearer”
Negligence law provides a good example of the interdependence between evidence
rules and substantive rules in the creation of incentives. Negligence liability imposes li-
ability on a tortfeasor when his behavior was negligent. Under normal circumstances,
the tortfeasor probably knows better than his victim if he engaged in negligent be-
havior. Yet, when the plaintiff bears the burden of proof the court requires the less
informed victim to prove the negligence of his tortfeasor. Consider a hypothetical
shifting of the burden of proof. An example could be a legal rule that imposes liability
on the tortfeasor, unless the tortfeasor can prove his diligent behavior. This rule would
shift both the liability and the burden of proof to the more informed party, imposing on
the tortfeasor the burden of proving his diligence as a condition for avoiding liability.
As pointed out by Hay and Spier (1997), in a hypothetical world of error-free ad-
judication, the choice between two twin alternatives would leave care incentives un-
changed. However, when adjudication errors are introduced, presumptions could affect
the ﬁnal allocation of liability and, in turn, affect the parties’ care and activity level in-
centives. We shall begin our analysis by considering the effects of a legal presumption
of non-negligence on the tortfeasor under a simple negligence regime. Suppose that
with probability αNN , the plaintiff fails to prove the tortfeasor’s negligence and the
tortfeasor avoids liability notwithstanding his negligence. The objective function of
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the tortfeasor in a simple negligence regime can be described by the following func-
tion:
TNN =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
uT − (1−αNN)pL j if kT = 0
uT − kT if kT = k¯T
(4.2.1)
where uT is the beneﬁt from the activity; pL is the probability of an accident when the
defendant does not take care; kT is the cost of taking care; k¯T is the cost of taking so-
cially optimal care; and j is the victim’s loss from an accident. In our setting, parties’
choice in the primary activity is binary: no care or socially optimal care. The stan-
dard analysis shows that the negligence rule induces efﬁcient care because it creates
a discontinuity in the injurer’s expected costs. However, if plaintiff fails to satisfy his
burden of proof of negligence with probability αNN , the discontinuity may be reduced
and the two branches overlap. Intuitively, the tortfeasor will choose to undertake pre-
cautions as long as the cost of exerting care kT is lower than the expected cost of no
care, equal to (1−αNN)pL j. However, tortfeasors facing high care costs relative to
expected loss imposed in case of accident may ﬁnd it optimal not to invest in care.
Evidence problems may thus dilute a tortfeasor’s care incentives. The defendant will
undertake optimal care only if the probability that the plaintiff will be able to prove the
defendant’s negligence is sufﬁciently high. As probatory difﬁculties for the plaintiff
increase, αNN → 1, a simple negligence rule gradually degenerates into a no liability
rule as shown in Figure 4.1, undermining the prospective defendant’s care incentives.
A change in the legal presumption could mitigate this problem.
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Let us consider a presumption of negligence on the tortfeasor under simple neg-
ligence: if the tortfeasor fails to produce evidence of his own diligence he bears full
liability. Let βN denote the probability of a failed proof of diligence. The objective
function of the tortfeasor in a simple negligence regime can be described as follows:
TN =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
uT − pL j if kT = 0
uT −βN pH j− pH cT − kT if kT = k¯T
(4.2.2)
where pH is the probability of accident if the defendant undertakes care, and cT is
the tortfeasor’s cost of presenting evidence. Evidentiary problems change the relative
price of negligent versus non-negligent behavior. A burden placed onto the defendant
reduces the wedge between the payoffs in cases of diligent versus non-diligent behav-
ior. Unlike what is observed in (4.2.1) for αNN → 1, the negligence rule in (4.2.2) de-
generates into a strict liability rule as probatory difﬁculties for the defendant increases,
βN → 1 , as shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Non-Equivalence of Presumptions under Simple Negligence
A similar analysis applies to other liability regimes. Consider for example a regime
of strict liability with contributory negligence. If there is a presumption of contributory
non-negligence on the victim, her objective function can be described as follows:
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VNCN =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
uV − (1−βNCN)pL j if kV = 0
uV − kV if kV = k¯V
(4.2.3)
where uV is the beneﬁt from the activity; pL is the probability of an accident when
the plaintiff does not take care; kV is the cost of taking care; k¯V is the cost of taking
socially optimal care; and βNCN is the probability that the tortfeasor fails to prove the
victim’s contributory negligence. If there is a presumption of contributory negligence
on the plaintiff, the objective function is deﬁned as:
VCN =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
uV − pL j if kV = 0
uV −αCN pH j− pH cV − kV if kV = k¯V
(4.2.4)
where pH is the probability of accident if the plaintiff takes care; cV is the victim’s
cost of presenting evidence; and αCN is the probability that the victim fails to produce
evidence of his contributory non-negligence. As probatory difﬁculties increase, the
rule of strict liability with contributory negligence degenerates as shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Non-Equivalence of Presumptions under Strict Liability with Contributory
Negligence
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Our result reconciles the analysis with Hay and Spier (1997) when the burden of
proof does not affect care incentives.
Proposition 4.2.1. In the presence of evidentiary problems, legal presumptions should
be created against the best discovery-bearer.
Corollary 4.2.2. In the absence of evidentiary problems, the analysis of Hay and Spier
(1997) holds.
Proof. See Appendix 4.5.
In a world of perfect adjudication, legal presumptions can be created to minimize
truth-ﬁnding costs without altering incentives. As shown by Figures 4.1 and 4.2, with-
out discovery errors, legal presumptions have no effects on the allocation of liability
and on the parties’ incentives. A rule of simple negligence remains unchanged when
a presumption of negligence is introduced against the tortfeasor. Likewise, a rule of
strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence remains unchanged when a
presumption of contributory negligence is introduced against the victim. This con-
ﬁrms the results of Hay and Spier (1997).
However, presumptions affect parties’ incentives when discovery is imperfect, and
the robustness of liability rules is affected by the choice of presumptions. More specif-
ically, the use of a presumption of negligence against the tortfeasor increases the ro-
bustness of negligence-based rules, while the use of a presumption of contributory
negligence against the victim increases the robustness of strict-liability rules. This can
be explained by observing that, in a negligence regime, discovery problems may un-
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dermine the tortfeasor’s care incentives. When primary liability is allocated on the
basis of negligence, incentives for a tortfeasor’s care can be effectively preserved with
the adoption of a presumption of negligence. For similar reasons, discovery problems
may undermine the victim’s care incentives. When primary liability is allocated on the
basis of strict liability, incentives for a victim’s care can be effectively preserved with
the adoption of a presumption of contributory negligence.
In both cases, legal presumptions can be used to minimize the impact of imperfect
discovery on the parties’ incentives. A selective use of presumptions can thus increase
the robustness of liability rules in the face of large evidentiary problems. Most notably,
in a world of imperfect adjudication, legal presumptions can be used to strengthen
incentives in the face of evidentiary problems. This often implies shifting the burden
to the individual whose precautions are more inelastic relative to discovery error.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is important to consider the effects of alternative legal pre-
sumptions on administrative costs. As pointed out in Chapter 2, under fault-based
regimes prospective injurers and potential victims will both behave non-negligently,
and therefore a large number of the accidents will occur despite the due diligence of
the individuals involved. In these cases, a presumption of non-negligence might be
more cost-effective than a presumption of negligence since it would substantially re-
duce the number of litigated cases with beneﬁcial savings in the administrative costs
of the tort system. Further research could investigate the interrelated effects between
alternative non-negligence regimes (i.e., “all-or-nothing based rules” vs. loss-sharing
rules) and legal presumptions in terms of administrative costs and incentives to enter
125
litigation.
4.3 Burden of Proof as an Activity Level Tax
Gathering information about the parties’ levels of care is among the most problem-
atic elements of discovery in tort litigation. Litigants generally have better informa-
tion about their own behavior at the time of the accident, but are generally required
to prove the negligent behavior of their counterparts. The less informed party has to
extract information from the more informed party through discovery. For example,
tortfeasors have information about their own behavior, but the burden of proof rests on
their victims. Likewise, for defenses such as contributory or comparative negligence,
the tortfeasor has to prove the victim’s negligence, even though the tortfeasor has less
access to such information.
In the preceding sections, we have critically examined the rationales for the tradi-
tional allocation of the burden of proof. We have evidenced the limits of the cheapest-
evidence-producer rationale in light of the parties’ asymmetric opportunities to invest
in new evidentiary technology, and the effect of presumptions on care incentives. We
have shown that legal presumptions can be selectively used to shift the burden of proof
to the party who can more effectively adopt evidence technology and whose incentives
are more critical for accident costs.
In the following, we will observe that legal presumptions can serve an additional
objective and become a policy instrument for mitigating excessive activity levels.
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A presumption that shifts the burden of proof from one party to the other will in-
crease the expected cost of the activity for such party. In the event of an accident,
the burdened party will have to incur the cost of producing evidence and will bear the
accident loss when he fails to produce the necessary evidence. Neutral as this burden
may appear, it has important effects. More speciﬁcally, a presumption that shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant increases the cost of both negligent and non-negligent
accidents. The cost associated with the burden of proof is qualitatively similar to a
tax imposed on the activity that generates the risk. This tax will reduce the level of
activity for the party facing the burden of proof. This reduction in activity level can be
desirable or undesirable, depending on which party bears the residual liability in the
speciﬁc case. This warrants further elaboration. As per Shavell’s activity level theo-
rem, no negligence based regime can incentivize optimal activity levels for both parties
(Shavell, 1980).39 This is because the party who does not bear the residual liability is
only concerned about avoiding liability by undertaking due care, and does not internal-
ize the additional cost of non-negligent accidents. Conversely, the bearer of residual
liability wants to avoid harm altogether and will be incentivized to undertake both op-
timal care and optimal activity level. In Chapter 2, I have shown that under certain
circumstances, loss-sharing rules among non-negligent parties are more desirable than
traditional all-or-nothing based rules in terms of activity-level incentives. Under loss-
39An ideal remedy in tort law should instead incentivize optimal precautionary care levels and optimal
activity levels for both parties. Shavell (1980) showed that this ideal is not achievable under negligence-
based regimes, because only the bearer of residual liability will have incentives to mitigate its activity
level. This proposition has become known in the law and economics literature as “Shavell’s activity
level theorem.”
127
sharing based rules, parties share the loss on the basis of the relevant characteristics of
their activities, e.g., riskiness and value.
When considering the traditional all-or-nothing based rule, the cost imposed by the
burden of proof can therefore do either of two things: depress the activity levels of the
residual bearer below the social optimum, or mitigate the excessive activity levels of
the non residual bearer. For example, when the victim is already the residual bearer
(e.g., under a negligence regime), imposing the burden of proof on the victim may
depress her activity level below the optimal point. In a negligence regime, a presump-
tion of negligence would therefore be desirable, by shifting the evidentiary burden to
the party who is not already burdened by the residual liability, thereby inducing both
parties to mitigate excessive activity levels. According to our analysis, ceteris paribus,
the burden of proof should be allocated to the party who does not face the residual loss
in the event of a non-negligent accident, i.e., presumptions should be placed in favor
of the residual bearer. The intuition behind this argument is that the burden of proof
imposes a tax on the activity which can alternatively distort the efﬁcient incentives of
the residual bearer, or mitigate the inefﬁciently high activity levels of the party who
does not bear the residual loss. The burden of proof can thus be used as an activity
level tax with a legal presumption in favor of the party burdened with the accident loss
when both parties acted diligently. Practically, this would entail creating a presumption
in favor of the plaintiff when the dispute arises under negligence regimes (i.e., simple
negligence, negligence with contributory negligence, or negligence with comparative
negligence), and a presumption in favor of the defendant when the dispute arises under
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strict liability regimes (i.e., strict liability with contributory negligence, or strict liabil-
ity with comparative negligence). In this manner, legal presumptions could be used to
create a partial decoupling, ultimately bringing the activity levels of both parties closer
to socially optimal levels.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This study developed a simple tort model to analyze the effects of legal presump-
tions on parties’ incentives to invest in evidence technology, and on parties’ incentives
to invest in care and activity levels. Care and activity level incentives are not sym-
metrically affected by shifts in the burden of proof. Tort incentives react differently
to changes in legal presumptions, and this provides a new normative criterion for the
choice of evidence regimes. We identiﬁed three factors that affect the optimal alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. The ﬁrst factor considers the effects of legal presumptions
on the incentives to invest in evidence-production technology, such as Snapshot® tech-
nologies and body cameras on police ofﬁcers. The second factor is based on the idea
that legal presumptions shift the effects of evidentiary uncertainty from one party to the
other and, by doing so, legal presumptions affect care level incentives. According to
our analysis, legal presumptions should be chosen to ensure that evidentiary problems
do not corrode the parties’ primary care incentives. Therefore, the burden should be
shifted onto the party whose precautions are more inelastic relative to discovery errors.
The third factor is based on the idea that legal presumptions shift the cost associated
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with evidence problems from one party to the other. These costs are equivalent to an
activity level tax, and legal presumptions can be created in favor of the residual bearer,
such that activity level incentives can move closer to optimality.
4.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1 and of Corollary 4.2.2. Here we develop the claim advanced
in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. Consider ﬁrst the effects of legal presumptions under a
regime of simple negligence. Following Hay and Spier (1997), let us introduce the
notation:
kT = tortfeasor’s cost of taking care
e = tortfeasor’s cost of technology adoption
pH = probability of accident if the tortfeasor takes care
pL = probability of accident if the tortfeasor does not take care
j = victim’s losses from an accident
cT = tortfeasor’s cost of presenting evidence when evidentiary technology is not adopted
cV = victim’s cost of presenting evidence when evidentiary technology is not adopted
cTe = tortfeasor’s cost of presenting evidence when evidentiary technology is adopted
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We assume that taking care is efﬁcient, i.e.,
kT < (pL− pH) j (4.5.1)
and that
cTe < cT < j (4.5.2)
Consider the case with no adjudication errors (Hay and Spier, 1997). Suppose that
there is a presumption of non-negligence on the tortfeasor, i.e., the plaintiff has the
burden of proof. The defendant’s cost of acting negligently is pL j. The defendant will
take care if
kT < pL j (4.5.3)
which is true anytime (4.5.1) holds. Suppose now there is a presumption of negligence
on the tortfeasor, i.e., the tortfeasor has the burden of proof. If he is negligent, he
will be held liable; if he is careful, he will not be held liable. Depending on whether
evidentiary technologies have been adopted, the defendant will take care if
kT + pH cT < pL j (4.5.4)
kT + pH cTe+ e < pL j (4.5.5)
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Condition (4.5.4) is true anytime (4.5.1) and (4.5.2) hold. When (4.5.4) holds, the
tortfeasor ﬁnds it convenient to adopt technology when the LHS in (4.5.5) is lower
than the LHS in (4.5.4), i.e.,
e < pH (cT − cTe) (4.5.6)
Let us introduce adjudication errors. Suppose that there is a presumption of non-
negligence on the tortfeasor, i.e., the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Let 0≤ αNN ≤ 1
be the probability that the plaintiff fails to prove the tortfeasor’s negligence. The de-
fendant will take care if
kT < (1−αNN) pL j (4.5.7)
which is true when αNN ≤ pH/pL and (4.5.1) holds. Suppose now that there is a pre-
sumption of negligence on the tortfeasor. Let 0≤ βN ≤ 1 be the probability that the de-
fendant fails in proving his non-negligence. For simplicity, we assume βN = 0 when the
defendant adopts evidentiary technologies. Depending on whether evidentiary tech-
nologies have been adopted, the defendant will take care if
kT +βN pH j+ pH cT < pL j (4.5.8)
kT + pH cTe+ e < pL j (4.5.9)
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Condition (4.5.8) is true when βN ≤ 1− cT/ j, (4.5.1), and (4.5.2) holds. When (4.5.8)
holds, the defendant ﬁnds convenient to adopt technology when the LHS in (4.5.9) is
lower than the LHS in (4.5.8), i.e.,
e < pH (cT − cTe)+βN pH j (4.5.10)
which is more easily satisﬁed than (4.5.6) when βN > 0.
By comparing (4.5.7) with (4.5.8), the defendant has more incentives to undertake
due care under a presumption of negligence rather than under a presumption of non-
negligence when the following condition is satisﬁed:
pH cT < (αNN pL−βN pH) j (4.5.11)
where αNN pL j is the plaintiff’s expected share of the loss which remains uncom-
pensated notwithstanding the defendant’s negligence, and βN pH j is the plaintiff’s ex-
pected share of the loss notwithstanding his non-negligence. Similarly, by comparing
(4.5.7) with (4.5.9) the defendant adopting evidentiary technologies has more incen-
tives to undertake due care under a presumption of negligence rather than under a
presumption of non-negligence when the following condition is satisﬁed:
pH cTe < αNN pL j− e (4.5.12)
Given (4.5.2) and (4.5.10), (4.5.12) is more easily satisﬁed than (4.5.11).
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Let us now consider the condition under which it is socially efﬁcient to shift the
burden of proof when evidentiary technology is not adopted. Suppose αNN > pH/pL
and βN ≤ 1− cT/ j. under a presumption of non-negligence the tortfeasor will be neg-
ligent, while under a presumption of negligence the tortfeasor will be diligent. Under
a presumption of non-negligence, the total cost faced by society is pL j+ pL cV . Under
a presumption of negligence, the total cost borne by society is pH j+ pH cT + kT . It
is socially efﬁcient to shift from a presumption of non-negligence to a presumption of
negligence when pL j+ pL cV > pH j+ pH cT + kT . This condition can be rewritten as
kT < (pL− pH) j+ pL cV − pH cT (4.5.13)
By symmetry, a similar analysis applies to victims’ care incentives under a regime of
strict liability with contributory negligence.
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5. Measuring Social Preferences in Accident
Prevention40
The preceding chapters have considered prospective tortfeasor and his victim as
risk-neutral individuals, free from any type of prosocial behavioral bias and moral
sentiment. However, the literatures on prosocial preferences and emphatic behavior
show that people care about the others’ well-being and feel empathy for the others’
pain (Cooper and Kagel, 2009; Crockett et al., 2014). Morality and prosocial moral
sentiments which involve sacriﬁcing some of personal beneﬁts to prevent others’ losses
(Blair, 1995), might inﬂuence care choices in an accident context. Do individuals
adopt a different precautionary behavior depending upon their role in an accident?
40This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Theodore Eisenberg, for inspiring conversations at
the very outset of this research during his visits at the University of Bologna and at the University
of Hamburg in 2013. The title of this manuscript echoes the title of Crockett et al.’s (2014) paper,
that is, “Harm to others outweighs harm to self in moral decision making,” with the aim to highlight
the opposite experimental results achieved under the different contexts analyzed in the two studies.
The author is extremely grateful to Stefania Bortolotti and Francesco Parisi for the guidance and the
encouragement on this project from the beginning. The ﬁrst session of the experiment was conducted
in January 2015 at the University of Bologna, Department of Economics, thanks to the cooperation
of Emanuela Carbonara. The second session was conducted in February 2015 at the University of
Modena and Reggio Emilia, Department of Economics, thanks to the cooperation of Barbara Luppi.
The author is very grateful for their suggestions and support. The author would also like to thank Maria
Bigoni, Marco Casari, Christoph Engel, Michael G. Faure, Alessio M. Pacces, Enrico Santarelli, Ann-
Soﬁe Vandenberghe, Louis T. Visscher for their helpful comments, and the participants in the SONIC
meetings at the University of Bologna and in the 2013 EDLE winter seminar in Erasmus University
Rotterdam.
How does feeling responsible for someone else’s losses affect precautionary behavior?
How people evaluate the cost of their monetary losses compared to the cost of the
others’ monetary losses, and how this evaluation changes with contexts, is still under
investigation. This chapter addresses this issue by testing whether individuals care
more about their own safety rather than the others’ safety. Recent contributions on
prosocial behavior showed that an agent who bears the responsibility for someone
else’s welfare, will behave in a more pro-social manner (“responsibility-alleviation
principle”; Charness, 2000; Charness and Jackson, 2009). This study analyzes private
care choices in a risky context, showing that individuals care more about losses to
self rather than losses toward others, and spend more resources to avoid suffering a
loss (even under perfect compensation) rather than causing a loss to others (and pay
compensation). These results contribute to better deﬁne the boundaries of prosocial
behaviors and ultimately suggest a new non-neutral context —substantially different
from the standard neutral contexts used to test altruistic behaviors— to study social
interactions in risky situations.
This chapter adds to the growing literature in psychology, neuroscience, behav-
ioral and experimental economics which questioned prosocial behaviors from different
perspectives. Smith (1759) ﬁrst hypothesized that individuals naturally tend towards
moral behaviors.41 This moral sentiment, embedded in social norms that discourage
41“There is no commonly honest man who does not more dread the inward disgrace of such an action
[. . . ], that for one man to deprive another unjustly of any thing, or unjustly to promote his own advantage
by the loss or disadvantage of another, is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain,
than all the misfortunes which can affect him, either in his body, or in his external circumstances.”
(Smith, 1759, III.3.8).
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harming others (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2010), leads people to dis-
like bad outcomes, especially when those harm others, and to evaluate the others’ pain
as higher than own pain. A second prediction on moral behaviors emerges from stud-
ies investigating how people behave in economic exchanges. It has been shown that
individuals are willing to donate shares of their endowment to anonymous strangers
(Engel, 2011), and to cooperate in social dilemmas (Rand et al., 2012). When related
to their own monetary outcome, however, people care much less about the others’
monetary outcome (Henrich et al., 2010). This predicts that individuals care about
the others’ losses, but far less than their own losses. The literature on other-regarding
preferences shows that individuals care for the well-being of others, and that human
behavior inevitably deviates from utility maximization (Eckel and Grossman, 1996;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Experimental studies provided
evidence that people are willing to help others even at a personal cost, independently
of the characteristics or the intentions of the recipients (unconditional or pure altruism,
sometimes called interdependent utility; Fong, 2007). A third hypothesis on moral
behaviors comes from studies on empathic experiences which enable individuals to
understand others’ feelings like sadness, happiness, and also pain. These contributions
predict that individuals evaluate others’ pain similarly to how they evaluate their own
pain — assuming that the cost of pain for others is similar to the cost of pain for oneself
(Masserman et al., 1964; Batson et al., 1981; Singer et al., 2004). Recently, Crockett
et al. (2014) quantiﬁed how individuals evaluate the costs of pain to themselves and
others in a neutral social context, and they found a “hyperaltruistic” valuation of oth-
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ers’ pain relative to own pain.
The aim of this chapter is to test whether individuals care more, or at least as much
as, about the others’ safety rather than their own safety in an accident context. Are
people more averse in injuring someone or in being injured? In order to address this
question, I performed a paper-based experimental study that relies upon the theoretical
predictions of the economic analysis of accident law.
The standard models of accident law assume that individual utility depends only on
own material payoff, without involving concerns for others (Shavell, 1980, 1987). By
relying on this presupposition, the economic analysis of tort law predicts that potential
injurers and prospective victims make identical precautionary choices under different
but mirrored liability rules —e.g., the no liability rule is the mirror image of the strict
liability rule. More speciﬁcally, an injurer under the no liability rule has theoretically
no incentives to take precautions to avoid an accident, since that rule does not require
him to compensate the victim for the accident loss. The same zero-care choice is ex-
pected from a victim under the strict liability rule. This rule requires the injurer to
always compensate the victim for accident loss. Knowing that, in case of an accident,
she will always receive compensation, the victim’s optimal strategy is not to invest in
precautionary measures. Similarly, a victim under the no liability rule and an injurer
under the strict liability rule would choose to undertake the socially optimal care level
to minimize the total expected accident costs. Given these symmetrical choices under
different liability rules, strict liability is considered the mirror image of no liability
(Cooter and Ulen, 2007, pp. 228-229; Miceli, 1997). Other liability rules are consid-
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ered as mirror images. The strict liability rule with contributory negligence defense
can be interpreted as a “negligence rule for victims” (Miceli, 1997; Müeller-Langer
and Schäfer, 2009). Under the simple negligence rule, the tortfeasor will be held li-
able for injury losses only if he was negligent, i.e., if he exerted a level of care lower
than the level speciﬁed by courts, namely the due-care standard. Under strict liability
with contributory negligence, the victim receives compensation in all cases except if
she behaved negligently. The Nash equilibrium is thus derived exactly as in the case of
simple negligence, with injurer and victim reversed. For simplicity of experimental de-
sign and interpretation of results, in my analysis I will test only two mirrored liability
rules, namely the no liability rule and the strict liability rule.
The theoretical properties of mirrored liability rules hold true under perfect com-
pensation if individuals are “role indifferent,” i.e., if they invest the same level of pre-
cautionary measures regardless of them being the cause of a monetary loss to others
or the victim of a monetary loss. In the example above, parties are expected to expend
the same amount of precautions either if they are victims under the no liability rule
or if they are injurers under the strict liability rule. The question arising is whether
individual behavior is actually “role indifferent” or rather “role averse”: people might
have a different perception of risk and damages depending upon their being victims
or injurers of an accident, and their being perfectly insured or not. The motivation
for the research arises from the literature on social preferences. Indeed, the experi-
mental literature on other-regarding behavior already showed that people care about
others’ well-being even at a personal cost and independently from the characteristics
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or the intentions of the recipients, and tend to evaluate the others’ losses as higher than
their own losses (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and
Schmidt, 2006; Fong, 2007; Cooper and Kagel, 2009; Engel, 2011). Several contri-
butions that analyzed individual behavior in economic exchanges showed that subjects
are willing to donate shares of their endowment to anonymous strangers (Engel, 2011),
and to cooperate in social dilemmas (Rand et al., 2012). However, people care much
less about others’ monetary outcome when related to their own (Henrich et al., 2010).
This predicts that individuals care about others’ losses, but far less than their own.
Recent studies on empathic behavior showed that individuals evaluate others’ pain
similarly to how they evaluate their own — assuming that the cost of pain for others
is similar to the cost of pain for oneself (Masserman et al., 1964; Batson et al., 1981;
Singer et al., 2004). Recently, Crockett et al. (2014) quantiﬁed how individuals eval-
uate the costs of pain for themselves and others in a neutral social context, and they
found a “hyperaltruistic” valuation of others’ pain relative to their own.
The experimental design presented here aims at quantifying whether and how much
individuals care about own safety compared to how much they care about the others’
safety. Three are the main results of this study. First, injurers have to fully compensate
victims for accident damages, victims invest in care about as much as injurers. This is
the most interesting and surprising result: even if perfectly insured, victims neverthe-
less spend resources to prevent the accident. This result can be interpreted as another
instance of social preferences: when victims are perfectly insured and injurers cannot
take actions to prevent the accident, victims see it as unfair to make potential injur-
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ers loose money with a high probability and spend resources to avoid unjust liability
to injurers. On the contrary, when not entitled to receive compensation for accident
losses, victims invest signiﬁcantly more than injurers. In the “Injurer, No Liability”
case, around 40% of injurers spend nothing to avoid causing an accident. Given that
injurers in this case are essentially playing a risky dictator game, this result can be seen
as coherent with the standard ﬁnding in dictator games, in which, on average, around
36% of all dictators give nothing to the recipient (Engel, 2011). However, injurers in
the “Injurer, No Liability” case nonetheless undertake on average more than 60% of
victims’ investments in the “Victim, No Liability” case. This can be interpreted as
another instance of social preferences: given that victims cannot take actions to avoid
the accident, injurers feel it as unfair to make victims suffering unjust and uncompen-
sated losses. The second result shows that, on average, subjects spend more resources
in the role of victims rather than in the role of injurers. This signals that individuals
do care about others’ safety but less than their own safety. The third result shows that
subjects spend more in care measures in the presence of expected liability costs. This
is coherent with the theoretical and experimental literature on liability law (Shavell,
1980; Kornhauser and Schotter, 1990, 1992; Angelova et al., 2013), and suggests that
individuals are more willing to prevent losses to self rather than losses to others (En-
gel, 2011; Henrich et al., 2010). So, for example, injurers are more averse in paying
compensation of damages rather than in causing uncompensated damages. Similarly,
potential victims undertook less precautions when they were expected to receive full
compensation and more precautions when they were expected to bear the full accident
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costs.
These observations, which deserves further investigations, offer a new perspective
on prosocial behaviors in risky situations and have important implications for the eco-
nomic analysis of accident law. This research ultimately tests the predictive power of
tort models, and allows to setup more realistic economic models of liability law.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 provides an extended review of the
related literature. Section 5.2 presents the experimental model, and formally derives
the hypotheses. Section 5.3 describes the experimental design, and Section 5.4 dis-
cusses the results. Section 5.5 concludes with a condensed summary of the implication
of the results for the literatures on prosocial behaviors and for the economic analysis
of accident law.
5.1 Extended Literature Review
This study relies on and contributes to three streams of literature: the economic
literature on other-regarding preferences; the neuroscientiﬁc literature on empathic be-
havior, and the economic literature on liability law. In the following, I review each of
these brieﬂy.
5.1.1 Experimental Literature on Other-Regarding Preferences
A considerable amount of experimental research investigated other-regarding be-
haviors from different angles and perspectives. Among others, Fehr and Fischbacher
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(2003) and Cooper and Kagel (2009) provide an extensive survey of the experimental
results on other-regarding preferences; Rotemberg (2006) discusses the literature on
reciprocity and altruism in the workplace; and Camerer (2003, pp.43-100) shows a
general broad overview of experiments to test unselﬁsh behavior.
Experiments on altruism are primarily based on ultimatum or dictator games, and
focused on two classes of fairness: unconditional altruism or strong reciprocity, and
reciprocal or reputation-based altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fong, 2007). The
difference between them is intuitive. Strong reciprocators bear the cost of being altruist
even in the absence of reputation or other private gain from their acts, whereas recipro-
cal altruists take actions only if they have long term interests. Results are various and,
beyond the acknowledgment that people tend to not choose the most selﬁsh outcome,
the conditions which are likely to motivate altruistic behaviors appear to be hardly
identiﬁable. This is partly due to two inﬂuential factors: the context-independent de-
sign generally implemented, and the effect of experimental design characteristics.
As regard the ﬁrst factor, the lack of a realistic social context in ultimatum and
dictator games has been addressed by varying the characteristics of the recipients and
the information available to the donors. Among others, Eckel and Grossman (1996)
compared the donations to anonymous student subjects with the donations to an es-
tablished charity within double-anonymous experiments. They found that dictators in
the charity experiment are less likely to keep the entire amount in the envelope (only
27% of dictators keep $10 when the recipient is a charity institution, in contrast to 63%
when the recipient is an anonymous student subject), and that, on average, subjects in
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the charity treatment donated 31% of their payoffs, in contrast to 10.6% donated by
dictators with anonymous recipients. Similarly, Fong (2007) analyzed the outcomes
from a charity game involving real-life welfare recipients. The author found a strong
evidence of both conditional and unconditional altruism, and that self-reported uncon-
ditional altruists highly react to the worthiness of the recipient.
Also the characteristics of the experimental design may inﬂuence subjects’ choices,
causing a misleading expectations of generosity outside the lab. Bardsley (2008) ar-
gued that subjects’ donations in dictator games may be an “artefact of experimentation”
(i.e., participants perceive that the game is about giving, and react to this sort of ex-
perimental demand), and proved that dictators are less willing to give money when a
taking option is available. The evidence that a simple manipulation of the experimental
design inﬂuences individuals’ behaviors is proved also by List (2007), who explored
a dictator game with variations on the action set (“give” and “take”) and on the origin
of endowment (“earned” and “unearned”). Hoffman et al. (1996) introduced a double-
anonymity dictator game by adding a subject-experimenter anonymity treatment to
the conventional between-subjects anonymity treatment. They found that under sin-
gle anonymity, 46% of dictators donate at least $3 of a $10 pie, while under double
anonymity only 16% of dictators donate at least $3. Forsythe et al. (1994) compared
the results from ultimatum and dictator games. The results show that in dictator games
only 22% of the players gives an equal share or better to recipients, while in ultimatum
games that percentage raises to 65%. Given the different outcomes, they concluded
with a rejection of the fairness hypothesis, under which, “if nontrivial offers are due
144
solely to proposal’s concerns with fairness, the distribution of the offers should be the
same in the two games”. For a more general discussion about the interpretation of the
results from dictator and ultimatum games, see also Camerer and Thaler (1995).
By testing human choices within ultimatum and dictator games, all these experi-
ments deﬁned pure altruism as a willingness to donate part or the entire endowment to
another individual, independently from his characteristics. In daily real-life activities,
other forms of other-regarding preferences can be observed. My experiment investi-
gates the presence of prosocial behaviors in accident prevention by testing individual
willingness to expend resources to prevent a monetary loss to another individual.
5.1.2 Neuroscientiﬁc Literature on Emphatic Behaviors
Empathy, that is the capacity of an individual to understand what another individ-
ual is experiencing, has attracted a growing attention from neuroscientiﬁc scholars.
Recent neuroimaging studies measuring brain activities showed that observing others
in pain activates areas of the brain similar to those experiencing pain (Singer et al.,
2004; Singer et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2008; Akitsuki and Decety,
2009). Among others, Singer et al. (2004) investigated pain-related empathy in 16
couples, under the assumption that couples are likely to feel empathy for each others.
They assessed brain activity in the female partner while painful stimulation was ap-
plied to her or to her partner’s right hand through an electrode attached to the back of
the hand. They were interested in comparing pain-related brain activity in the context
of “self” and “other.” Their results provided more evidence on pain-related empathic
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responses and showed that empathic experience does not involve activation of an en-
tire pain matrix, but only of that component associated with the affective dimension of
pain experience. In a more recent study, Singer et al. (2006) found that male partici-
pants who perceived the suffering person as being unfair in a monetary exchange game
showed a desire for revenge instead of an empathic response.
Other related contributions have investigated whether individuals are more likely
to help an ingroup member rather than an outgroup member in similar need (Levine
et al., 2005; De Dreu et al., 2010; Hein et al., 2010). The empirical evidence is mixed.
Lanzetta and Englis (1989) found that subjects may even take pleasure in the outgroup
member’s suffering. Results depend on how ingroup members evaluate outgroup mem-
bers. My experiment is related to this literature on emphatic behavior: individuals may
understand what another individual will experience if an accident happens, and would
try to avoid the accident by investing in precautions. It would be interesting to extend
my experimental design to include pain-and-suffering damages, and to compare the
results with the neuroscientiﬁc contributions on pain-related emphatic responses.
5.1.3 Experimental Literature on Accident Law
This study aims primarily at investigating prosocial behaviors in a speciﬁc risky
context (i.e., a car accident). The implications of the results add to the contributions
on other-regarding and prosocial preferences. In addition, this study relies on and
ultimately contributes to the experimental literature on liability rules. Despite the ex-
tensive number of tort models, we know very little about actual precautionary behav-
146
iors under different liability rules, partly because this behavior is difﬁcult to observe
unless an accident really happens.42 Even if experiments are becoming a growing
methodology in the toolbox of law and economics scholars (Arlen and Talley, 2008),
experiments on tort law is one of the least developed applications of experimental
methodology in the study of law. Until now, a small literature (ﬁve previous contribu-
tions) has experimentally investigated the deterrent effects of speciﬁc legal rules, and
compared the outcomes with the theoretical predictions.43 This section brieﬂy reviews
the results from these contributions.
The ﬁrst paper in this area, Kornhauser and Schotter (1990), compared the strict
liability rule with the negligence rule in terms of care incentives in a single-actor acci-
dent context. In Kornhauser and Schotter (1990), all participants were potential injur-
ers, and their outcome depended only on their own chosen level of care (unilateral-care
model). Relying on the theoretical results, the authors tested three hypotheses. First, if
the due standard of care is set at the socially optimal level, then a prospective injurer
has the same precautionary incentives under both the negligence and the strict liability
rules. Secondly, if the due standard of care is set slightly above the socially optimal
level, then potential injurers will adhere to the standard, but if it is set sufﬁciently above
the socially optimal level, then rational economic agents will abandon it by choosing a
level of care consistent with the strict liability rule. Thirdly, if the standard of due care
is set at the socially optimal level, then economic agents will always engage in more
42For a review of the empirical research on tort law, see Van Velthoven (2009).
43Other contributions have experimentally tested the general assertion that tort liability deters individ-
uals from undertaking potentially harmful activities. See Kötz and Schaefer (1993), Cardi et al. (2012),
Eisenberg and Engel (2012), and the references therein.
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potentially dangerous activities under the negligence rule rather than under strict liabil-
ity. They found neither the predicted efﬁciency equivalence between strict liability and
simple negligence, nor the predicted difference in activity levels following which sub-
jects would have chosen more activity level under simple negligence than under strict
liability. Speciﬁcally, in all strict liability experiments, participants chose excessively
high levels of care in the early rounds, and then decreased them as the experiment
progressed. At the end, care levels were signiﬁcantly less than those predicted by the
theory. On the contrary, under the negligence rule, participants behave according to
the predictions of the theory. Kornhauser and Schotter (1992) compared simple neg-
ligence and negligence with contributory negligence defense in a two-actor accident
context.44 They found those rules to be equivalent when the standard of due care is
set at the socially optimal level. The rule of negligence with contributory negligence
dominates simple negligence when the actors were allowed to choose the intensity of
the risky activity. However, neither class of rules performs well in terms of efﬁciency
when individuals were asked to choose both the level of care and the level of activ-
ity. Finally, as the theory predicts, the agent who bears the loss in equilibrium has
incentives to reduce the level of activity, and, contrary to what expected, the amount of
information the subjects have on others’ care choices does not increase the efﬁciency
of any rule.
44The authors tested four hypotheses, three based on the theoretical analysis of accident law, and one
posed by their experimental design. First, when the standard of due care is set at the socially optimal
level, rules of negligence and rules of negligence with contributory negligence induce equivalent choices
of care. Secondly, agents choose a lower level of risky activity if they bear the costs of the accidents in
equilibrium. Thirdly, if the standard of due care increases, the agents will adhere to it up to a certain
point, and then abandon it. Fourthly, providing information about the others’ care levels yields to
outcomes that are more efﬁcient (or at least closer) to the equilibrium.
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LeighAnne and Crevier (1992) compared the contributory negligence defense with
comparative negligence in a two-actor accident model. The number of observations
collected (eight subjects, ﬁve periods, and non-computerized classroom setting) were
not sufﬁcient to draw any conclusion. Wittman et al. (1997) compared negligence
with contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and no-fault rules in a dynamic
perspective to detect which of them more rapidly achieves the efﬁcient equilibrium.
Their experiment strongly conﬁrms both equilibrium and learning theory. They found
that no-fault rules lead to suboptimal levels of care, and that comparative negligence
and negligence with contributory negligence achieve the same (efﬁcient) equilibrium,
with a faster convergence under comparative negligence.
Angelova et al. (2013) analyzed the investments in safety under no liability, strict
liability and simple negligence, and compared them to the ﬁrst best. Their context is
different from the previous ones: they investigated which liability rule is more efﬁcient
in reducing the probability that a ﬁrm harms third parties (i.e., the environment or
individuals). They found that strict liability and simple negligence are equally effective
(in contrast with the results in Kornhauser and Schotter, 1990), and both perform better
than no liability. Moreover, the investment in safety is not sensitive to the ﬁnancial
ability of the ﬁrm to compensate potential victims.
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5.2 Experimental Model and Hypotheses
This section presents the standard unilateral-care accident model and describes the
equilibrium properties of the liability rules. The theoretical results provide the hy-
potheses for the experiment.
The standard economic model of accident law relies on three basic elements: the
cost of harm, the cost of avoiding harm, and the beneﬁt of socially valuable activi-
ties (e.g., driving cars, manufacturing, practicing medicine). There are two parties, a
prospective tortfeasor and his victim, that are assumed to be stranger to each other,
risk-neutral, and free from any type of behavioral bias. Parties undertake a risky but
—socially and individually— desirable activity, and invest in costly levels of care to
reduce the probability of an accident. My analysis focuses on precautionary choices,
and thus considers activity levels as exogenous. Following the conventional notation,
let x and y denote the tortfeasor’s and victim’s care levels respectively, and z¯ and u¯
denote the tortfeasor’s and victim’s activity levels respectively.
Let us assume that both parties’ utilities decrease in care level at a constant or in-
creasing rate, and increase in activity level at a decreasing rate. Let w = e(z¯)− c(x)
be the injurer’s level of wealth, and let b = e(u¯)− c(y) be the victim’s wealth. Fol-
lowing the standard assumptions of tort models, I assume the following relationships:
cx > 0, cxx ≥ 0 for the tortfeasor, and similarly cy > 0, cyy ≥ 0 for the victim. Given
exogenous activity levels, e(z¯) and e(u¯) are interpreted as the parties’ initial endow-
ments.
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Let us now turn to the cost of accidents. The probability of an accident decreases
as parties increase their care levels at a constant or increasing rate, i.e., px < 0, pxx ≥ 0
for the tortfeasor, and py < 0, pyy ≥ 0 for the victim. The accident loss is denoted by
L > 0.
5.2.1 Social Problem
The socially optimal levels of care are derived as solutions of the social optimiza-
tion problem. The social welfare function is deﬁned as the sum of parties’ utilities, net
of the expected cost of the accident. In a unilateral framework where the accident rates
depend only upon the behavior of one party, the social optimization problem is deﬁned
as follows:
max
a
S = e(z¯)+ e(u¯)− c(a)− p(a)L (5.2.1)
where a ∈ {x,y} depending on which of the two parties can prevent an accident by
undertaking care measures. The socially optimal care levels a∗∗, with a∗∗ ∈ {x∗∗, y∗∗},
satisfy the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
ca =−pa L (5.2.2)
According to this condition, the socially optimal care levels are the levels at which
the marginal beneﬁt from an increase in care investments (i.e., the reduction in the
expected accident costs, −pa L) equals the marginal care cost (ca).
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The next step is to deﬁne the private maximization problems under the no liability
rule and the strict liability rule. The main results are pointed out as hypotheses for the
experiment.
5.2.2 Private Problem
The expected private utility functions are given by individual beneﬁts from the
activity at the net of the cost of precaution and of the expected cost of accident. Let
T and V denote the expected utilities of the tortfeasor and of the victim. The private
optimization problems can be deﬁned as follows:
max
x
T = e(z¯)− c(x)−σ p(a)L (5.2.3)
max
y
V = e(u¯)− c(y)− (1−σ) p(a)L (5.2.4)
where a ∈ {x,y}, and σ ∈ {0,1} is the share of the loss borne by the injurer under the
liability rule in place. More speciﬁcally, σ = 0 under the no liability rule, and σ = 1
under the strict liability rule.45
Let us consider the precautionary choices of the parties when they can inﬂuence the
probability of an accident. The privately optimal care levels under no liability, denoted
by x∗nl for the injurer and by y
∗
nl for the victim, are respectively deﬁned by the following
45For a review of the standard Calabresi-Brown model, see the pioneering work by Brown (1973) and
the recent review of the economic analysis of liability rules by Dari-Mattiacci (2005).
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ﬁrst-order conditions:
cxnl = 0 (5.2.5)
cynl =−pynlL (5.2.6)
By comparing (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) with the socially optimal levels, it follows that x∗nl =
0< x∗∗ and y∗nl = y
∗∗. As standard in the literature, under the no liability rule potential
injurers have no incentives to invest in care since they will never have to compensate
the victim in case of accident. By contrast, potential victims have correct incentives to
undertake socially optimal care levels to minimize the expected accident costs.
At the exact opposite, under the strict liability rule, σ is equal to 1, and the privately
optimal care levels, i.e., x∗sl for the injurer and y
∗
sl for the victim, are respectively deﬁned
as follows:
cxsl =−pxslL (5.2.7)
cysl = 0 (5.2.8)
In this case, the victim has no incentives to exercise care since any monetary loss will
be compensated, i.e., y∗sl = 0< y
∗∗, whereas the injurer fully internalizes the beneﬁt of
precautions x∗ = x∗∗sl .
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5.2.3 Hypotheses
The comparison between the privately optimal care levels of the two parties reveals
the symmetric properties of the two rules. Since parties are assumed to be identical
except for their role, potential injurers under the strict liability rule have the same pre-
cautionary incentives as potential victims under the no liability rule, i.e., x∗sl = y
∗
nl = a
∗∗
where a∗∗ is the socially optimal level of care deﬁned in (5.2.2). Similarly, potential
injurers under the no liability rule have no incentives to undertake precautions, as po-
tential victims under the strict liability rule, i.e., x∗nl = y
∗
sl = 0. Thus, in the aggregate,
victims and injurers under the two rules are expected to invest in the same aggregate
level of care. Table 5.1 summarizes the theoretical results of the standard accident
model.
Victim Injurer
No Liability c(y∗nl) = c(y
∗∗) c(x∗nl) = 0 < c(x
∗∗)
Strict Liability c(y∗sl) = 0 < c(y
∗∗) c(x∗sl) = c(x
∗∗)
Table 5.1: Socially vs.Privately Optimal Care Expenditures
The hypotheses to be tested in the experiment essentially derive from two sources:
the economic theory on liability law outlined above in this section, and the experi-
mental results on prosocial behaviors and other-regarding preferences reviewed in the
introductory sections. The ﬁrst three hypotheses aim to test the theoretical predictions
on equilibrium care choices and to detect possible behavioral biases.
Hypothesis 5.2.1 (Care Expenditures per Role). Potential injurers have higher pre-
cautionary incentives under the strict liability rule rather than under the no liability
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rule, i.e., c(x∗sl)> c(x
∗
nl). Potential victims have higher precautionary incentives under
the no liability rule rather than under the strict liability rule, i.e., c(y∗nl)> c(y
∗
sl).
Hypothesis 5.2.2 (Equivalence of Roles per Liability Rule). Potential injurers under
the strict liability rule and potential victims under the no liability rule undertake the
same care level. Formally, c(x∗sl) = c(y
∗
nl). Potential injurers under the no liability
rule and potential victims under the strict liability rule undertake the same care level.
Formally, c(x∗nl) = c(y
∗
sl).
Hypothesis 5.2.3 (Equivalence of Roles). Under mirrored liability rules, potential
victims and potential injurers invest in the same aggregate level of care measures.
Formally, c(x∗sl)+ c(x
∗
nl) = c(y
∗
sl)+ c(y
∗
nl).
Hypothesis 5.2.1 tests whether individuals undertake more precautions when bur-
dened by liability costs. Hypotheses 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, that are the most relevant for this
study, test the theoretical prediction of symmetrical care choices of potential injurers
and victims under alternative mirrored liability rules. These hypotheses, if not rejected,
imply that individuals are equally averse between suffering a loss and causing a loss to
others.
However, moral sentiments and prosocial behaviors could lead individuals to eval-
uate the cost of others’ losses as higher than their own losses in a context where they
feel responsible for that loss (Charness, 2000; Charness and Jackson, 2009). In a risky
context, this implies that individuals might spend more resources to avoid causing a
loss to others rather than to avoid suffering a loss per se. By relying on the experimen-
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tal results on prosocial and other-regarding preferences, we would expect individuals
to make different care choices depending upon their role in an accident. More specif-
ically, under mirrored liability rules, I would expect potential injurers to expend more
resources in care measures than victims. These considerations lead to the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5.2.4 (Prosocial Preferences). Subjects care about the others’ monetary
loss, regardless of their role in the accident, i.e., c(x∗nl) + c(y
∗
nl) > 0. Subjects care
more about the others’ monetary loss rather than their own, regardless of their role in
the accident, i.e., c(xnl∗)+ c(y∗sl)> c(xsl∗)+ c(y
∗
nl).
Hypothesis 5.2.5 (Prosocial Preferences and Nonequivalence of Roles). Subjects spend
more resources to avoid causing a monetary loss to others rather than to avoid suffer-
ing a monetary loss. In the aggregate, potential injurers expend more resources in care
measures than potential victims, i.e., c(x∗sl)+ c(x
∗
nl)> c(y
∗
sl)+ c(y
∗
nl).
5.3 Experimental Design and Parameters
This study asks individuals to trade off proﬁts from themselves against monetary
losses either for themselves or for another person. To test the hypotheses outlined in
Section 5.2, I ran two sessions of a paper-based experiment. The participants were all
undergraduate students in economics: 109 students were recruited from the University
of Bologna for the ﬁrst session, and 115 students were recruited from the University
of Modena and Reggio Emilia for the second session, for a total of 224 participants.
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The decisions of participants who incorrectly replied to at least one of the three check
questions in the instructions were not considered. Thus, the ﬁnal analysis was carried
out considering the choices of 208 participants.
In unilateral-care accident models, the probability of an accident depends only
upon the behavior of one party, either the injurer (i.e., p(x)), or the victim (i.e., p(y)).
Let us denote the party who can invest in precautions the “active player”, and the party
who cannot take any action to prevent an accident the “passive player”. In these two
sessions all the participants were active players.
The experiment used a between-subject, 2 x 2 design, with two liability rules for
each role. Each participant was assigned the role of injurer or victim (role treatment),
and was asked to take decisions under both the strict liability rule and the no liability
rule (liability-rule treatment). Each session lasted approximately 20 minutes. Payoffs
were denominated in a ﬁctitious currency called points and denoted with the symbol
§. Participants received non-monetary incentives to participate in the experiment, that
is, extra-points for the ﬁnal grade of the course exam.
5.3.1 Roles and Task
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned either the
role of injurer or the role of victim. The roles were privately communicated and re-
main ﬁxed through the experiment. All the participants were active players and were
assigned the role of car drivers. Each subject was asked to decide whether and how
many precautions he would like to undertake to reduce the accident rate. Each active
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player was informed that his precautionary choices would have inﬂuenced the proba-
bility of an accident involving another subject that could not do anything to prevent it
(the passive player). The probability of an accident was computed on the basis of the
active parties’ precautionary investments. The identity of the subjects and their indi-
vidual investment in care remained private information, and no feedback concerning
the happening of the accident was provided during the study.
5.3.2 Parameters
At the beginning of each treatment, participants received an initial endowment of
§140. In each treatment, subjects were asked to decide whether and how many pre-
cautions they would like to undertake in a range from 0 to 6 care units. A marginal
investment in care reduces the probability of an accident by 10%, and entails an in-
creasing marginal cost. The probability of an accident is expressed by the following
function: p(a) = 0.85− 0.10a, where a = x ∈ [0,6] if the injurer is the active player,
or a = y ∈ [0,6] if the victim is the active player. The probability of loss thus ranges
between 25% (if the active player invests in the maximum amount of precautions, i.e.,
6) and 85% (if the active player undertakes zero precautions). The cost of precautions
is deﬁned by the following function: c(a) = 4a+a2, with a = x,y ∈ [0,6]. The cost of
precautions ranges from 0 (when the active players invests in zero precautions) to 60
(when the active player invests in the maximum amount of precautions). If the accident
happens, the (ﬁxed) monetary loss will be of §80. Negative payoffs were not possible.
Table 5.2 summarizes the parameters set in this experimental design:
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Parameter Value Description
e(z¯), e(u¯) §140 initial endowment
x, y ∈ [0,6] units care levels
c(a) = 4a+a2; a = x,y ∈ [0,60] cost of care
p(a) = 0.85−0.10a; a = x,y ∈ [0.25,0.85] probability of an accident
L §80 accident loss
Table 5.2: Parameters of the Experimental Design
5.3.3 Predictions
This section revisits the Hypotheses outlined in Section 5.2 on the basis of the
parameters set in the experimental design. From (5.2.2), it follows that the socially
optimal care level is 2. Given (5.2.7) and (5.2.6), the theory predicts that potential in-
jurers under the strict liability rule and victims under the no liability rule will undertake
socially optimal care levels, i.e., x∗sl = y
∗
nl = 2. In this case, the optimal expenditure
in precautions is §12. Similarly, given (5.2.5) and (5.2.8), the standard results imply
that potential injurers under the no liability rule and victims under the strict liability
rule will have no incentives to undertake precautions, i.e., x∗nl = y
∗
sl = 0, or at least less
incentives than they would have in the presence of expected liability costs (Hypothe-
ses 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). Under Hypothesis 5.2.3, injurers and victims should undertake in
aggregate the same level of precautions, i.e., x∗sl + x
∗
nl = y
∗
nl + y
∗
sl = 2. In other words,
the aggregate care expenditure should be §12 for both injurers and victims. Table 5.3
summarizes the optimal precautionary expenditures under the alternative liability rules
considered, given the parameters of the experimental design.
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Victim Injurer
No Liability c(y∗nl) = c(y
∗∗) = §12 c(x∗nl) = §0 < c(x
∗∗)
Strict Liability c(y∗sl) = §0 < c(y
∗∗) c(x∗sl) = c(x
∗∗) = §12
Aggregate c(y∗nl)+ c(y
∗
sl) = §12 c(x
∗
nl)+ c(x
∗
sl) = §12
Table 5.3: Socially vs.Privately Optimal Care Expenditures in the Experiment
5.4 Results
This section presents the results of the experiment in relation to the underlying hy-
potheses. Before discussing the results, Table 5.4 provides the descriptive statistics by
presenting the mean, medians and standard deviations of subjects’ care expenditures.
t = 0 (victims)
— Quantiles —
Liability Rule N Mean S.D. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max
no liability 104 27.48 20.65 0.00 12.00 21.00 45.00 60.00
strict liability 104 21.07 20.72 0.00 0.00 21.00 32.00 60.00
aggregate 208 48.55 32.53 0.00 32.00 45.00 66.00 120.00
t = 1 (injurers)
— Quantiles —
Liability Rule N Mean S.D. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max
no liability 104 17.01 18.62 0.00 0.00 12.00 32.00 60.00
strict liability 104 20.53 18.48 0.00 0.00 21.00 32.00 60.00
aggregate 208 37.54 31.07 0.00 12.00 33.00 60.00 120.00
Table 5.4: Summary statistics for care expenditures
Table 5.4 suggests that on average subjects in each role and under each rule invest in
more than optimal care levels. It can be noticed also that individuals expend resources
to prevent an accident even when they were not burdened by the expected liability costs
(i.e., victims under the strict liability rule and injurers under the no liability rule). This
can be interpreted as a natural propensity to care about the others’ monetary losses,
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even when this comes at own expenses (see Hypothesis 5.2.4). This result is consis-
tent with the extant literature on other-regarding preferences in predicting individuals’
aversions to bad outcomes especially when these affect others’ well-being. Table 5.4
suggests also that care expenditures were higher when subjects were burdened by the
expected accident costs, i.e., c(x∗sl)> c(x
∗
nl) for the injurers and c(y
∗
nl)> c(y
∗
sl) for the
victims (see Hypothesis 5.2.1).
To assess whether these differences are signiﬁcant, I compare pairwise the two dis-
tributions using Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests and sign tests (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6
in Appendix 5.6). The distributions of care investments are (i) signiﬁcantly different
from the predicted care levels; (ii) signiﬁcantly lower under the no liability rule rather
than under the strict liability rule for injurers (sign test, p-value = 0.0843); (iii) sig-
niﬁcantly lower under the strict liability rule rather than under the no liability rule for
victim (sign test, p-value = 0.0008). On the basis of these results, Hypothesis 5.2.1 on
care choices per role under the two liability rules cannot be rejected.
To better appreciate differences in investment patterns across the treatments, Figure
5.1 plots the average investments in care measures.
Both graphs in Figure 5.1 show that subjects’ investment in care measures is higher
than the predicted values. More speciﬁcally, Figure 5.1a shows that care expenditures
are higher in the presence of expected liability costs, as the theoretical results predict.
Victims have spent on average §27.48 in precautions under the no liability rule against
the §21.07 spent under the strict liability rule. Injurers have spent on average §20.53 in
safety under the strict liability rule against the §17.01 spent under the no liability rule.
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Figure 5.1: Average Care Investments by Treatment
Figure 5.1b highlights the fact that on average potential victims undertook approxi-
mately the same level of precautions of injurers under the strict liability rule (§21.07
spent by victims and §20.53 spent by injurers).
Figure 5.1b shows the most interesting and surprising result of this experiment:
Result 5.4.1. Under the strict liability rule, victims invest about as much as injurers.
Victims under the strict liability rule heavily invest in care measures, even if per-
fectly insured. Indeed, on average, under the strict liability rule, victims invested about
as much as injurers (§21.07 spent by victims and §20.53 spent by injurers). Note that
in the “Victim, Strict Liability” case, (a) injurers have to pay whenever damage occurs,
but (b) only victims can take actions to prevent the accident. In other words, victims
are the active players and are perfectly insured against accident losses. From a theo-
retical point of view, we would have expected victims to undertake zero precautions or
at least less precautions than injurers in the “Injurers, Strict Liability” case. Surpris-
ingly, we found that victims invested about as much as injurers. This result could have
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been driven by different motivations. First, it can be interpreted as another instance of
social preferences: the victims see it as unfair to make injurers loose money with such
a high probability, and heavily invest in precautions in order to prevent unjust liability
for injurers. Another interpretation is related to the fact that only victims suffer the
damage to their property. In this case, the willingness to protect personal properties
might prevail over the compensation damages. In other words, victims care about their
own personal properties, regardless of the compensatory system in place in case of
damages.
Considering now the no liability rule, I found the following result:
Result 5.4.2. Under the no liability rule, victims invest much more than injurers.
This is coherent with the theoretical models of accident law (Shavell, 1980). Around
40% of injurers spend nothing to avoid causing an accident. Given that injurers in this
case are essentially playing a risky dictator game, this result can be seen as coherent
with the standard ﬁndings in dictator games in which on average around 36% of all
dictators give nothing to the recipient (Engel, 2011). These results show that injurers
in the “Injurer, No Liability” case nonetheless undertake on average more than 60%
of victims’ investments in the “Victim, No Liability” case. This can be interpreted as
another instance of social preferences: given that, in the “Injurer, No Liability” case,
victims cannot take actions to avoid the accident, injurers feel it as unfair to make
victims suffering unjust and uncompensated losses.
Furthermore, Figure 5.1a shows that care expenditures are higher in the presence of
expected liability costs, as the theoretical results predict (i.e., Hypothesis 5.2.1 cannot
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be rejected). Victims have spent on average §27.48 in precautions under the no liability
rule against the §21.07 spent under the strict liability rule. Injurers have spent on
average §20.53 in safety under the strict liability rule against the §17.01 spent under
the no liability rule.
Result 5.4.3. Subjects invest more in precautions in the presence of expected liability
costs. Victims undertake more precautions under the no liability rule rather than un-
der the strict liability rule, and injurers undertake more precautions under the strict
liability rule rather than under the no liability rule.
Potential injurers and victims undertake care levels even when it would be desirable
to not undertake them. More speciﬁcally, we would have expected potential injurers
and victims to invest in zero precautions when they were not burdened by expected lia-
bility costs (i.e., under the no liability rule and the strict liability rule respectively). The
results show that individuals have incentives to deviate from the zero-care equilibria
(see Tables 5.5 and 5.6 for the Wilcoxon signed rank-sum tests and sign tests in Ap-
pendix 5.6) suggesting that people care about the others’ monetary losses. However,
when comparing the incentives to undertake care measures with and without expected
liability costs, it appears that individuals are more willing to invest in care measures
when these prevent a monetary loss to self rather than to others, regardless of their role
in the accident. Figure 5.2 shows that the total amount of care investments of injurers
under the strict liability rule and of victims under the no liability rule (“with liability
costs”) is signiﬁcantly greater than the total amount of care investments of injurers un-
der the no liability rule and of victims under the strict liability rule (“without liability
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costs”), i.e., c(xsl)+ c(ynl)> c(xnl)+ c(ysl) (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in Appendix 5.6).
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Figure 5.2: Loss To Self vs.Loss To Others
Following these results, Hypothesis 5.2.4 under which individuals were expected
to care about the others’ monetary losses at least as much as their own can be rejected.
Let us now analyze the care choices of injurers compared to the care choices of vic-
tims. It has been already shown that parties do not adhere to the predicted equilibrium
levels of care and that they invest more in care in the presence of expected liability
costs (i.e., Hypothesis 5.2.1 cannot be rejected). The question now is whether there are
differences in care investments between injurers and victims. The theoretical model
predicts that injurers and victims should have the same precautionary incentives under
mirrored liability rules. In other words, people should be expected to expend resources
to prevent being the victim of an accident inasmuch as to prevent being the injurer of
an accident.
In order to test whether the difference in care choices between injurers and victims
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is statistically signiﬁcant, I consider the aggregate care investments under the two li-
ability rules. Hypothesis 5.2.3 states that in aggregate, under mirrored liability rules,
the distributions of care choices should be equal between injurers and victims. The
Mann-Whitney test is performed to test this prediction. The results in Table 5.7 show
that the distribution of care expenses is signiﬁcantly lower under the role of injurers
rather than under the role of victims (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.0110
under the hypothesis that c(xsl)+ c(xnl) = c(ysl)+ c(ynl)).
To better appreciate differences in investment patterns across the treatment “role”,
Figure 5.3 plots the kernel-density functions of the aggregate care investments of in-
jures (black line) and of victims (grey line). Figure 5.4 shows the kernel-density plots
with the histogram of the aggregate care investments under the two roles.
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Figure 5.3: Kernel-Density Plots of the Aggregate Care Levels per Role
The graphs in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 conﬁrm that subjects do not act as theoretically
predicted, and that the care investments are not uniformly distributed across the treat-
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Figure 5.4: Aggregate Care Levels per Role
ment “role”. By comparing the two kernel distributions in Figure 5.3, it can be noticed
that victims tend to invest less in low care levels and more in medium-high care levels
as compared to injurers’ choices. Following this result, Hypothesis 5.2.5 under which
individuals were expected to care more about the others’ safety rather than own safety
can be rejected.
These results are summarized as follows:
Result 5.4.4. Most subjects preferred to invest in care measures even when not bur-
dened by expected liability costs, i.e., c(xnl) + c(ysl) > 0. Subjects care about the
others’ monetary loss, but less than their own. Formally, subjects invest in more pre-
cautions when burdened by expected liability costs, regardless of them being injurers
or victims, i.e., c(xnl)+ c(ysl)< c(xsl)+ c(ynl).
Result 5.4.5. Subjects spend more resources to avoid suffering a loss rather than
to avoid causing a loss to others. Formally, potential victims spent more resources
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in precautions than potential injurers to prevent an accident, i.e., c(xnl) + c(xsl) <
c(ysl)+ c(ynl).
These tests show that the distributions of care investments are different between
injurers and victims. On the basis of the neuroscientiﬁc contributions and of the exper-
imental literature on prosocial behavior and other-regarding preferences, individuals
should be expected to undertake more precautions to prevent a monetary loss to others
rather than to self (Hypothesis 5.2.4). On the contrary, the experimental results show
that subjects spent more resources to avoid suffering a loss rather than causing it.
This result is coherent with the contributions on prosocial preferences which show
that people care about the others’ monetary outcome, but less than their own (Engel,
2011). Nevertheless, the observation of relatively hypoaltruistic behavior in the con-
text of accident prevention suggests that the valuation of others’ well-beings is highly
context-dependent.
5.5 Implications, Limitations, and Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents an experimental design in which people care more about their
own monetary loss than an anonymous stranger’s monetary loss and dislike suffering a
loss to self more than causing a loss to others, even if their decisions were completely
anonymous with no possibility of being punished or otherwise judged.
Consistently with previous studies of social preferences (e.g., Engel, 2011), result
5.4.4 highlights that individuals value the others’ monetary loss less than their own.
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Result 5.4.5 shows that people spend more resources to avoid suffering a loss rather
than to avoid causing a loss to others. This is a novel result which adds to the extant
contributions on prosocial preferences, and stands in contrast with the observation that
individuals dislike being responsible of bad outcomes, especially when they affect the
others’ well-being (Ritov and Baron, 1990; Kahneman, 2011). Under this perspective,
the added cost of moral responsibility should have led people to value others’ losses
more than their own.
This experiment adds another perspective to these previous contributions. The re-
sults show that individuals are more averse in suffering a loss to self rather than in
causing a loss to others. There are several potential explanations for these ﬁndings.
First, the consequences of subjects’ care decisions on others’ well-being is uncertain,
and people might have biased risk-perceptions depending upon their role in an acci-
dent. Potential injurers might be unrealistically optimistic about their ability to avoid
an accident, whereas potential victims might perceive unrealistically high rates of risks
for themselves (DeJoy, 1989). This could ultimately lead injurers to undertake less pre-
cautions than victims. Even when potential victims are not pessimistically biased, they
could expect injurers’ optimistic bias and compensate their unrealistic risk perceptions
by undertaking more precautions.
An alternative explanation stems from the possibly different perception of eco-
nomic and pain-and-suffering damages (Cohen and Miller, 2003; Avraham, 2015).
This experiment considered economic damages and perfect compensation. Potential
injurers might become more willing to undertake care measures in the presence of
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pain-and-suffering damages, but victims might remain more harm-averse especially
in case of imperfect compensation of noneconomic damages. The consideration of
noneconomic damages might thus either reduce the difference in care investments be-
tween injurers and victims or left it unchanged. Future investigations which include
pain-and-suffering damages and imperfect compensation may make it possible to ana-
lyze the conditions under which my results hold.
A third possibility arises from the fact that in this experiment the monetary loss
falls entirely on one of the two subjects. This might lead the victims to undertake more
precautions than injurers given the potential threat to their personal property, even if
damages are compensated. Injurers, on the contrary, do not suffer any damage to their
personal property and are less willing to adopt precautions. For example, a driver might
be less averse in causing a damage to another car and pay the compensation, rather
than suffering a damage to his own vehicle, even if compensated. The willingness
to protect personal properties might prevail over the compensation damages. In other
words, individuals care about own personal properties, regardless of the compensatory
system in place in case of damages.
Other questions still have to be answered, opening the possibility for further re-
search on this topic. One of them is whether the results of my experiment would
generalize to a bilateral-care model. In unilateral-care accidents, only one of the two
subjects can reduce the probability of an accident by undertaking precautions, while
the other subject is completely passive. In bilateral-care accidents, both parties’ de-
cisions affect the probability of an accident. Results might substantially change if
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subjects know that also others can invest in care to avoid an accident. Determining
how people behave under different accident frameworks remain an empirical question.
Future research and ﬁeld methods might explore the boundaries of subjective val-
uations of harm in an accident setting by varying the parameters of this study. For
example, it is possible that the “aversion-to-suffer” found in this research is limited to
harms of medium consequences (in this experiment, the damages amount to §80 on
§140 of initial endowment); to property damages; and to a relatively wide probability
of having an accident (in this experiment, the probability of an accident ranges from
25 to 85 percent). Other extensions might also include the uncertainty of being victims
or injurers in an accident, and the possibility that also injurers suffer a share of the loss
together with the victims. Different results might also arise when distinguishing the
care choices by male and female participants.
This study provided a novel context for testing moral preferences and investigating
antisocial behaviors. The results show a greater aversion to be injured rather than to
cause a loss. Understanding the boundary conditions of this observation has implica-
tions for many legal and political decisions about social interactions in risky situations.
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5.6 Appendix A: Tables
H0 z Prob> |z|
c(xsl) = 12 3.257 0.0011
c(ynl) = 12 5.657 0.0000
c(xnl) = 0 7.660 0.0000
c(ysl) = 0 7.769 0.0000
c(xsl) = c(xnl) 1.599 0.1098
c(ysl) = c(ynl) 2.958 0.0031
c(xsl)+ c(ysl) = c(xnl)+ c(ynl) 3.308 0.0009
c(xsl)+ c(xnl) = c(ysl)+ c(ynl) 12.176 0.0000
Table 5.5: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests
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H0 Ha p-value
mdn of c(xsl)−12 = 0
mdn of c(xsl)−12 > 0 0.0057
mdn of c(xsl)−12 < 0 0.9969
mdn of c(xsl)−12! = 0 0.0115
mdn of c(ynl)−12 = 0
mdn of c(ynl)−12 > 0 0.0000
mdn of c(ynl)−12 < 0 1.0000
mdn of c(ynl)−12! = 0 0.0000
mdn of c(xnl) = 0
mdn of c(xnl)> 0 0.0000
mdn of c(xnl)< 0 1.0000
mdn of c(xnl) ! = 0 0.0000
mdn of c(ysl) = 0
mdn of c(ysl)> 0 0.0000
mdn of c(ysl)< 0 1.0000
mdn of c(ysl) ! = 0 0.0000
mdn of c(xsl)− c(xnl) = 0
mdn of c(xsl)− c(xnl)> 0 0.0843
mdn of c(xsl)− c(xnl)< 0 0.9483
mdn of c(xsl)− c(xnl) ! = 0 0.1686
mdn of c(ynl)− c(ysl) = 0
mdn of c(ynl)− c(ysl)> 0 0.0008
mdn of c(ynl)− c(ysl)< 0 0.9997
mdn of c(ynl)− c(ysl) ! = 0 0.0016
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl) = c(xnl)+ c(ysl)
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl)> c(xnl)+ c(ysl) 0.0005
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl)< c(xnl)+ c(ysl) 0.9997
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl) ! = c(xnl)+ c(ysl) 0.0010
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl) = c(xnl)+ c(ysl)
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl)> c(xnl)+ c(ysl) 0.0005
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl)< c(xnl)+ c(ysl) 0.9997
mdn of c(xsl)+ c(ynl) ! = c(xnl)+ c(ysl) 0.0010
Table 5.6: Sign Tests
t obs rank sum expected
0 104 11967 10868
1 104 9769 10868
combined 208 21736 21736
unadjusted variance 188378.67
adjustment for ties -1345.47
adjusted variance 187033.20
Ho: c(ysl)+ c(ynl) = c(xsl)+ c(xnl)
z = 2.541
Prob > |z| = 0.0110
Table 5.7: Two-Sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) Test
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5.7 Appendix B: Instructions
5.7.1 Instructions for Injurers
A short study on decision making
We are conducting a survey about care choices. The time needed to complete this
survey is approximately 30 minutes. Please read the instructions carefully.
Imagine that you have an initial portfolio of 140 points. Your choices in the
survey and chance will inﬂuence your ﬁnal portfolio and also the ﬁnal portfolio of
another participant. For your participation in this study, you will receive extra-points
for the ﬁnal grade of the course exam.
You are randomly matched with another participant, whose identity will remain
private information.
Both you and the other participant have been assigned the role of drivers.
Your task is to decide how much you want to invest in precautions to avoid a
collision causing an economic damage to the other participant’s car.
The more precautions you take, the higher the cost for you, but the lower the prob-
ability of causing an economic damage to the other participant’s car.
The other participant cannot take any precaution to avoid the collision.
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Scenario 1
If the accident happens, you will not have to compensate the other participant
for the economic damage you caused to his/her car.
You can decide how many points you want to spend in precautions.
• Please look at the ﬁrst row of the table, you can decide to spend zero points
in precautions. In this case you get the initial earning (§140) and do not suffer
any cost of care. If you invest zero in precaution, the collision happens with a
probability of 85%.
• Look at the second row, investing 5 points in precautions reduces the probability
of collision to 75%, and your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 5 = §135.
• Look at the bottom row of the table, investing 60 points reduces the probability
of collision to 25%, and your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 60 = §80.
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The economic damage to the other participant’s car in case of collision amount
to §80.
If an accident happens, the other participant bears the loss you caused to his/her
car.
If the accident happens, the ﬁnal earning of the other participant will be 140 - 80 =
§60.
If the accident does not happen, the other participant keeps the initial endowment
of §140.
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Let consider the following example. Imagine that you decide to invest 5 points in
precautions:
• The probability of a collision is 75%;
• Whether the accident happen or not, your ﬁnal earning will be 140 [initial points]
- 5 [cost of precautions] = §135, since you never pay to compensate the other
participant;
• The other participant will earn §140 [initial earning points] if the accident does
not happen, or 140 - 80 [accident cost] = §60 if the accident happens since the
victim will not receive any compensation for the accident loss.
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In the following, you will be asked to answer three questions to check your under-
standing of the instructions.
1. Assume that you have invested 21 points in precautions. What is the correspon-
dent probability of collision?
• 75%
• 45%
• 55%
• 25%
2. Assume that you have invested 12 points in precautions and that the collision
happens. What is the ﬁnal earning for you and for the other participant?
• You: §95; Other participant: §60
• You: §108; Other participant: §60
• You: §128; Other participant: §60
• You: §128; Other participant: §140
3. If the accident happens, you have always to compensate the other participant for
the economic damage you caused to his/her car.
• True
• False
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Please answer the question below. Your ﬁnal earning and the ﬁnal earning of the
other participant will be computed based on your choice.
Based on the table above, how much would you like to spend in precaution to avoid
causing a damage to the other participant’s car?
• § 0
• § 5
• § 12
• § 21
• § 32
• § 45
• § 60
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Scenario 2
Consider now that you have always to compensate the other participant for the
economic damage to his/her car. The other participant cannot take any precaution to
avoid the collision. You can decide how much to spend in precautions.
• Please look at the ﬁrst row of the table, you can decide to spend zero points in
precautions.
– If the collision does not happen (probability 15%), you get the initial earn-
ing (§140) and do not suffer any cost.
– If the collision happens (probability 85%), you have to compensate the
other participant for the damage caused to his/her car, so you get 140 - 80
= §60.
• Look at the second row of the table, investing 5 points in precautions reduces the
probability of collision to 75%.
– If the collision does not happen (probability 25%), you get the initial earn-
ing minus the cost of care, 140 - 5 = §135.
– If the collision happens (probability 75%), you have to compensate the
other participant for the damage caused to his/her car, so you get 140 - 5 -
80 = §55.
• Look at the bottom row of the table, investing 60 points reduces the probability
of collision to 25%.
– If the collision does not happen (probability 75%), you get the initial earn-
ing minus the cost of care, 140 - 60 = §80.
– If the collision happens (probability 25%), you have to compensate the
other participant for the damage caused to his/her car, so you get 140 - 60
- 80 = §0.
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If an accident happens, you will always have to compensate the other partici-
pant, that is, you always bear the damage of §80.
Whether the accident happens or not, thanks to your compensation the other
participant will always receive §140.
Let consider the following example. Imagine that you decide to invest 5 points in
precautions:
• The probability of a collision is 75%;
• If the accident happens, your ﬁnal earning will be 140 [initial points] - 5 [cost of
precautions] - 80 [compensation for damages] = §55;
• If the accident does not happen, your ﬁnal earning will be 140 [initial points] - 5
[cost of precautions] = §135;
• Whether the accident happen or not, the other participant will always earn §140
[initial points] since he/she will always receive compensation in case of an acci-
dent.
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In the following, you will be asked to answer three questions to check your under-
standing of the instructions.
1. Assume that you have invested 12 points in precautions and that the collision
does not happen. What is the ﬁnal earning for you and for the other participant?
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• You: §140 ; Other Participant: §48
• You: §140 ; Other Participant: §128
• You: §48 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §128 ; Other Participant: §140
2. Assume that you have invested 12 points in precautions and that the collision
happens. What is the ﬁnal earning for you and for the other participant?
• You: §95 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §108 ; Other Participant: §60
• You: §48 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §48 ; Other Participant: §60
3. If the accident happens, you have always to compensate the other participant for
the economic damage you caused to his/her car.
• True
• False
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Please answer the question below. Your ﬁnal earning and the ﬁnal earning of the
other participant will be computed based on your choice.
How much would you like to spend in precaution to avoid causing an economic
damage to the other participant’s car and then paying compensation?
• §0
• §5
• §12
• §21
• §32
• §45
• §60
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5.7.2 Instructions for Victims
A short study on decision making
We are conducting a survey about care choices. The time needed to complete this
survey is approximately 30 minutes. Please read the instructions carefully.
Imagine that you have an initial portfolio of 140 points. Your choices in the
survey and chance will inﬂuence your ﬁnal portfolio and also the ﬁnal portfolio of
another participant. For your participation in this study, you will receive extra-points
for the ﬁnal grade of the course exam.
You are randomly matched with another participant, whose identity will remain
private information.
Both you and the other participant have been assigned the role of drivers.
Your task is to decide how much you want to invest in precautions to avoid a
collision with the other participant’s car causing an economic damage to your car.
The more precautions you take, the higher the cost for you, but the lower the prob-
ability of suffering a damage to your car.
The other participant cannot take any precaution to avoid the collision.
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Scenario 1
If the accident happens, you will always receive compensation for the damage
from the other participant. In other words, in case of a collision, your car is damaged
but the other participant who caused the accident will compensate you for the entire
amount of the damage.
You can decide how many points you want to spend in precautions.
• Please look at the ﬁrst row of the table corresponding to zero points in precau-
tions. In this case you get the initial earning (§140) and do not suffer any cost
of care. If you invest zero in precautions, the collision happens with a 85%
probability.
• Look at the second row, investing 5 points in precautions reduces the probability
of collision to 75%, and your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 5 = §135.
• Look at the bottom row of the table, investing 60 points reduces the probability
of collision to 25%, and your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 60 = §80.
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The economic damage to your car in case of collision amount to §80.
If an accident happens, the other participant will pay for the damage he/she
caused to your car and you will receive perfect compensation.
If the accident happens, the other participant’s ﬁnal payment will be 140 - 80 =
§60.
If the accident does not happen, the other participant’s ﬁnal payment will be §140.
Let consider the following example. Imagine that you decide to invest 5 points in
precautions:
• The probability of a collision is 75%;
• Whether the accident happen or not, your ﬁnal earning will be 140 [initial points]
- 5 [cost of precautions] = §135 since you always receive compensation from the
other participant;
• The other participant will earn §140 [initial earning points] if the accident does
not happen, or 140 - 80 [accident cost] = §60 if the accident happens since he
will always pay to compensate the damages to your car.
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In the following, you will be asked to answer three questions to check your under-
standing of the instructions.
1. Assume that you have invested 21 points in precautions. What is the correspon-
dent probability of collision?
• 75%
• 45%
• 55%
• 25%
2. Assume that you have invested 12 points in precautions and that the collision
happens. What is the ﬁnal earning for you and for the other participant?
• You: §95 ; Other participant: §60
• You: §108 ; Other participant: §60
• You: §128 ; Other participant: §60
• You: §128 ; Other participant: §140
3. If the accident happens, you have always receive compensation from the other
participant for the economic damage to your car.
• True
• False
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In the following you will be asked to answer the ﬁrst question based on which your
earning and the one of the other participant will be computed.
How much would you like to spend in precaution to avoid the collision and the
damage to your car?
• §0
• §5
• §12
• §21
• §32
• §45
• §60
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Scenario 2
Consider now that you never receive compensation for the economic damage to
your car.
The other participant cannot take any precaution to avoid the collision. You
can decide how many points you want to spend in precautions.
• Please look at the ﬁrst row of the table, you can decide to spend zero points in
precautions.
– If the collision does not happen (probability 15%), you get the initial earn-
ing (§140) and do not suffer any cost.
– If the collision happens (probability 85%), you suffer the accident loss of
80 without receiving any compensation. Your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 80
= §60.
• Look at the second row of the table, investing 5 points in precautions reduces the
probability of collision to 75%.
– If the collision does not happen (probability 25%), you get the initial earn-
ing minus the cost of care, 140 - 5 = §135.
– If the collision happens (probability 75%), you suffer the accident loss of
80 without receiving any compensation. Your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 80
= §60.
• Look at the bottom row of the table, investing 60 points reduces the probability
of collision to 25%.
– If the collision does not happen (probability 75%), you get the initial earn-
ing minus the cost of care, 140 - 60 = §80.
– If the collision happens (probability 25%), you suffer the accident loss of
80 without receiving any compensation. Your ﬁnal earning will be 140 - 60
- 80 = §0.
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If an accident happens, you will never receive compensation for the damage that
the other participant caused to your car, that is you always pay §80 to recover your
damage.
Whether the accident happens or not, the other participant will always get §140.
Let consider the following example. Imagine that you decide to invest 5 points in
precautions:
• The probability of a collision is 75%;
• If the accident happens, your ﬁnal earning will be 140 [initial points] - 5 [cost of
precautions] - 80 [cost of damages] = §55;
• If the accident does not happen, your ﬁnal earning will be 140 [initial points] - 5
[cost of precautions] = §135;
• Whether the accident happen or not, the other participant will always earn §140
[initial points] since he/she will never pay compensation for the damages he/she
caused.
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In the following, you will be asked to answer three questions to check your under-
standing of the instructions.
1. Assume that you have invested 21 points in precautions and that the collision
does not happen. What is the ﬁnal earning for you and for the other participant?
• You: §95 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §119 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §39 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §140 ; Other Participant: §39
2. Assume that you have invested 12 points in precautions and that the collision
happens. What is the ﬁnal earning for you and for the other participant?
• You: §95 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §108 ; Other Participant: §60
• You: §48 ; Other Participant: §140
• You: §48 ; Other Participant: §60
3. If the accident happens, you have always receive compensation from the other
participant for the economic damage to your car.
192
• True
• False
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In the following you will be asked to answer the second question based on which
your earning and the one of the other participant will be computed.
How much would you like to spend in precaution to avoid economic damages to
your car?
• §0
• §5
• §12
• §21
• §32
• §45
• §60
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6. Conclusion
The literature on the economic analysis of tort law is extensive and the precaution-
ary streams generated by liability systems have been studied from different angles and
perspectives. The economic analysis of law involves applying existing economic the-
ories to legal contexts to identify the effects of legal rules on individual behaviors and
whether these effects are socially desirable (Polinsky and Shavell, 2008; Calabresi,
2014). My analysis has focused on several characteristics of the incentive schemes
created by the legal system through tort law. My task in this research has been to
explore some overlooked issues about the incentive streams generated by alternative
liability systems in different legal contexts. My general aim is twofold: to contribute
to the development of more sophisticated models of tort law and to show that there
remain many interesting unanswered questions despite the exhaustive literature on tort
law and economics. My approach has been mainly theoretical, with an experimental
application. As with any other research of this type, the translation of my theoretical
and experimental results into practical guidelines for policy-makers has to take into ac-
count the intrinsic boundaries and the assumptions of the adopted frameworks. In the
light of the methodology that I have used to answer my research questions, my results
can be exploited to provide valuable policy implications.
This concluding chapter is divided into three parts: Section 6.1 summarizes the
main results for each chapter, highlights the implications for policy-makers and pro-
vides several insights for future research. Section 6.2 discusses how the results achieved
in the separate chapters may combine with each-other.
6.1 Main Results and Insights for Future Research
6.1.1 Endogenous Allocation of Residual Liability
Chapter 2 discusses how residual liability should be optimally allocated to foster
superior (second-best) activity levels. The traditional analysis of accident law consid-
ers the allocation of the residual liability as an exogenous variable: the reason why the
residual loss should fall on either the victim or the tortfeasor has been taken as given
and has never been questioned. Chapter 2 identiﬁes the conditions under which loss-
sharing rules should be employed rather than conventional all-or-nothing based rules.
The results show that loss-sharing rules among faultless parties are more desirable than
all-or-nothing based rules in the presence of countervailing considerations on parties’
activities (e.g., the activity of one individual is socially more valuable yet riskier than
the other party’s activity), homogeneous conditions of risk (e.g., similar riskiness of
parties’ activities, similar degree of parties’ risk aversion) and superadditive risk (i.e.,
when moderate activity levels are less harmful than a high activity level of only one of
the two parties). In the following, I will brieﬂy discuss each of these conditions.
196
The reason why loss-sharing rules are desirable under homogeneous conditions of
risk is intuitive. For example, let us consider the riskiness of activities. Intuitively, if
the activity of the injurer is more likely to increase the probability of an accident with
respect to the victim’s activity, it is preferable to shift a larger portion of the residual
loss onto the tortfeasor. When the injurer’s activity is substantially riskier, the adoption
of a strict-liability rule may be thus warranted. By contrast, when the victim’s activity
is riskier than that of the injurer, a negligence rule is more desirable. When the injurer’
and the victim’s activities have a similar degree of riskiness, the residual loss should
be optimally shared among the two parties. A similar analysis applies to the value of
activities, whereby residual liability should fall on the party that can reduce its activity
level at a lower social cost. A reduction in the level of activity yields a reduction in the
probability of an accident, as well as a decrease in the total value of the activity. For
this reason, residual liability should be shifted upon the individual who undertakes the
less valuable activity, because a reduction in the activity level will be less costly from
a social perspective. It follows straightforwardly that when the parties’ activities have
comparable values, loss-sharing rules are preferable to all-or-nothing allocations.
To illustrate why loss-sharing rules are desirable in the presence of countervailing
considerations on parties’ activities, consider a collision between a car and a truck.
Consider the case in which the truck driver’s activity is socially more valuable yet
creates a greater risk than the car. In this case, when considering the value of the
activities, efﬁciency would require the application of a negligence rule. By contrast,
when considering the riskiness of the activities, efﬁciency would instead require the
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application of a strict liability rule. In such cases in which efﬁciency criteria point in
opposite directions, loss-sharing rules optimally balance the two countervailing policy
objectives.
To illustrate why loss-sharing rules are desirable in the presence of superadditive
risk, consider — for example — the emission of chemicals and noise in the environ-
ment. The presence of moderate quantities of the two pollutants may be less harmful
than the presence of high levels of only one pollutant. In this situation, it is optimal
to spread activity-level incentives between the parties through loss-sharing rules. By
contrast, in the presence of subadditive risk, the total harm is greater when both parties
carry out moderate activity levels conjunctly rather than when only one party exerts
excessive activity levels. For example consider the presence of children and cyclists
on a trail. The frequency of accidents grows larger as the two activities mix together,
whereby having all children or all cyclists is preferable than having the two activities
mixed together. In this situation, it would be optimal to separate complementary activ-
ities through regulation (e.g., planning pedestrian areas) or tort law by allocating the
residual liability entirely on one party or the other through all-or-nothing based rules.
The ﬁndings presented in Chapter 2 further explain long-standing principles of the
tort system, in addition to providing ways of improving them. For example, the results
show that the party who carries out the riskier activity should bear the residual liability
for non-negligent conduct. This can explain the widespread adoption of strict-liability
rules in case of ultrahazardous activities, as well as the use of no-liability when the
victim came to the nuisance or exposed herself to risk. Similarly, our analysis explains
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the presence of immunities or heightened standards of liability (gross negligence or
intent required for liability) when socially valuable activities are involved.
As a ﬁnal note, it should be noted that policy-makers’ ability to effectively separate
individuals based upon the characteristics of their activities might be compromised
given the difﬁculty in measuring some of the factors involved (e.g., comparing the
values of parties’ activities). In cases where useful information is not known to the
judicial system, loss-sharing rules provide a practical alternative to rules in which only
one party bears the entire accident costs.
Chapter 2 analyzes who should optimally bear the residual loss to generate opti-
mal activity-level incentives. The identiﬁcation of the “best residual-liability-bearer”
could be reﬁned by evaluating the relevance of other factors. For example, future stud-
ies can analyze how to allocate the residual loss when one of the two parties can take
precautions most cheaply (the cheapest precaution taker) or most effectively (the most
effective precaution taker). Further investigations could also study all the policy in-
struments that can be used to inﬂuence activity levels. There might be situations in
which it is optimal to use the allocation of residual liability to mitigate activity levels,
as well as others in which it is more desirable to set different due-care standards, and
further situations in which due-care standards and residual liability both play a crucial
role for activity-level incentives.
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6.1.2 Tailoring Negligence Standards to Automation
Chapter 3 extends the standard unilateral-care tort model to analyze the social cost
of accidents in cases where the actor is not a human being, but rather an automated
technology. The general question is whether conventional negligence-based liability
systems should change to encourage the production and adoption of new automated
technologies. The analysis leads to two fundamental results, the ﬁrst of which is related
to care-level incentives. More speciﬁcally, Chapter 3 has proved that the standard
of due-care should be optimally tailored to the automation level of the activity, i.e.,
it should decrease with increasing automation. It follows that as the activity tends
towards full automation, a negligence regime gradually degenerates into a no-liability
rule. In other words, the traditional concept of the reasonable person standard used to
evaluate a negligent behavior should slightly change to consider the level of activity
automation. This result is intuitive and coherent with the recent contribution by Dari-
Mattiacci and Franzoni (2014), who argued that “if the new technology reduces harm
substantially, adoption should be encouraged: court should relax the standard of the
new technology and raise that of the old one.” For example, the case of autonomous
vehicles brings this claim to an extreme, whereby this technology has the potential to
substantially increase social welfare by reducing the probability of accidents, and —
to encourage their adoption — the due-care standard for users of driverless vehicles
should be substantially reduced, while the due-care standards for users of similar non-
automated products should be raised. This latter observation could be included in
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Chapter 3, whereby an interesting extension of my theoretical framework could be
to explore how the negligence standards should change when parties involved in an
accident adopted different types of technologies.
This result has also another implication concerning the potential beneﬁts of auto-
mated technologies. If the users of automated technologies could be held liable for
accidents that such technologies “caused,” they could have incentives either to always
monitor the actions of the automated devices — thus nullifying the intrinsic function of
automated products — or to not adopt safer automated devices to have a major control
of the activity. Instead, tailored standards are aligned with the purposes of automated
technologies, allowing the user to be distracted while automated devices perform an
activity autonomously, without the threat of liability issues. Consequently, tailored
due-care standards also create an incentive to adopt safer, automated technologies, es-
pecially for risky actions, as well as proving their actual usage in courts to avoid full
liability costs.
The second result is related to activity-level incentives. Automatic technologies
can trace the user’s activity and thus preserve information that can be eventually used
by courts and juries to monitor the user’s activity level. The question arising is whether
automated-activity levels that become observable should be included in the standard of
negligence. The answer lies in the trade-off between creating incentives for socially
optimal automated-activity levels and creating incentives to adopt automated technolo-
gies. More speciﬁcally, including activity levels in the negligence standard could create
optimal incentives on activity levels, although it would reduce the incentives to adopt
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automated technologies in the ﬁrst place. For this reason, the standard of negligence
should also consider activity levels when the automated technology is already widely
adopted or mandated by regulation.
Technological advances in the automation sector have the potential to change the
liability system and the legal deﬁnition of negligence. Chapter 3 represents a ﬁrst at-
tempt to include automation into the traditional economic analysis of accident law.
Several extensions of our model are warranted to test whether our results hold in dif-
ferent contexts, including asymmetric information between the consumer and the man-
ufacturer, a bilateral accident model in which both injurers and victims can adopt dif-
ferent types of safety technologies, and automated technologies that are complements
to the user’s care level.
As a ﬁnal note, it is worth stressing that the insurance system together with the li-
ability system play a crucial role in creating a market for new automated technologies
(see, more generally, Faure, 2006, on the conditions under which insurance should
be made compulsory). Tort, product and insurance liability should be studied as an
overall integrated system to better understand whether and how the traditional legal
framework should change in line with the advent of new automated technologies. Sev-
eral, mostly legal, contributions have studied the possible changes in the insurance
system. For example, with respect to driverless cars, Colonna (2012) proposed a new
insurance framework that could work in conjunction with the current tort law. Speciﬁ-
cally, Colonna argued for the desirability a two-tiered insurance structure similar to the
nuclear energy industry’s Price-Anderson Act. This system requires each autonomous
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car and technology manufacturer to obtain a ﬁrst tier private insurance policy and an-
nually contribute to a second tier or pool of funds. Each manufacturers’ contribution to
the second pool of funds depends on the type of product they produce, their predicted
revenue and the amount of risk that they expect to incur. Colonna argued that this sys-
tem can alleviate the manufacturers’ worries of uncertain liability, while imposing no
costs on consumers nor governments.
Chapter 3 provides several insights for further investigations on automated tech-
nologies. For example, future research could question how to allocate liability costs
when both parties involved in an accident exerted an automated activity (e.g., a col-
lision between two driverless cars) or how a potential no-fault liability for automated
technologies can be mitigated with an optimal allocation of the burden of proof. In-
deed, the more these machines become interactive and autonomous, the more third par-
ties will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to prove that the manufacturer or product-user did not conform
to a certain standard of conduct. In these cases, questioning the traditional allocation of
the burden of proof upon the plaintiffs appears to have a crucial importance. It would
be also interesting to consider the administrative costs of tailoring due-care standards
to automated technologies, as suggested in Chapter 3. It might be the case that even
if the liability system does not change, the expected decrease in the number of crashes
and the consequent reduction in insurance costs would nonetheless encourage people
and insurance companies to adopt this technology. This solution would avoid the ad-
ditional administrative costs of tailored due-care standards. The theoretical framework
introduced in Chapter 3 could be used to evaluate these open questions.
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6.1.3 Optimal Deﬁnition of Legal Presumptions
Chapter 4 uses a simple model to study the effects of legal presumptions in a tort
setting. There are two key insights of this chapter: ﬁrst, there is nothing fundamentally
necessary about placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs; and second, legal presump-
tions channel individual behaviors by generating three incentive streams, i.e., incen-
tives to invest in evidence-production technology, in care and activity levels. Chapter 4
proceeds stepwise by considering these three factors which could optimally guide the
deﬁnition of legal presumptions.
New evidence technologies such as genetic testing, computer recording of data,
black-box technology, body cameras and trafﬁc surveillance cameras, are substantially
increasing the amount of information that can be acquired, preserved, and used in
court to support a claim. Chapter 4 points out that the incentives to adopt private
fact-keeping technologies are endogenously determined by evidence law: if optimally
deﬁned, legal presumptions could create incentives for the voluntary adoption of such
technologies. The result is very intuitive: a party who knows that he may be faced
with the burden of proving his diligent behavior would develop an interest in adopting
evidence technologies. By contrast, if the information gathered by such technologies
could be used against its own user, the adoption incentives would obviously diminish.
The ﬁrst result follows in a straightforward manner from these simple observations: the
party who is faced with the burden of proof has incentives to voluntary adopt evidence
technologies. For this reason, the burden of proof should be shifted upon the party who
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can more effectively adopt such technologies.
In terms of the effects of legal presumptions on care levels, Chapter 4 shows that
tort incentives react differently to changes in legal presumptions in the presence of
discovery errors. The current literature has assumed away discovery errors, argu-
ing that legal presumptions have no effect on care incentives (Hay and Spier, 1997).
However, in real-life cases, parties would frequently have probatory difﬁculties. For
example, consider the conventional allocation of the burden of proof under a simple
negligence regime, whereby the victim has to prove the tortfeasor’s negligence to re-
ceive harm compensation. In most cases, the probability that the victim will succeed in
proving the tortfeasor’s negligence is less than 1 (as it is instead assumed in the current
literature on the deﬁnition of legal presumption – e.g., Hay and Spier, 1997). In other
words, there is a positive probability that a tortfeasor could avoid liability notwith-
standing his negligence. In the presence of such discovery errors, the tortfeasor will
undertake optimal care if and only if the probability that the victim will fail to prove
the defendant’s negligence is sufﬁciently low, otherwise the tortfeasor’s care incentives
will be diluted. As probatory difﬁculties for the plaintiff increase, a simple negligence
rule gradually degenerates into a no liability rule, completely undermining the defen-
dant’s care incentives. Chapter 4 shows that a shift of the legal presumption could
mitigate this problem. Indeed, consider the same situation, albeit with a presumption
of negligence on the tortfeasor: if the tortfeasor fails to produce evidence of his own
diligence, he bears full liability. Unlike what is observed under a presumption of non-
negligence on the tortfeasors, the negligence rule under a presumption of negligence
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on the tortfeasor degenerates into a strict liability rule as probatory difﬁculties for the
defendant increase; thus, the tortfeasor’s care incentives are preserved. A similar anal-
ysis has been applied to a regime of strict liability with contributory negligence. In
conclusion, Chapter 4 shows that the optimal deﬁnition of legal presumption depends
upon the relative probatory difﬁculties of the parties involved in a claim in order to
preserve parties’ precautionary choices.
Regarding the effects of legal presumptions on activity levels, Chapter 4 relies on
simple observations to argue that the burden of proof — which works as a tax on
activity levels — can lead either the residual bearer of the loss to exert levels below the
social optimum, or the non-bearer of the residual loss to reduce his excessive levels. It
is obvious that the second alternative is preferable to the former, whereby both parties’
activity levels would approach the social optimum.
Chapter 4 aggregates the three forementioned interrelated effects of legal presump-
tion into the best-discovery-bearer principle, which stands as an alternative to the
traditional cheapest-evidence-producer criterion following which legal presumptions
should be deﬁned solely to minimize truth-ﬁnding costs. The best-discovery-bearer
principle requires a shift of the burden of proof to the parties: (a) who can most effec-
tively invest in evidence technology; (b) whose precautions are more inelastic relative
to discovery errors (to preserve care incentives and guarantee the robustness of liabil-
ity rules in the presence of adjudication errors); and (c) who are not already burdened
by the residual liability (to mitigate excessive activity levels of both parties without
pushing the activity level of the residual bearer below the socially optimal level).
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Chapter 4 offers many insights for future research on the optimal allocation of the
burden of proof. For example, how should the burden of proof be assigned if the fac-
tors included in the “best-discovery-bearer” point in different directions? For example,
a party can have a low probability of making discovery errors but also be the residual
bearer of the loss. How should the burden of proof be assigned if a party is the best
discovery-bearer but not the cheapest evidence-producer? Intuitively, the answer to
both these questions should depend on which factor prevails in pursuing two or more
countervailing policy objectives. For example, consider a simple negligence regime in
which a victim has to prove the tortfeasor’s negligence. Let us assume that the victim
has a lower probability of making discovery errors than the tortfeasor. The efﬁciency
criterion identiﬁed in Chapter 4 regarding care-level incentives would require the allo-
cation of the burden of proof upon the victim. However, the third efﬁciency criterion
related to the activity-level incentives would require a shift of the burden of proof upon
the tortfeasor, given that he does not bear the residual liability. In this hypothetical situ-
ation, the efﬁciency criteria clearly point in opposite directions. If one of the two policy
objectives prevails from a social perspective (i.e., from the perspective of minimizing
expected accident costs), efﬁciency would require allocating the burden of proof in ac-
cordance with such a dominant objective. There might be situations in which neither
of the two objectives prevail. In such cases, any choice between the two alternative
deﬁnitions of legal presumptions would be optimal. In general and by intuition, when
a trade-off arises between two or more policy objectives (e.g., incentivizing the adop-
tion of evidence technology vs. preserving care incentives when discovery errors are
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present), the best-discovery-bearer principle would require deﬁning legal presumptions
according to the policy objective that prevails from a social perspective, or to indiffer-
ently follow one among the countervailing policy objectives if none of them prevails.
These observations follow by intuition, and a more sophisticate analysis along this path
is warranted.
Moreover, the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4 can be fruitfully ex-
ploited in two ways: it can be generalized by also including victim’s care levels; and
it can be uniﬁed to study all the effects of legal presumptions on tort incentives con-
junctively. A possible extension can consider a litigation model in which parties move
sequentially.
6.1.4 Liability Incentives are Role-Dependent
The theoretical analysis of tort law predicts that liability incentives are role-independent:
individuals undertake the same precautionary choices under mirrored liability rules
(i.e., the rules of strict liability and no liability), regardless of them being victims or
tortfeasors of an accident. Chapter 5 focuses on such a theoretical prediction by asking
whether liability incentives are effectively role-independent. Conversely, do people
undertake different precautionary behaviors depending upon them being victims or
injurers of an accident? The rationale of this question comes from the growing lit-
erature in neuroscience, behavioral and experimental economics on other-regarding
preferences. Several studies show that individuals care about the well-being of others,
showing a willingness to sacriﬁce their own endowment to prevent harming others and
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to cooperate in social dilemmas (Eckel and Grossman, 1996,; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Henrich et al., 2010; Engel, 2011; Rand et al., 2012).
Chapter 5 adds to this literature by evaluating prosocial behaviors in the context of ac-
cident prevention, by relying upon the theoretical predictions of the economic analysis
of accident law.
The experimental results show that subjects are less likely to suffer a loss rather
than to cause it. In other words, under mirrored liability rules (i.e., the rules of no
liability and strict liability), victims have devoted more resources to preventing an
accident than potential injurers, even under a full compensation of damages. This
result stands in contrast with the theoretical predictions of the traditional tort model
by showing that care incentives are role-dependent, while it also provides a new risky
context in which to evaluate prosocial preferences.
The most surprising result is that in the “strict liability case,” victims invest about
as much as injurers. This is interesting because victims are perfectly insured. More
speciﬁcally, in the “Victim StrictLiability” condition, injurers have to pay whenever
damage occurs, although only victims can do anything about this. I would interpret
this result as another instance of social preferences, whereby the victims see it as unfair
to make the injurers lose money with such a high probability.
Future research could analyze whether the result in Chapter 5 holds true under dif-
ferent conditions. The ﬁrst two obvious extensions are to consider a lower probability
range of accident and a bilateral-care model in which both parties can take actions to
avoid a collision. Other extensions might also include the uncertainty of being victims
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or injurers in an accident, as well as the possibility that injurers also suffer a share of
the loss together with the victims.
6.2 Concluding Remarks on the Main Results
Despite dealing with speciﬁc research questions, the separate chapters of my disser-
tation combine with each others in one or more aspects. This section brieﬂy discusses
the existence of possible balances between the different policy objectives separately
identiﬁed in the previous chapters. The central interest throughout my dissertation lies
with individual incentives to undertake different measures of precautions, namely care
levels and precautionary technologies (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5) as well as activity levels
(Chapters 2 and 3).
In terms of care-level incentives, Chapters 2 shows that under any fault-based lia-
bility regime, parties have incentives to comply with due-care standards if these latter
are set at their second-best and regardless of the allocation of the loss among negli-
gent parties. This claim might be reﬁned by considering the results of the following
chapters. If potential injurers have adopted automated technologies, care incentives are
preserved under due-care standards tailored to automation (Chapter 3). Moreover, in
the presence of large probatory difﬁculties, care incentives are undermined under the
traditional deﬁnition of legal presumptions. If read together, the results from Chapters
3 and 4 suggest the desirability of the no liability rule with a shift of the burden of
proof upon the tortfeasor when this latter adopts fully automated technologies (e.g.,
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driverless cars). In fact, under due-care standards tailored to automation, the simple
negligence rule gradually degenerates into the no liability rule as activity becomes
fully automated (Chapter 3). At the same time, the more the tortfeasor’s activity be-
come autonomous, the more potential victims will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to prove that the
manufacturer or the product-user did not conform to a certain standard of conduct. As
proven in Chapter 4, in the presence of a victim’s high probatory difﬁculties, the bur-
den of proof should be shifted upon the tortfeasor to preserve their care incentives. In
addition to tailored due-care standards, also this change in the deﬁnition of legal pre-
sumption is likely to foster the adoption of safer automated technologies. Indeed, if he
has to prove his non-negligent behavior, a potential tortfeasor would have incentives
to reduce the probability of an accident by investing in safer devices. Chapter 5 deals
with care incentives as the other chapters in this book, with the aim to identify the
actual precautionary behavior of the parties and compare it with the predicted theoret-
ical behavior. Chapter 5 shows that victims are potentially more willing to undertake
precautions than tortfeasors. This result has the potential to affect the allocation of
the residual loss. Since victims are generally more careful than potential injurers, they
will exert risky activities at a lower intensity or frequency than tortfeasors. This might
suggest to shift a larger share of the residual loss upon potential tortfeasors, even when
parties are identical, i.e., when the efﬁciency criteria described in Chapter 2 suggests
an equal split of the residual loss.
Regarding activity-level incentives, Chapter 2 shows which party should bear the
accident loss in equilibrium based upon the relevant characteristics of parties’ activi-
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ties and risk preferences. Chapter 4 also deals with residual liability, stating that legal
presumptions should optimally favor the residual bearer of the loss, whereby the non-
bearer of the residual loss also has incentives to reduce his excessive activity level.
In the presence of loss-sharing rules among non-negligent parties, this result implies
the burden of proof should be shifted upon the party who bears the lower share of the
residual loss. Chapter 3 further states the desirability of a negligence standard based
upon activity levels in the presence of widely adopted automated technologies. In gen-
eral, the analyses in these three chapters suggest that an endogenous allocation of the
residual liability, a selective use of the burden of proof and due levels of automated
activities are valuable instruments that policy-makers can use to inﬂuence parties’ ac-
tivity levels. Furthermore, the results in Chapter 3 show that the due level of automated
activity should optimally increase with the automation level. Since automated activi-
ties are less risky than non-automated activities, the results from Chapters 2 and 3 —
if read together — imply that the party that has adopted a fully automated technology
should face a low due-care standard and a due level of automated activity, as well as a
lower share of the residual loss (as the efﬁciency criterion on the riskiness of activity
would require; see Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2). The deﬁnition of a due-activity level
thus counterbalances the lower share of the residual liability. When considering that
the optimal allocation of the burden of proof is upon the non-residual bearer of the
loss, one could accordingly interpret Table 2 as deﬁning not only who should bear the
residual loss but also who should bear the burden of proof, i.e., the party that is not
indicated in the cell of the table.
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6.3 A Final Note
My analysis started from the premise that the economic analysis of accident law
could be rendered more accurate by making its theoretical framework more sophis-
ticated and in line with the recent behavioral ﬁndings. My impression is that much
more could be done, especially in two directions: reﬁning tort models to better predict
human behavior and testing whether these theoretical predictions are more accurate
in experimental and empirical studies. All of the chapters of my dissertation provide
interesting ideas for future research and can be proﬁtably exploited to investigate other
issues in the economics of tort law and related ﬁelds.
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7. English Summary
The analysis of tort law is one of the most inﬂuential and extensively developed
applications of the economic approach in the study of law. Notwithstanding the ex-
haustive number of contributions on tort law and economics, several open questions
remain that warrant further investigation. The general aim of this research project is to
reﬁne the traditional model of tort law in order to make it more realistic, updated with
the recent technological progress and in line with the experimental results concerning
prosocial behavior. This book is divided into six chapters: Chapters 1 and 6 provide an
introduction and conclusions, respectively, while the remaining chapters are written in
the form of separate yet related articles.
The ﬁrst research topic deals with the optimal allocation of the residual liability
to foster superior (second-best) activity-level incentives. The term “residual liability”
denotes liability in cases where both injurer and victim have adopted the due standards
of care (i.e., when both parties are non-negligent). The allocation of residual liability
is a policy instrument for inﬂuencing activity-level incentives. Traditional tort regimes
have adopted “all-or-nothing” approaches, whereby the residual liability is entirely
allocated either to the tortfeasor or to the victim, with no possibility of loss sharing
between non-negligent parties. The choice between conventional all-or-nothing rules
and loss-sharing rules as alternative allocation of the residual liability accrues a crucial
role in incentivizing optimal activity levels, but has never been questioned. Chapter 2
addresses this issue and proves that the allocation of the residual loss should optimally
depend upon the relevant characteristics of parties’ activities — e.g., riskiness, value,
and interaction in the production of accident loss — and upon parties’ relative risk
attitudes. The results show that loss-sharing rules among faultless parties are more
desirable than traditional all-or-nothing based rules in a large variety of situations, for
example when parties’ activities have the same value and degree of riskiness and when
moderate activity levels are less harmful than a high activity level of only one of the
two parties.
The allocation of residual liability is relevant not only for activity-level incentives,
but also for investments in new precautionary technologies. Chapter 3 deals with a spe-
ciﬁc type of safer technologies, namely automated technologies, for example driverless
cars and automated drones. The conventional economic conception of tort law has in-
deed assumed the existence of two human actors - a tortfeasor and a victim - although
this assumption becomes tenuous with the recent advancements in the automation sec-
tor. The question arising in the presence of automated activities is whether and how the
current negligence-based liability system should evolve to encourage such technolo-
gies. Chapter 3 shows that the traditional concept of the reasonable person standard,
used to evaluate whether an actor was negligent, should slightly change to consider
the level of activity automation and that the standard of due care should also include
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activity levels when the automated technology is already widely adopted or mandated
by regulation.
Automated technologies have the potential to affect not only liability law and reg-
ulation, but also the law of evidence. Indeed, the more such machines become inter-
active and autonomous, the more third parties will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to prove that the
manufacturer or the product user did not conform to a certain standard of conduct.
In these cases, questioning the traditional allocation of the burden of proof upon the
plaintiffs appears to hold crucial importance. Chapter 4 proceeds along this path by
questioning the traditional allocation of the burden of proof in a tort setting. There are
two main results: ﬁrst, there is nothing fundamentally necessary about placing the bur-
den of proof on plaintiffs, unlike the traditional evidence law would rather predict; and
second, the allocation of legal presumptions channels individual behaviors by gener-
ating three incentive streams: incentives to invest in evidence-production technology,
to undertake care measures in the presence of adjudication errors and to mitigate ex-
cessive activity levels. The results show that the burden of proof should be allocated
to strengthen the robustness of incentives in the presence of evidentiary problems, and
this requires a shift of the burden of proof to the parties (a) who can most effectively
invest in evidence technology; (b) whose precautions are more critical for accident
costs; and (c) who are not already burdened by the residual liability.
Chapter 5 deals with care incentives and aims at identifying the actual precaution-
ary behavior of the parties, rather than the theoretical behavior, which was the focus
of the other chapters. Chapter 5 aims at evaluating prosocial behaviors and other-
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regarding preferences in the context of accident prevention. The results show that indi-
viduals spend more resources to avoid suffering a loss themselves than to avoid causing
a loss to another subject. This is a novel result which adds behavioral insights to the
traditional economic analysis of accident law and to the extant contributions on proso-
cial behavior. Indeed, this observation stands in contrast with one of the acknowledged
results on other-regarding preferences, being that individuals dislike being responsi-
ble of bad outcomes, especially when they affect others’ well-being. The added cost
of moral responsibility does not lead people to value others’ losses more than their
own in an accident situation. This study provides a novel context for further testing
moral preferences and antisocial behaviors, with several implications for many legal
and political decisions about social interactions in risky situations.
All chapters of this book provide interesting ideas for future research and can be
proﬁtably exploited to investigate other issues in the economics of tort law and related
ﬁelds, especially in two directions: reﬁning tort models to better predict human behav-
ior and testing whether these theoretical predictions are more accurate in experimental
and empirical studies.
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Samenvatting
De analyse van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht is een van de meest invloedrijke en meest
ontwikkelde toepassingen van de economische benadering van het recht. Ondanks het
enorme aantal publicaties over de economische analyse van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht,
zijn er nog veel onbeantwoorde vragen die verder onderzoek rechtvaardigen. Het algemene
doel van dit onderzoeksproject is het traditionele model van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht te
verfijnen om het realistischer te maken, te actualiseren voor wat betreft recente
technologische ontwikkelingen, en in overeenstemming te brengen met experimentele
resultaten op het gebied van prosociaal gedrag. Dit boek is onderverdeeld in zes
hoofdstukken: Hoofdstuk 1 en 6 bevatten respectievelijk een inleiding en conclusie en de
overige hoofdstukken zijn geschreven in de vorm van afzonderlijke maar wel gerelateerde
artikelen.
Het eerste onderzoeksonderwerp gaat over de optimale toewijzing van ‘residual liability’ om
betere (‘second-best’) activiteitenprikkels te verstrekken. Met de term ‘residual liability’
wordt bedoeld de aansprakelijkheid in gevallen waarin zowel de laedens als de gelaedeerde
zich zorgvuldig hebben gedragen (d.w.z. wanneer beide partijen niet-nalatig zijn). De
toewijzing van residual liability is een beleidsinstrument waarmee prikkels voor het
activiteitenniveau beïnvloed kunnen worden. In de traditionele aansprakelijkheidsregimes
worden “alles-of-niets”-benaderingen gehanteerd, waarbij de residual liability volledig
wordt toegewezen aan hetzij de laedens, hetzij de gelaedeerde, zonder mogelijkheid de
schade over de niet-nalatige partijen te verdelen. De keuze tussen conventionele alles-of-
niets-regels en schadeverdelingsregels als alternatieve mogelijkheid voor de toewijzing van
de residual liability kan een cruciale rol spelen bij het stimuleren van optimale
activiteitenniveaus, maar is nooit onderzocht. Deze kwestie komt aan de orde in hoofdstuk
2, waarin wordt aangetoond dat de toewijzing van residual liability in de optimale situatie
afhankelijk is van de relevante kenmerken van de activiteiten van de partijen, zoals mate van
risico, waarde en interactie in het veroorzaken van ongevalsschade, en van de relatieve
risicohoudingen van de partijen. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat regels voor het verdelen van de
schade over foutloze partijen in een grote verscheidenheid aan situaties wenselijker zijn dan
de traditionele alles-of-niets-regels, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de activiteiten van de partijen
dezelfde waarde en mate van risico hebben en wanneer gematigde activiteitenniveaus minder
schadelijk zijn dan een hoog activiteitenniveau bij slechts een van beide partijen.
De toewijzing van residual liability is niet alleen relevant voor de stimulering van het
activiteitenniveau, maar ook voor investeringen in nieuwe voorzorgstechnologieën.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over een specifieke soort veiligere technologieën, namelijk
geautomatiseerde technologieën, bijvoorbeeld auto’s zonder bestuurder en geautomatiseerde
drones. Bij de conventionele economische conceptie van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht wordt
het bestaan van twee menselijke actoren verondersteld, de laedens en de gelaedeerde. Met
de recente ontwikkelingen in de automatisering verliest deze aanname echter aan betekenis.
De vraag die zich opwerpt bij geautomatiseerde activiteiten, is of en hoe het huidige systeem
van schuldaansprakelijkheid zich zou moeten ontwikkelen om deze technologieën te
stimuleren. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond dat het traditionele idee van de redelijke
persoon, dat wordt gebruikt om te beoordelen of een actor al dan niet onzorgvuldig was,
enigszins zou moeten veranderen om rekening te houden met de mate van automatisering
van de activiteiten en dat de zorgvuldigheidsnorm ook activiteitenniveaus moet omvatten
wanneer de geautomatiseerde technologie al op grote schaal wordt toegepast of door
regelgeving wordt voorgeschreven.
Geautomatiseerde technologieën kunnen niet alleen het aansprakelijkheidsrecht en
regulering beïnvloeden, maar ook het bewijsrecht. Sterker nog, hoe meer dergelijke
machines interactief en autonoom worden, hoe moeilijker het voor derden is om te bewijzen
dat de fabrikant of de gebruiker van het product niet hebben voldaan aan een bepaalde
gedragsnorm. In deze gevallen is het cruciaal om vraagtekens te plaatsen bij de traditionele
bewijslastverdeling. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt dit pad verder bewandeld door de traditionele
bewijslastverdeling bij een onrechtmatige daad te onderzoeken. De twee belangrijkste
bevindingen hiervan zijn: ten eerste is het in geen enkel opzicht fundamenteel noodzakelijk
om de bewijslast bij de eisers te leggen, in tegenstelling tot wat het traditionele bewijsrecht
meestal voorschrijft; en ten tweede resulteert het hanteren van bewijsvermoedens in sturing
van individuele gedragingen, doordat zij drie soorten prikkels creëert: prikkels om te
investeren in technologie die bewijs kan leveren, om zorg te nemen in situaties waarin de
rechter beoordelingsfouten en om excessieve activiteitenniveaus te verlagen. Uit de
resultaten blijkt dat de bewijslast zodanig moet worden toegewezen dat het gedragsprikkels
versterkt in situaties van bewijsproblemen en hiervoor is een verschuiving van de bewijslast
nodig naar de partijen (a) die het meest effectief kunnen investeren in bewijstechnologie; (b)
van wie de voorzorgsmaatregelen meer invloed hebben op de ongevalskosten; en (c) die niet
al belast zijn met de residual liability.
Hoofdstuk 5 betreft zorgprikkels en beoogt het feitelijke zorggedrag van de partijen in kaart
te brengen, in plaats van het theoretische gedrag, waarop de overige hoofdstukken zich
richtten. Hoofdstuk 5 beoogt prosociaal gedrag te evalueren, alsmede ‘other-regarding
preferences’ (dus zorg om anderen) in de context van ongevallenpreventie. Uit de resultaten
blijkt dat individuen meer middelen uitgeven om te voorkomen dat zij zelf schade lijden dan
om te voorkomen dat zij een ander schade berokkenen. Dit is een nieuw resultaat dat
aanvullende gedragswetenschappelijke inzichten biedt voor de traditionele economische
analyse van het ongevallenrecht en voor de bestaande literatuur over prosociaal gedrag. Deze
observatie contrasteert zelfs met een van de erkende resultaten op het gebied van other-
regarding preferences, namelijk dat individuen niet graag verantwoordelijk zijn voor slechte
resultaten, vooral niet als die van invloed zijn op het welzijn van anderen. De extra kosten
van morele verantwoordelijkheid hebben niet tot gevolg dat mensen in een ongevalssituatie
schade van anderen hoger waarderen dan die van henzelf. Dit onderzoek biedt een nieuw
kader voor het verder onderzoeken van morele voorkeuren en antisociale gedragingen, met
verschillende implicaties voor vele juridische en politieke beslissingen over sociale
interacties in risicovolle situaties.
Alle hoofdstukken van dit boek dragen interessante ideeën aan voor verder onderzoek en
kunnen worden benut om andere kwesties in de economische analyse van het
onrechtmatigedaadsrecht en gerelateerde vakgebieden te onderzoeken in met name twee
richtingen: modellen op het gebied van onrechtmatige daad verfijnen om menselijk gedrag
beter te voorspellen en in experimentele en empirische onderzoeken testen of deze
theoretische voorspellingen accurater zijn.
